10 ideas
3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52) |
1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) | |
A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential. |
1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) |
3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11) |
3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23) |
20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Davidson's original account of intentions might still stand if we could accept that prior intentions are different in kind from intentions with which one acts. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Problems in the Explanation of Action [1987]) by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's' | |
A reaction: Davidson says prior intention is all-out judgement of desirability. Prior intentions are more deliberate, with the other intentions as a presumed background to action. Compare Sartre's dual account of the self. |
1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28) | |
A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus. |
1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3) |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |