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All the ideas for 'works', 'Sociobiology' and 'works'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934 [Gentzen, by Read]
     Full Idea: Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934.
     From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna]
     Full Idea: Gentzen argued that the inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning.
     From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 5.3
     A reaction: Possibly inspired by Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as use? This idea was the target of Prior's famous connective 'tonk', which has the role of implying anything you like, proving sentences which are not logical consequences.
The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen]
     Full Idea: The introduction rules represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned, and the elimination rules are no more, in the final analysis, than the consequences of these definitions.
     From: Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]), quoted by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8
     A reaction: If an introduction-rule (or a truth table) were taken as fixed and beyond dispute, then it would have the status of a definition, since there would be nothing else to appeal to. So is there anything else to appeal to here?
Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen]
     Full Idea: To every logical symbol there belongs precisely one inference figure which 'introduces' the symbol ..and one which 'eliminates' it. The introductions represent the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned, and eliminations are consequences of these.
     From: Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938], II.5.13), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - "Yes" and "No" III
     A reaction: [1935 paper] This passage is famous, in laying down the basics of natural deduction systems of logic (ones using only rules, and avoiding axioms). Rumfitt questions whether Gentzen's account gives the sense of the connectives.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions beyond arithmetic [Gentzen, by Musgrave]
     Full Idea: Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions which transcend arithmetic.
     From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §5
     A reaction: This does not contradict Gödel's famous result, but reinforces it. The interesting question is what assumptions Gentzen felt he had to make.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Genetic behaviours that have enhanced human success include aggression, rape and xenophobia [Wilson,EO, by Okasha]
     Full Idea: Wilson claimed that many human behaviours, including aggression, rape, and xenophobia, had a genetic basis, and were adaptations favoured by natural selection because they enhanced the reproductive success of our ancestors.
     From: report of Edmund O. Wilson (Sociobiology [1975]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 7
     A reaction: This led to the Sociobiology Wars, when E.O. Wilson was attacked by Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.