17 ideas
16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Plantinga proposes surrogates for nonexistent things - individual essences that are themselves necessary existents and that correspond one-to-one with all the 'things' that might exist. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 1 | |
A reaction: There are an awful lot of competing concepts of essence flying around these days. This one seems to require some abstract 'third realm' (or worse) in which these essences can exist, awaiting the arrival of thinkers. Not for me. |
14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: What we might call 'identity criteria' associated with a name such as 'Aristotle' are what the users of the name regard as essential and established facts about him. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], I) | |
A reaction: The problem here is that identifying something is superficial, whereas essences run deep. Plantinga is, in fact, talking about Lockean 'nominal essence' (and seems unaware of the fact, and never mentions the Lockean real/nominal distinction). |
14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Surely it is true of Socrates that he is Socrates and he is identical with Socrates. If these are true of him, then 'being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterize him; they are among his properties or attributes. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II) | |
A reaction: As far as I can see (if you insist on accepting self-identity as meaningful) the most you get here is that these are predicates that can attach to Socrates. If you identify predicates with properties you are in deep metaphysical trouble. |
14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Does Socrates have, in addition to his essential properties, an 'essence' or 'haecceity' - a property essential to him that entails each of his essential properties and that nothing distinct from him has in the world? | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II) | |
A reaction: Plantinga says yes, and offers 'Socrateity' (borrowed from Boethius) as his candidate. This is a very odd use of the word 'essence'. I take an essence to be a complex set of fundamental properties. I am also puzzled by his use of the word 'entails'. |
14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Let us call properties that enjoy the distinction of being instantiated by every object in every possible world 'trivially essential properties'. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], I) | |
A reaction: These would appear to be trivially 'necessary' rather than 'essential'. This continual need for the qualifier 'trivial' shows that they are not talking about proper essences. |
14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Socrates has P essentially if he has P in every world, or has it in every world in which he exists, or - most plausible of all - has P in the actual world and has its complement [non-P] in no world. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], Intro) | |
A reaction: These strike me as mere necessary properties, which are not the same thing at all. Essences give rise to the other properties, but Plantinga offers nothing to do the job (and especially not 'Socrateity'!). Essences must explain, say I! |
14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Is it the case that any property had essentially by anything is had essentially by everything that has it? | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], III) | |
A reaction: Plantinga says it is not true, but the only example he can give is Socrates having the property of 'being Socrates or Greek'. I take it to be universally false. There are not two types of property here. Properties sometimes play an essential role. |
14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: E is an essence if and only if (a) 'has E essentially' is instantiated in some world or other, and (b) for any world W and property P, E entails 'has P in W' or 'does not have P in W'. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], IV) | |
A reaction: 'Entail' strikes me as a very odd word when you are talking about the structure of the physical world (or are we??). Why would a unique self-identity (his candidate for essence) do the necessary entailing? |
14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Is there any reason to suppose that 'being identical with Socrates' names a property? Well, is there any reason to suppose that it does not? I cannot think of any, nor have I heard any that are at all impressive. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II) | |
A reaction: Is there any reason to think that a planet somewhere is entirely under the control of white mice? Extraordinary. No wonder Plantinga believes in God and the Ontological Argument, as well as the existence of 'Socrateity' etc. |
12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |
Full Idea: In my view, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], Abs) | |
A reaction: My immediate reaction is that epistemic necessity is not necessity at all. 'For all I know' 2 plus 2 might really be 95, and squares may also be circular. |
14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: The idea of modality 'de re' is no more (although no less) obscure that the idea of modality 'de dicto'; for I think we can see that any statement of the former type is logically equivalent to some statement of the latter. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], Intro) | |
A reaction: If two things are logically equivalent, that doesn't ensure that they are equally clear! Personally I am on the side of de re modality. |
12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical necessity derives from distinguishing things which can happen and things which can't, in virtue of their nature, which we discover empirically: the metaphysically possible, I claim, is constrained by the laws of nature. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I) | |
A reaction: She claims that Kripke is sympathetic to this. Personally I like the idea that natural necessity is metaphysically necessary (see 'Scientific Essentialism'), but the other way round comes as a bit of a surprise. I will think about it. |
12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
Full Idea: So-called broadly logical necessity (by which I mean, not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I) | |
A reaction: This is controversial, and is criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. Fine argues that 'narrow' (formal) logical necessity is metaphysical. Between them they have got rid of logical necessity completely. |
12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |
Full Idea: Validity is governed by epistemic necessity, i.e. an argument is valid if and only if there is an a priori route from premises to conclusion. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §V) | |
A reaction: Controversial, and criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. I don't think I agree with her. I don't see validity as depending on dim little human beings. |
14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: We easily understand Kafka's story about the man who wakes up to discover that he now has the body of a beetle; and in fact the state of affairs depicted is entirely possible. I can imagine being an alligator, so Socrates could have had an alligator body. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], III) | |
A reaction: This really is going the whole hog with accepting whatever is conceivable as being possible. I take this to be shocking nonsense, and it greatly reduces Plantinga in my esteem, despite his displays of intelligence and erudition. |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |