Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Can there be Vague Objects?' and 'Self, Body and Coincidence'

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9 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality

16129	Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Evans tries to derive a contradiction from the supposition that a given identity statement is of indeterminate truth-value. (As it happens, I consider that this argument is flawed)
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.3
	A reaction: A priori, I wouldn't expect to be able to settle the question of whether there are any vague objects simply by following some logical derivation. Empirical examination, and conceptual analysis (or stipulation) have to be involved.

16459	Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
	Full Idea: Maybe the world is vague, and vagueness is a necessary feature of any true description of it. Also identities may lack a determinate truth value because of their vagueness. Hence it is a fact that some objects have fuzzy boundaries. But is this coherent?
	From: Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978])
	A reaction: [compressed] Lewis quotes this introduction to the famous short paper, to show that Evans wasn't proposing a poor argument, but offering a reductio of the view that vagueness is 'ontic', or a feature of the world.

16460	Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
	Full Idea: The correct interpretation is that Evans trusts his reader (unwisely) to take for granted that there are vague identity statements, that a proof of the contrary cannot be right, and that the vagueness-in-describing view affords a diagnosis of the fallacy.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319
	A reaction: [Lowe 199:11 is a culprit!] Lewis put this interpretation to Evans, who replied 'Yes, yes, yes!'.

16457	There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
	Full Idea: One problem with Evans's argument that there are no such thing as vague identity statements is that its conclusion is plainly false. Example: 'Princeton = Princeton Borough', where it is unsettled what region 'Princeton' denotes.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319
	A reaction: Lewis endorses the view that vagueness is semantic. I certainly don't endorse Evans's argument, which hinges on a weird example of a property, as applied to Leibniz's Law.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties

14534	Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum]
	Full Idea: Shoemaker ventured the theory in 1980 that properties just are clusters of powers, but he has subsequently abandoned this, and now thinks properties bestow their bearers with causal powers.
	From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Self, Body and Coincidence [1999], p.297) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 1.1
	A reaction: Like Mumford and Anjum, I prefer the earlier theory. I think taking powers as basic is the only story that really makes sense. A power is intrinsic and primitive, whereas properties are complex, messy, partly subjective, and higher level.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

14484	If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
	Full Idea: We cannot accept the existence of vague objects, according to Evans's argument that there cannot be indeterminacy of identity. ...From the assumption that it is indeterminate whether a = b, we conclude, determinately, that it's not the case that a = b.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by Amie L. Thomasson - Ordinary Objects 05.6
	A reaction: I think we should keep intrinsic identity separate from identity between entities. A cloud can be clearly identified, while being a bit fuzzy. It is only when you ask whether we saw the same cloud that Evans's argument seems relevant.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

16224	There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
	Full Idea: Two things can't be vaguely identical, because then a would have an indeterminacy which b lacks (namely, being perfectly identical to b), so by Leibniz's Law they can't be identical.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978], 4.7) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: [my summary of Katherine Hawley's summary (2001:118) of Evans] Hawley considers the argument to be valid. I have grave doubts about whether b's identity with b is the sort of property needed for an application of Liebniz's Law.

29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy

16713	Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
	Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
	From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism

6610	I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
	Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
	From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
	A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.