9 ideas
| 23248 | Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: The so-called Empiricists in Hellenistic times [as cited by Galen] denied the existence of reason, treating it as a useless theoretical postulate introduced by some philosophers | |
| From: report of Galen (An Outline of Empiricism [c.170], 87.4-9.28ff) by Michael Frede - Intro to 'Rationality in Greek Thought' p.3 | |
| A reaction: I think 'be sensible' is understood by everyone, but 'use your reason' is far from obvious. The main role of reason seems to be as an identifier for human exceptionalism. Animals obviously make good judgements. Frede thinks the empiricists were right. |
| 14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is customary in logic to take a theory to be a set of sentences closed under logical consequence, whereas it is common in discussions of theories of truth to take a theory to be an axiomatized theory. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], n8) |
| 14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| Full Idea: Fine's paper argues that the notion of semantic necessity has a role to play in understanding the nature and content of semantics comparable to the role of metaphysical necessity in metaphysics. | |
| From: report of Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010]) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 2 |
| 14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: On one view, a semantics for a given language is taken to be an assignment of semantic values to its expressions; according to the other, a semantics is taken to be a theory of truth for that language. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], Intro) | |
| A reaction: The first is Frege, the second Tarski via Davidson, says Fine. Fine argues against these as the correct alternatives, and says the distinction prevents us understanding what is really going on. He votes for semantics as giving 'semantic requirements'. |
| 14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Semantics should be conceived as a body of semantic requirements or facts - and not as a body of semantic truths, or as an assignment of semantic values. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], 5) | |
| A reaction: The 'truths' view is Tarski, and the 'values' view is Frege. You'll have to read the Fine paper to grasp his subtle claim. |
| 14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: What distinguishes the referential position in semantics from Fregeanism is that it makes use of de re semantic facts, in which it is required of an object itself that it enter into certain semantic requirements. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], 5) | |
| A reaction: I have a repugnance to any sort of semantics that involves the objects themselves, even when dealing with proper names. If I talk of 'Napoleon', no small Frenchman is to be found anywhere in my sentences. |
| 14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The source of the Quinean scepticism about analytic and synthetic is, first, scepticism over whether we can factor truth into a semantic and a factual component, and (second) if we can, is the factual component ever null? | |
| From: Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], 1) | |
| A reaction: You certainly can't grasp 'bachelors are unmarried men' if you haven't grasped the full Woosterian truth about men and marriage. But I could interdefine four meaningless words, so that you could employ them in analytic sentences. |
| 16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
| 6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |