Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Virtue Ethics: an Introduction' and 'Meaning'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

12 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
7752 Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
     Full Idea: Only what I may call the primary intention of an utterer is relevant to the (non-natural) meaning of an utterance.
     From: H. Paul Grice (Meaning [1957], p.47)
     A reaction: This sounds okay for simple statements, but gets really tricky with complex statements, such as very ironic remarks delivered to an audience of diverse people.
7751 Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
     Full Idea: For a statement to have (non-naturally) meant something, not merely must it have been 'uttered' with the intention of inducing a certain belief, but also the utterer must have intended an 'audience' to recognise the intention behind the utterance.
     From: H. Paul Grice (Meaning [1957], p.43)
     A reaction: This is Grice's famous and distinctive theory of meaning. I am struck by the problem of a password, which seems to have a quite different intention from its literal meaning. Also a speaker with two different audiences and opposite intentions.
7753 We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
     Full Idea: To show that the criteria for judging linguistic intentions are very like the criteria for judging non-linguistic intentions is to show that linguistic intentions are very like non-linguistic intentions.
     From: H. Paul Grice (Meaning [1957], p.48)
     A reaction: This hint at the end of his paper is one of the key attractions of Grice's view. It offers an account of language that fits it into the world of animal communication and evolution. It never seems to quite capture the way meaning goes beyond intentions.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
5078 Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Kant and Mill were in total agreement in trying to give content to the distinction between moral right and wrong, without recourse to any divine lawgiver.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.14)
     A reaction: A nice analysis, in tune with MacIntyre and others, who see such attempts as failures. It is hard, however, to deny the claims of rational principles, or of suffering, in our moral framework. I agree with Taylor's move back to virtue, but it ain't simple.
5067 Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: If morality is based on wrong (meaning 'forbidden'), right ('permitted'), and obligatory ('required'), we are led to ask 'Who is it that thus permits, forbids or requires that certain things be done or not done?'
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Clear reinforcement for Nietzsche's attack on conventional morals, which Taylor sees as a relic of medieval religious attitudes. Taylor says Kant offered a non-religious version of the same authority. I agree. Back to the Greek pursuit of excellence!
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
5079 Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Pleasures can be located in a particular part of the body, and can be momentary, and come and go, but this is not the case with happiness.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.16)
     A reaction: Probably no one ever thought that pleasure and happiness were actually identical - merely that pleasure is the only cause and source of happiness. These are good objections to that hypothesis. Pleasure simply isn't 'the good'.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5068 'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: The word 'eudaimonia' means literally 'having a good demon', which is apt, because it suggests some kind of supreme good fortune, of the sort which might be thought of as a bestowal.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.5)
     A reaction: Beware of etymology. This implies that eudaimonia is almost entirely beyond a person's control, but Aristotle doesn't think that. A combination of education and effort can build on some natural gifts to create a fully successful life.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
5076 To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: To the Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.10)
     A reaction: A problem case might be a work of art, but one might reply that there is no obvious perfection there because there is no clear function. For artefacts and organisms the principle seems very good. But 'Is the Cosmos good?'
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
5077 The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12)
     A reaction: This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings).
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
5066 If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though.
5065 The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: The ethics of duty cannot be sustained independently of a religious framework.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is a big challenge to Kant, echoing Nietzsche's jibe that Kant just wanted to be 'obedient'. The only options are either 'natural duties', or 'duties of reason'. Reason may have a pull (like pleasure), but a 'duty'? Difficult.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
5994 Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
     Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
     From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.