6 ideas
| 14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can be predicated of something which does not exist. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Merely Possible Propositions [2010], p.28) | |
| A reaction: [He says he is 'agreeing with Plantinga' on this] This seems very puzzling, as you can obviously say that dragons do not exist, but they breathe fire. Why can't you attach predicates to hypothetical objects? |
| 8836 | Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet] |
| Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible. | |
| From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141) | |
| A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons. |
| 8837 | Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet] |
| Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential. | |
| From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148) | |
| A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential. |
| 14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence containing the individual, along with properties and relations. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Merely Possible Propositions [2010], p.22) | |
| A reaction: Since Russell took properties and relations to be features of reality, this made the whole proposition a feature of reality. This is utterly different from what I understand by the word 'proposition', which is a feature of thought, not of the world. |
| 16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
| 6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |