Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Substitutional Classes and Relations' and 'The Symposium'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato]
     Full Idea: By far the greatest and fairest branch of wisdom is that which is concerned with the due ordering of states and families, whose name is moderation and justice.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 209a)
     A reaction: ['Justice' is probably 'dikaiosune'] It is hard to disagree with this, and it relegates ivory tower philosophical contemplation to second place, unlike the late books of Aristotle's Ethics.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context [Russell]
     Full Idea: Any sentence, a single word, or a single component phrase, may often be quite devoid of meaning when separated from its context.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906], p.165)
     A reaction: Contextualism is now extremely fashionable, in philosophy of language and in epistemology. Here Russell is looking for a contextual way to define classes [so says Lackey, the editor].
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless [Russell]
     Full Idea: 'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are, I maintain, not merely silly remarks, but totally devoid of meaning.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906], p.166)
     A reaction: He connects this to paradoxes in set theory, such as the assertion that 'the class of human beings is a human being' (which is the fallacy of composition).
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level [Russell, by Bostock]
     Full Idea: Russell's Axiom of Reducibility states that to any propositional function of any order in a given level, there corresponds another which is of the lowest possible order in the level. There corresponds what he calls a 'predicative' function of that level.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 8.2
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell]
     Full Idea: Relations in intension are of the utmost importance to philosophy and philosophical logic, since they are essential to complexity, and thence to propositions, and thence to the possibility of truth and falsehood.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906], p.174)
     A reaction: Should we able to specify the whole of reality, if we have available to us objects, properties and relations? There remains indeterminate 'stuff', when it does not compose objects. There are relations between pure ideas.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik]
     Full Idea: According to Diotima, the Forms are the objects of desire operative in philosophical discourse.
     From: report of Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210a4-) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.199
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato]
     Full Idea: There is a state of mind half-way between wisdom and ignorance - having true opinions without being able to give reasons for them.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 202a)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 2140, where Plato scorns this state of mind. What he describes could be split into two - purely lucky true beliefs, and 'externalist knowledge', with non-conscious justification.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato]
     Full Idea: We retain identity not by staying the same (the preserve of gods) but by replacing losses with new similar acquisitions.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 208b)
     A reaction: Any modern student of personal identity should be intrigued by this remark! It appears to take a rather physical view of the matter, and to be aware of human biology as a process. Are my continuing desires token-identical, or just 'similar'?
We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato]
     Full Idea: During the period from boyhood to old age, man does not retain the same attributes, though he is called the same person.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 207d)
     A reaction: This precisely identifies the basic problem of personal identity over time. If this is the problem, DNA looks more and more significant for the answer, though it would be an awful mistake to think a pattern of DNA was a person.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato]
     Full Idea: What is good is the same as what is beautiful.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 201c)
Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato]
     Full Idea: Ugliness is out of harmony with everything that is godly; beauty, however, is in harmony with the divine.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 206d)
     A reaction: This remark shows how the concept of 'harmony' is at the centre of Greek thought (and is a potential bridge of the is/ought gap).
Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato]
     Full Idea: There cannot be such a thing as love of ugliness.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 201a)
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato]
     Full Idea: The second stage of progress is to realise that beauty of soul is more valuable than beauty of body.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210b)
Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato]
     Full Idea: One should step up from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, until at last one knows what absolute beauty is.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 211c)
     A reaction: Presumably this is why Socrates refused sexual favours to Alcibiades. The idea is inspiring, and yet it is a rejection of humanity.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato]
     Full Idea: Music may be called a knowledge of the principles of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 187c)
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato]
     Full Idea: Wisdom is one of the most beautiful of things, and Love is love of beauty, so it follows that Love must be a love of wisdom.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 204b)
     A reaction: Good, but wisdom isn't the only exceptionally beautiful thing. Music is beautiful partly because it is devoid of ideas.
Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato]
     Full Idea: Phaedrus: Love is not only the oldest and most honourable of the gods, but also the most powerful to assist men in the acquisition of merit and happiness, both here and hereafter.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 180b)
     A reaction: Maybe we should talk less of love as a feeling, and more as a motivation, not just in human relationships, but in activities like gardening and database compilation.
Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato]
     Full Idea: Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 206a)
     A reaction: Even the worst human beings often have lovers. 'Perpetual' is a nice observation.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato]
     Full Idea: 'What will be gained by a man who is good?' 'That is easy - he will be happy'.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 205a)
     A reaction: Suppose you tried to assassinate Hitler in 1944 (a good deed), but failed. Happiness presumably results from success, rather than mere good intentions.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato]
     Full Idea: By happy you mean in secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful? - Certainly.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 202c)
     A reaction: We seem to have lost track of the idea that beauty might be an essential ingredient of happiness.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato]
     Full Idea: The only form of servitude which has no dishonour has for its object the acquisition of excellence.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 184c)
The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato]
     Full Idea: The man who would pursue the right way to his goal must begin, when he is young, by contemplating physical beauty.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210a)
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato]
     Full Idea: No god is a lover of wisdom or desires to be wise, for he is wise already.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 204a)
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.