Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Conditionals and Possibilia' and 'Probabilities of Conditionals'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington]
     Full Idea: Lewis was first to prove this remarkable result: there is no proposition A*B such that, in all probability distributions, p(A*B) = pA(B) [second A a subscript]. A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition.
     From: report of David Lewis (Probabilities of Conditionals [1976]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 3.1
     A reaction: The equation says the probability of the combination of A and B is not always the same as the probability of B given A. Bennett refers to this as 'The Equation' in the theory of conditionals. Edgington says a conditional is a supposition and a judgement.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington]
     Full Idea: Jackson defends the truth-functional account by saying that for a conditional to be assertable, it must not only be believed that its truth-conditions are satisfied, but the belief must be robust or resilient with respect to the antecedent.
     From: report of Frank Jackson (Conditionals and Possibilia [1981]) by Dorothy Edgington - Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? 4
     A reaction: ..That is, one would not abandon the conditional if one believed the antecedent to be true.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.