Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori' and 'Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action'

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13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic

9358	There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The fact is that there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms and such that whoever, using it, avoids false premises, will never reach a false conclusion.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.366)
	A reaction: As the man who invented modal logic in five different versions, he speaks with some authority. Logicians now debate which version is the best, so how could that be decided? You could avoid false conclusions by never reasoning at all.

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle

9357	Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its negative. It declares our purpose to make a complete dichotomy of experience, ..which is only our penchant for simplicity.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.365)
	A reaction: I find this view quite appealing. 'Look, it's either F or it isn't!' is a dogmatic attitude which irritates a lot of people, and appears to be dispensible. Intuitionists in mathematics dispense with the principle, and vagueness threatens it.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

9364	Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: A name must represent some uniformity in experience or it names nothing.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368)
	A reaction: I like this because, in the quintessentially linguistic debate about the exact logical role of names, it reminds us that names arise because of the way reality is; they are not sui generis private games for logicians.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

9362	Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: Those laws and those laws only have necessary truth which we are prepared to maintain, no matter what.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367)
	A reaction: This bold and simple claim has famously been torpedoed by a well-known counterexample - that virtually every human being will cling on to the proposition "dogs have at some time existed" no matter what, but it clearly isn't a necessary truth.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention

9365	We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The a priori contains principles which can be maintained in the face of all experience, representing the initiative of the mind. But they are subject to alteration on pragmatic grounds, if expanding experience shows their intellectual infelicity.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.373)
	A reaction: [compressed] This simply IS Quine's famous 'web of belief' picture, showing how firmly Quine is in the pragmatist tradition. Lewis treats a priori principles as a pragmatic toolkit, which can be refined to be more effective. Not implausible...

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection

9361	We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: Physical processes present us with phenomena in which the purely mathematical has to be separated out by abstraction.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367)
	A reaction: This is the father of modal logic endorsing traditional abstractionism, it seems. He is also, though, endorsing the view that a priori knowledge is created by us, with pragmatic ends in view.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism

23674	If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid]
	Full Idea: If a man should give to his neighbour a potion which he really believes will poison him, but which, in the event, proves salutary, and does much good; in moral estimation, he is a poisoner, and not a benefactor.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
	A reaction: I take Reid to mean that morality concerns how we assess the agent, and not the results of his actions. Mill and Bentham concede that we judge people this way, but don't think morality mainly concerns judging people.

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule

23675	We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid]
	Full Idea: It is a first principle of morals, that we ought not to do to another what we should think wrong to be done to us in like circumstances.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 6)
	A reaction: This negative form of the rule is more plausible than the positive form, presumably because there is more consensus about what we all dislike than what we all prefer. But presents for people that they would like, not that you like.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue

23672	To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid]
	Full Idea: A man cannot be virtuous, if he has no regard to duty.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
	A reaction: Thus are Aristotle and Kant united in a simple sentence. Aristotle thinks that a virtuous person thereby sees what is the right thing to do, but I take 'duty' to imply a requirement which comes not from good character but from external society.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour

23673	Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid]
	Full Idea: I presume it will be granted, that, in every man of real worth, there is a principle of honour, a regard to what is honourable or dishonourable, very distinct from a regard to his interest.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
	A reaction: Note that there is a 'principle' of honour in a person's character, and there are also actions which are intrinsically honourable or not. I fear that only the worthy are honourable, and only the honourable are worthy!

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

9363	Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The scientific search is for such classification as will make it possible to correlate appearance and behaviour, to discover law, to penetrate to the "essential nature" of things in order that behaviour may become predictable.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368)
	A reaction: Modern scientific essentialists no longer invoke scare quotes, and I think we should talk of the search for the 'mechanisms' which explain behaviour, but Lewis seems to have been sixty years ahead of his time.

29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy

16713	Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
	Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
	From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism

6610	I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
	Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
	From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
	A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.