Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Virtue Ethics: an Introduction' and 'Are Freedom and Equality Compatible?'

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14 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
5078 Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Kant and Mill were in total agreement in trying to give content to the distinction between moral right and wrong, without recourse to any divine lawgiver.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.14)
     A reaction: A nice analysis, in tune with MacIntyre and others, who see such attempts as failures. It is hard, however, to deny the claims of rational principles, or of suffering, in our moral framework. I agree with Taylor's move back to virtue, but it ain't simple.
5067 Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: If morality is based on wrong (meaning 'forbidden'), right ('permitted'), and obligatory ('required'), we are led to ask 'Who is it that thus permits, forbids or requires that certain things be done or not done?'
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Clear reinforcement for Nietzsche's attack on conventional morals, which Taylor sees as a relic of medieval religious attitudes. Taylor says Kant offered a non-religious version of the same authority. I agree. Back to the Greek pursuit of excellence!
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
5079 Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Pleasures can be located in a particular part of the body, and can be momentary, and come and go, but this is not the case with happiness.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.16)
     A reaction: Probably no one ever thought that pleasure and happiness were actually identical - merely that pleasure is the only cause and source of happiness. These are good objections to that hypothesis. Pleasure simply isn't 'the good'.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5068 'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: The word 'eudaimonia' means literally 'having a good demon', which is apt, because it suggests some kind of supreme good fortune, of the sort which might be thought of as a bestowal.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.5)
     A reaction: Beware of etymology. This implies that eudaimonia is almost entirely beyond a person's control, but Aristotle doesn't think that. A combination of education and effort can build on some natural gifts to create a fully successful life.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
5076 To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: To the Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.10)
     A reaction: A problem case might be a work of art, but one might reply that there is no obvious perfection there because there is no clear function. For artefacts and organisms the principle seems very good. But 'Is the Cosmos good?'
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
5077 The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12)
     A reaction: This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings).
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
5066 If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though.
5065 The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: The ethics of duty cannot be sustained independently of a religious framework.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is a big challenge to Kant, echoing Nietzsche's jibe that Kant just wanted to be 'obedient'. The only options are either 'natural duties', or 'duties of reason'. Reason may have a pull (like pleasure), but a 'duty'? Difficult.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
21733 The right-wing conception of freedom is based on the idea of self-ownership [Cohen,GA]
     Full Idea: The right-wing conception of freedom is, I think, founded on the idea that each person is the morally rightful owner of himself, even if existing legal systems do not acknowledge it. Let us call that the 'self-ownership' thesis.
     From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 1)
     A reaction: He cites Nozick as articulating this view. At the end Cohen rejects self-ownership, though he agrees that no one would accept that the state could be the owner of your eyes. Do I own my hair after it is cut?
21739 Plenty of people have self-ownership, but still lack autonomy [Cohen,GA]
     Full Idea: Universal self-ownership fails to ensure autonomy, since it tends to produce proletarians, who lack it.
     From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 3)
     A reaction: The implication is that autonomy is not a property of individuals but a social phenomenon. Self-owning people can still be imprisoned. What about autonomy without self-ownership? A bright slave who is given extensive responsibility?
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
21736 It is doubtful whether any private property was originally acquired legitimately [Cohen,GA]
     Full Idea: It is easy to doubt that much actually existing private property was formed in what anyone could think was a legitimating way.
     From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 2)
     A reaction: What if I created an artificial island out of unwanted raw materials? What about the first humans to reach some remote territory?
21734 It is plausible that no one has an initial right to own land and natural resources [Cohen,GA]
     Full Idea: One may plausibly say of external things in their initial state, of raw land and natural resources, that no person has a greater right to them than any other does.
     From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 1)
     A reaction: How about if your group has lived on that plot for fifty generations, and some interlopers arrive and claim part of it. No one thought of 'owning' it till the interlopers arrived. Native Americans and Australians.
21735 Every thing which is now private started out as unowned [Cohen,GA]
     Full Idea: In the prehistory of anything that is now private property there was at least one moment at which something privately unowned was taken into private ownership.
     From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 2)
     A reaction: He is obviously talking about land and natural resources. Presumably a table which I made and own was always private property, although the land where the trees were grown was not. Though in some communities what I make could be automatically communal.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
5994 Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
     Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
     From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.