10 ideas
| 17896 | We need to know the meaning of 'and', prior to its role in reasoning [Prior,AN, by Belnap] |
| Full Idea: For Prior, so the moral goes, we must first have a notion of what 'and' means, independently of the role it plays as premise and as conclusion. | |
| From: report of Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960]) by Nuel D. Belnap - Tonk, Plonk and Plink p.132 | |
| A reaction: The meaning would be given by the truth tables (the truth-conditions), whereas the role would be given by the natural deduction introduction and elimination rules. This seems to be the basic debate about logical connectives. |
| 17898 | Prior's 'tonk' is inconsistent, since it allows the non-conservative inference A |- B [Belnap on Prior,AN] |
| Full Idea: Prior's definition of 'tonk' is inconsistent. It gives us an extension of our original characterisation of deducibility which is not conservative, since in the extension (but not the original) we have, for arbitrary A and B, A |- B. | |
| From: comment on Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960]) by Nuel D. Belnap - Tonk, Plonk and Plink p.135 | |
| A reaction: Belnap's idea is that connectives don't just rest on their rules, but also on the going concern of normal deduction. |
| 11021 | Prior rejected accounts of logical connectives by inference pattern, with 'tonk' his absurd example [Prior,AN, by Read] |
| Full Idea: Prior dislike the holism inherent in the claim that the meaning of a logical connective was determined by the inference patterns into which it validly fitted. ...His notorious example of 'tonk' (A → A-tonk-B → B) was a reductio of the view. | |
| From: report of Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: [The view being attacked was attributed to Gentzen] |
| 13836 | Maybe introducing or defining logical connectives by rules of inference leads to absurdity [Prior,AN, by Hacking] |
| Full Idea: Prior intended 'tonk' (a connective which leads to absurdity) as a criticism of the very idea of introducing or defining logical connectives by rules of inference. | |
| From: report of Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960], §09) by Ian Hacking - What is Logic? |
| 23569 | The only just cause for a war is a wrong received [Vitoria] |
| Full Idea: There is a single and only just cause for commencing a war, namely, a wrong received. | |
| From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.170), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 04 | |
| A reaction: Walzer affirms this as one the principles of international law. In particular, mere differences of religion or politics cannot justify a war. The tricky bit is when the participants don't agree on the severity of the wrong. |
| 23601 | Leaders can only attack foreigners who have done wrong (as with their own subjects) [Vitoria] |
| Full Idea: A political leader cannot have greater authority over foreigners than over his own subjects; but he may not draw the sword against his own subjects unless they have done wrong; therefore he can only do so against foreigners in the same circumstances. | |
| From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.303), quoted by Jeff McMahan - Killing in War 1.4 | |
| A reaction: The question would then be whether they have 'done some wrong' against this leader, or against some other people (such as their fellow citizens). That would be the 'intervention' justification. Are they engaged in the wrong, or responsible for it? |
| 23566 | Princes should not justify a war to their subjects, and doing so would undermine the state [Vitoria] |
| Full Idea: A prince is not able and ought not always to render reasons for the war to its subjects, and if the subjects cannot serve in the war except they be satisfied of its justice, the state would fall into grave peril. | |
| From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.176), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 03 | |
| A reaction: This medieval view depends entirely on the absolute sovereignty of princes, and confidence that princes are wise and innately just. No student of history should believe such wicked nonsense. |
| 23576 | Sacking a city is lawful if it motivates the attacking troops [Vitoria] |
| Full Idea: It is not unlawful to put a city to sack, if it is necessary for the conduct of the war …as a spur to the courage of the troops. | |
| From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.184), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 08 | |
| A reaction: Hideous. Presumably this would include raping the women. Could you motivate a football team in a similar way? Or to get your children to pass exams? |
| 16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
| 6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |