Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Virtue Ethics: an Introduction' and 'The Nature of Things'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
9406 A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton]
     Full Idea: To say that a class is natural is to say that when some of its members are shown to people they pick out others without hesitation and in agreement.
     From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat')
     A reaction: He concedes a number of problems with his view, but I admire his attempt to at least begin to distinguish the natural (real!) classes from the ersatz ones. A mention of causal powers would greatly improve his story.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
15730 Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton]
     Full Idea: Pure, extreme nominalism sees all classification as the product of arbitrary convention.
     From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat')
     A reaction: I'm not sure what the word 'arbitrary' is doing there. Nominalists are not daft, and if they can classify any way they like, they are not likely to choose an 'arbitrary' system. Pragmatism tells the right story here.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15728 The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton]
     Full Idea: The naturalness of a class depends as essentially on the nature of the observers who classify as it does on the nature of the objects that they classify. ...It depends on our perceptual apparatus, and on our relatively mutable needs and interests.
     From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat')
     A reaction: This seems to translate 'natural' as 'natural for us', which is not much use to scientists, who spend quite a lot of effort combating folk wisdom. Do desirable sports cars constitute a natural class?
9407 Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton]
     Full Idea: To say there are properties is to say there are natural classes, classes introduction to some of whose members enables people to pick out others without hesitation and in agreement.
     From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat')
     A reaction: Aristotle would like this approach, but it doesn't find many friends among modern logician/philosophers. We should go on to ask why people agree on these things. Causal powers will then come into it.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
15729 Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton]
     Full Idea: Properties that have no concrete instances must be defined in terms of those that have.
     From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat')
     A reaction: I wonder what the dodo used to smell like?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
8520 An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K]
     Full Idea: Quinton proposes that an individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position.
     From: report of Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], Pt I) by Keith Campbell - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars §5
     A reaction: This seems the obvious defence of a bundle account of objects against the charge that indiscernibles would have to be identical. It introduces, however, 'positions' into the ontology, but maybe that price must be paid. Materialism needs space.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
5078 Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Kant and Mill were in total agreement in trying to give content to the distinction between moral right and wrong, without recourse to any divine lawgiver.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.14)
     A reaction: A nice analysis, in tune with MacIntyre and others, who see such attempts as failures. It is hard, however, to deny the claims of rational principles, or of suffering, in our moral framework. I agree with Taylor's move back to virtue, but it ain't simple.
5067 Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: If morality is based on wrong (meaning 'forbidden'), right ('permitted'), and obligatory ('required'), we are led to ask 'Who is it that thus permits, forbids or requires that certain things be done or not done?'
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Clear reinforcement for Nietzsche's attack on conventional morals, which Taylor sees as a relic of medieval religious attitudes. Taylor says Kant offered a non-religious version of the same authority. I agree. Back to the Greek pursuit of excellence!
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
5079 Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Pleasures can be located in a particular part of the body, and can be momentary, and come and go, but this is not the case with happiness.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.16)
     A reaction: Probably no one ever thought that pleasure and happiness were actually identical - merely that pleasure is the only cause and source of happiness. These are good objections to that hypothesis. Pleasure simply isn't 'the good'.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5068 'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: The word 'eudaimonia' means literally 'having a good demon', which is apt, because it suggests some kind of supreme good fortune, of the sort which might be thought of as a bestowal.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.5)
     A reaction: Beware of etymology. This implies that eudaimonia is almost entirely beyond a person's control, but Aristotle doesn't think that. A combination of education and effort can build on some natural gifts to create a fully successful life.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
5076 To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: To the Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.10)
     A reaction: A problem case might be a work of art, but one might reply that there is no obvious perfection there because there is no clear function. For artefacts and organisms the principle seems very good. But 'Is the Cosmos good?'
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
5077 The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12)
     A reaction: This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings).
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
5066 If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though.
5065 The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: The ethics of duty cannot be sustained independently of a religious framework.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is a big challenge to Kant, echoing Nietzsche's jibe that Kant just wanted to be 'obedient'. The only options are either 'natural duties', or 'duties of reason'. Reason may have a pull (like pleasure), but a 'duty'? Difficult.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
5994 Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
     Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
     From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.