Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Rearrangement of Particles' and 'Reductive Theories of Modality'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
9218 Maybe what distinguishes philosophy from science is its pursuit of necessary truths [Sider]
     Full Idea: According to one tradition, necessary truth demarcates philosophical from empirical inquiry. Science identifies contingent aspects of the world, whereas philosophical inquiry reveals the essential nature of its objects.
     From: Theodore Sider (Reductive Theories of Modality [2003], 1)
     A reaction: I don't think there is a clear demarcation, and I would think that lots of generalizations about contingent truths are in philosophical territory, but I quite like this idea - even if it does make scientists laugh at philosophers.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15540 You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis]
     Full Idea: To say that properties are really relations to times is to treat temporary intrinsics (such as my changing shape) as a matter of relations, but then 'intrinsic properties' would not deserve the name, and it is untenable if it denies temporary intrinsics.
     From: David Lewis (Rearrangement of Particles [1988], 1)
     A reaction: [I have compressed a paragraph; he refers to his 1986:204] If a property is meant to be a 'relation to a time', I am not sure what the relata are meant to be, and I agree with Lewis that this seems a long way from properties.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
16713 Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
6610 I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.