6 ideas
| 16285 | A possible world can be seen as a complete and consistent novel [Jeffrey] |
| Full Idea: A novel describes a possible world in as much detail as is possible without exceeding the resources of the agent's language. But if talk of possible worlds seems dangerously metaphysical, focus on the novels themselves, when complete and consistent. | |
| From: Richard Jeffrey (The Logic of Decision [1965], 12.8), quoted by David Lewis - On the Plurality of Worlds | |
| A reaction: Lewis seems to cite this remark from Jeffrey as the source of the idea that ersatz linguistic worlds are like novels. Why won't a novel with one tiny inconsistency count as a possible world? People seem to live in it. |
| 19155 | Instead of gambling, Jeffrey made the objects of Bayesian preference to be propositions [Jeffrey, by Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Jeffrey produced a version of Bayesianism that made no direct use of gambling (as Ramsey had), but treats the objects of preference ...as propositions. | |
| From: report of Richard Jeffrey (The Logic of Decision [1965]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 3 | |
| A reaction: I'm guessing that Jeffreys launched modern Bayesian theory with this idea. It suggest that one can consider degrees of truth, rather than mere winning or losing. |
| 22439 | There are only duties if there are rights, so truth is only for those with a right to it [Constant] |
| Full Idea: A duty is that on the part of one being which corresponds to the rights of another. Where there are no rights there are no duties. To tell the truth is therefore a duty, but only to the one who has the right to the truth. | |
| From: Benjamin Constant (On Political Reactions [1797], p.123), quoted by Immanuel Kant - On a supposed right to lie p.28 | |
| A reaction: We can't claim a right to have all questions answered truthfully (because there is a right to privacy), but we might claim a right not to be lied to (as long as we accept a refusal to answer). Kant rejected this idea. |
| 22440 | Unconditional truth-telling makes a society impossible [Constant] |
| Full Idea: The moral principle 'it is a duty to tell the truth' would, if taken unconditionally and singly, make any society impossible. | |
| From: Benjamin Constant (On Political Reactions [1797], p.124), quoted by Immanuel Kant - On a supposed right to lie p.28 | |
| A reaction: He gives the well known example of the murderer at the door asking if your friend is inside. Compare everyone becoming perfectly telepathic. Our society would collapse, but a new society would learn to live with it. |
| 16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
| 6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |