24 ideas
8220 | Philosophy is in a perpetual state of digression [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Philosophy can be seen as being in a perpetual state of digression. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Anyone who has ever tried to teach philosophy will vouch for this. Philosophy is the 'Arabian Nights', conjuring up wonderful stories, to avoid having to face something nasty. Philosophy is perpetual postponement of problems. |
8217 | Philosophy is a concept-creating discipline [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], Intro) | |
A reaction: One might very reasonably reply that Geography is a discipline which creates concepts. However, this emphasis is an interesting corrective to the school of analysis, which appears confined to existing, and even 'folk', concepts. |
8242 | Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Philosophy does not consist in knowing, and is not inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Speak for yourself. I wonder what the criteria are for 'Interesting' or 'Important'. They can't seriously count 'remarkable' as a criterion of philosophical success, can they? There can be remarkable stupidity. |
14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Philosophy, although it uses no microscopes or other apparatus of special observation, is really an experimental science, resting on that experience which is common to us all. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], I) | |
A reaction: The 'experimental' either implies that thought-experiments are central to the subject, or that philosophers are discussing the findings of scientists, but at a high level of theory and abstraction. Peirce probably means the latter. I can't disagree. |
8223 | The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Those who criticise without creating, those who are content to defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it needs to return to life, are the plague of philosophy. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the continental view of analytical philosophy, that it is pathetically conservative. I would offer MacIntyre as a response, who gives a beautiful analysis of why the super-modern view is dead. The French are hopelessly romantic. |
8247 | Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 2.6) | |
A reaction: I would have thought that it was science that needs logic. Art is more elitist than science, and less universal. I presume artists and phenomenologists share a target of deconstructing lived human experience. |
14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is an anacoluthon to say that a proposition is impossible because it is self-contradictory. It rather is thought so to appear self-contradictory because the ideal induction has shown it to be impossible. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III) |
8224 | 'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: 'Eris' is the Greek divinity of discord, conflict, and strife, the complementary opposite of Philia, the divinity of union and friendship. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.2 n) | |
A reaction: Are these actual gods? This interestingly implies that the wonders of dialectic and Socrates' elenchus are simply aspects of friendship, which was elevated by Epicurus to the highest good. The Greeks just wanted wonderful friends and fine speeches. |
8219 | Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This offers some explanation of why Anglo-American philosophers are steeped in logic, and the continentals just ignore it. I have some sympathy with the French view. Logic seems to study language with all the interesting part drained off. |
8246 | Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: A real hatred inspires logic's rivalry with, or its will to supplant, philosophy. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 2.6) | |
A reaction: A delightful corrective to the neurotic inferiority that most English-speaking philosophers feel about their failure to master logic. What was Aristotle playing at when he invented logic? Philosophical talent is utterly different from a talent for logic. |
14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Mathematics is purely hypothetical: it produces nothing but conditional propositions. Logic, on the contrary, is categorical in its assertions. True, it is a normative science, and not a mere discovery of what really is. It discovers ends from means. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], II) |
14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The whole of the theory of numbers belongs to logic; or rather, it would do so, were it not, as pure mathematics, pre-logical, that is, even more abstract than logic. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: Peirce seems to flirt with logicism, but rejects in favour of some subtler relationship. I just don't believe that numbers are purely logical entities. |
14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Many say everything is logically possible which involves no contradiction. In this sense two contradictory propositions may be severally possible. In the substantive sense, the contradictory of a possible proposition is impossible (if we were omniscient). | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III) |
8221 | We cannot judge the Cogito. Must we begin? Must we start from certainty? Can 'I' relate to thought? [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: There is no point in wondering whether Descartes' Cogito is right or wrong. Is it necessary "to begin", and, if so, is it necessary to start from the point of view of a subjective certainty? Can thought be the verb of an I? There is no direct answer. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: A nice first sentence for a work of philosophy would be "It is necessary to begin". Is the Cogito the only idea that is beyond judgement? I fear a slippery slope here, which would paralyse all of our judgements - and would therefore be ridiculous. |
14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
Full Idea: If Mill says that experience is the only source of any kind of knowledge, I grant it at once, provided only that by experience he means personal history, life. But if he wants me to admit that inner experience is nothing, he asks what cannot be granted. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898]) | |
A reaction: Notice from Idea 14785 that Peirce has ideas in mind, and not just inner experiences like hunger. Empiricism certainly begins to look more plausible if we expand the notion of experience. It must include what we learned from prior experience. |
14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The real world is the world of sensible experience, and it is part of the process of sensible experience to locate its facts in the world of ideas. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III) | |
A reaction: This is the neatest demolition of the sharp dividing line between empiricism and rationalism that I have ever encountered. |
8222 | Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: If one concept is 'better' than an earlier one, it is because it makes us aware of new variations and unknown resonances, it carries out unforeseen cuttings-out, it brings forth an Event that surveys (survole) us. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I don't get much of that, but it is certainly in tune with the Kuhn/Feyerabend idea that what science can generate is fresh visions, rather than precisely expanded truths. Personally I consider it dangerous nonsense, but I thought I ought to pass it on. |
8218 | Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: The concept of the Other Person as expression of a possible world in a perceptual field leads us to consider the components of this field in a new way. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I like the idea that other people are possible worlds. You can give reductionist accounts of the human animal till the cows come home, but when one walk into your visual field, the mind takes off. See Crusoe and Friday. |
8248 | Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: According to phenomenology, thought depends on man's relations with the world - with which the brain is necessarily in agreement because it is drawn from these relations. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], Conclusion) | |
A reaction: The development of externalist views of mind, arising from the Twin Earth idea, seems to provide a link to continental philosophy, where similar ideas are found in Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. So study science, psychology, or sociology? |
8245 | The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Logic is reductionist not accidentally, but essentially and necessarily: following the route marked out by Frege and Russell, it wants to turn the concept into a function (...when actually a concept is a form, or a force). | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 2.6) | |
A reaction: [Last part on p.144] I'm not sure that I understand 'form or force', but the idea that concepts are mere functions is like describing something as 'transport', without saying whether it is bus/bike/train.. Is a concept a vision, or a tool? |
14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Ethics is the science of aims. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], II) | |
A reaction: Intriguing slogan. He is discussing the aims of logic. I think what he means is that ethics is the science of value. 'Science' may be optimistic, but I would sort of agree with his basic idea. |
8243 | Atheism is the philosopher's serenity, and philosophy's achievement [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: It is amazing that so many philosophers take the death of God as tragic. Atheism is not a drama, but the philosopher's serenity and philosophy's achievement. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.4) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that it is the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that feels the death of God as a tragedy. Modern Anglo-American philosophers are mostly pretty serene on the subject, unless, like Dennett, they go on the offensive. |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |