16698
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Days exist, and yet they seem to be made up of parts which don't exist [Burley]
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Full Idea:
I grant that a successive being is composed out of non-beings, as is clear of a day, which is composed of non-entities. Some part of this day is past and some future, and yet this day is.
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From:
Walter Burley (Commentary on 'Physics' [1325], III text 11,f.65rb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
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A reaction:
The dilemma of Aristotle over time infected the scholastic attempt to give an account of successive entities. A day is a wonderfully elusive entity for a metaphysician.
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16690
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Unlike permanent things, successive things cannot exist all at once [Burley]
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Full Idea:
This is the difference between permanent and successive things: that a permanent thing exists all at once, or at least can exist all at once, whereas it is incompatible with a successive thing to exist all at once.
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From:
Walter Burley (Commentary on 'Physics' [1325], III txt 11,f.65rb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1
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A reaction:
Permanent things sound like what are now called 'three-dimensional' objects, but scholastic 'entia successiva' are not the same as spacetime 'worms' or collections of temporal stages.
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4993
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If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
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Full Idea:
When a bird pulls a worm from the ground, then swallows it piece by piece, there is a sense in which its behaviour can be said to be about the worm.
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From:
Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.4)
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A reaction:
This is preparing the ground for a possible behaviourist account of intentionality. Reply: you could say rain is about puddles, or you could say we have adopted Dennett's 'intentional stance' to birds, but it tells us nothing about their psychology.
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4982
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Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
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Full Idea:
If the mind causes brain events, then they are not caused by other brain events, and such causal gaps should be detectable by scientists; there should also be a gap of brain-events which cause no other brain events, because they are causing mind events.
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From:
Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §2.5)
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A reaction:
This is the double causation problem which Spinoza had spotted (Idea 4862). Expressed this way, it seems a screamingly large problem for dualism. We should be able to discover some VERY strange physical activity in the brain.
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4991
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Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
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Full Idea:
For many kinds of mental states, notably intentional ones such as beliefs and desires, behaviourism is appealing, ..but for sensations and experiences such as pain, it seems grossly implausible.
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From:
Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.1)
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A reaction:
The theory does indeed make a bit more sense for intentional states, but it still strikes me as nonsense that there is no more to my belief that 'Whales live in the Atlantic' than a disposition to say something. WHY do I say this something?
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4994
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Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
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Full Idea:
There is a temptation to think that 'aboutness', and the 'contents' of thoughts, and the relation of 'reference', are single and unitary relationships, but behaviourism offers an alternative approach.
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From:
Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.5)
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A reaction:
Personally I wouldn't touch behaviourism with a barge-pole (as it ducks the question of WHY certain behaviour occurs), but a warning against simplistic accounts of intentional states is good. I am sure there cannot be a single neat theory of refererence.
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4984
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All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
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Full Idea:
All psychological statements which are meaningful, that is to say, which are in principle verifiable, are translatable into propositions which do not involve psychological concepts, but only the concepts of physics.
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From:
Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §3.8)
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A reaction:
This shows how eliminativist behaviourism arises out of logical positivism (by only allowing what is verifiable). The simplest objection: we can't verify the mental states of others, because they are private, but they are still the best explanation.
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4997
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It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
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Full Idea:
It is widely accepted that for many concepts, if not all, grasping the concept requires grasping some theory, ...which makes difficulties for the view that concepts are not learned: for 'radical concept nativism', as Fodor calls it.
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From:
Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §7.3)
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A reaction:
Not a problem for traditional rationalist theories, where the whole theory can be innate along with the concept, but a big objection to modern more cautious non-holistic views (such as Fodor's). Does a bird have a concept AND theory of a nest?
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4995
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Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
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Full Idea:
To most behaviourists it seems misguided to expect there to be a single relation that connects referring expressions with their referents.
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From:
Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.5)
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A reaction:
You don't need to be a behaviourist to feel this doubt. Think about names of real people, names of fictional people, reference to misunderstood items, or imagined items, or reference in dreams, or to mathematical objects, or negations etc.
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5994
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Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
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Full Idea:
The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
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From:
report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.
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