Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Elimination of Metaphysics by Analysis of Language' and 'Does moral phil rest on a mistake?'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics

16252	Metaphysics uses empty words, or just produces pseudo-statements [Carnap]
	Full Idea: Since metaphysics doesn't want to assert analytic propositions, nor fall within the domain of physical science, it is compelled to employ words for which no criteria of application are specified, ..or else combine meaningful words..into pseudo-statements.
	From: Rudolph Carnap (Elimination of Metaphysics by Analysis of Language [1959]), quoted by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 2.4
	A reaction: A classic summary of the logical positivist rejection of metaphysics. I incline to treat metaphysics as within the domain of science, but at a level of generality so high that practising scientists become bewildered and give up.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics

9261	The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard]
	Full Idea: Reading the 'Ethics' is so disappointing, because Aristotle does not try to convince us that we really ought to do what our non-reflective consciousness has hitherto believed we ought to do.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: Aristotle didn't speak the language of 'duty' (see Idea 2172), but he could work it into his account if Prichard asked nicely. I take the truly virtuous person to be, above all, a wonderful citizen. Duties are contractual; good deeds flow from virtue.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism

9262	The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
	Full Idea: Moral Philosophy rests on the mistake of supposing the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: This is a beginning of the rebellion against the Enlightenment Project in ethics, which is why Prichard has become popular. At bottom he is offering intuition ('direct moral thinking'), which is a frustratingly thin concept.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique

9260	Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
	Full Idea: It is untrue to urge that, since courage is a virtue, we ought to act courageously. We feel an obligation to act, but not from a certain desire. The action is done from obligation, so isn't an act of courage. ..In fact, virtue is no basis for morality.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: One of the few interesting and direct attacks on virtue theory, before its modern revival. Prichard urges a perception of what is valuable (or good) as the basis for obligation and right action. He is right that values come first, in virtue and elsewhere.

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty

9259	We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard]
	Full Idea: The relation involved in an obligation need not be a relation to another at all. Thus we should admit that there is an obligation to overcome our natural timidity or greediness, and this involves no relations to others.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: An interesting un-Aristotelian and individualistic view of virtue. Why would we want to rid ourselves of timidity or greediness? Either it is self-interested, or we wish to be better citizens. See Richard Taylor on duty.

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism

9258	If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]
	Full Idea: If the badness of pain were the reason why we ought not to inflict pain on another, it would equally be a reason why we ought not to inflict pain on ourselves; yet, though we would call such behaviour foolish, we wouldn't think it wrong.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912], n4)
	A reaction: A very nice point. Note that it will equally well apply to 'benefit' or 'preferences', or any other ideal which utilitarians set out to maximise. It may not be bad to hurt yourself, but it might still be bad to harm yourself.

27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology

5994	Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
	Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
	From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.