Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' and 'Sentences'

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5 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol]
     Full Idea: It appears that a single thing, which must be imagined as some sort of interval [intervallum] existing between two things, cannot exist in extramental reality, but only in the intellect.
     From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], I fols318 v a-b), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7
     A reaction: This is the standard medieval denial of the existence of real relations. It contrasts with post-Russell ontology, which seems to admit relations as entities. Heil and Auriol and right.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger]
     Full Idea: Sellars' Grain Problem contended that it was a problem for materialism that physical objects have a granularity whereas sensations are homogeneous and without grain.
     From: report of Wilfrid Sellars (Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind [1956], Ch. n22) by Thomas W. Polger - Natural Minds Ch.1 n22
     A reaction: This doesn't strike me as a serious problem. I assume that my sensations are granular, but at a level too fine for me to introspect. There are three hundred trillion connections in the brain (Idea 2952), a lot of them involved in sensations.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol]
     Full Idea: Prime matter has no essence, nor a nature that is determinate, distinct, and actual. Instead, it is pure potential, and determinable, so that it is indeterminately and indistinctly a material thing.
     From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], II.12.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
     A reaction: Pasnau thinks Auriol has the best shot at explaining the vague idea of 'prime matter', with the thought that it exists, but indeterminateness is what gives it a lesser mode of existence. It strikes me as best to treat 'exist' as univocal.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
     Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
     From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol]
     Full Idea: If someone says 'God could make straightness without a line, and roughness and lightness in weight without parts', …then show me the reason why God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, yet cannot do these things.
     From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], IV.12.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 11.4
     A reaction: How engagingly bonkers. The key idea preceding this is that God can do all sorts of things that are beyond our understanding. He is then obliged to offer some examples.