Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'On the Nature of Acquaintance' and 'The Methods of Ethics (7th edn)'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
     A reaction: This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick]
     Full Idea: If we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally, we cannot also say that it is by free choice that he acts irrationally.
     From: Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874], p.511), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 7.4
     A reaction: A very nice riposte. Clearly people can rationally choose to act irrationally, e.g. at a wild party.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray]
     Full Idea: Sidgwick said self-interest is not self-evidently rational. Unless we invoke a religious idea of the soul, human personality is no more than a succession of continuities in memory and behaviour. In that case, why should anyone favour their future self?
     From: report of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874]) by John Gray - Seven Types of Atheism 2
     A reaction: This sounds like Locke's account of the self, as psychological continuity. We can say that our continuous self is a fiction, the hero of our own narrative. Personally I think of the self as a sustained set of brains structures which change very little.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick]
     Full Idea: It is a self-evident principle that the good of one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the Universe, than the good of any other, ..and as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, not merely at a particular part.
     From: Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874], III.XIII.3)
     A reaction: Showing that even a very empirical theory like utilitarianism has an a priori basis. Of course, the principle is false. What about animals, the senile, criminals, androids? What bestows 'importance'?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf]
     Full Idea: Sidgwick's complex version of utilitarianism urges that institutions should be set in place to maximise utility, but that individual actions people undertake might not appear to be justifiable on utilitarian terms.
     From: report of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 1 Refs
     A reaction: This seems to be a specifically political version of utilitarianism, but isn't cited much by political philosophers who discuss utilitarianism.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.