8 ideas
9073 | Abstraction from an ambiguous concept like 'mole' will define them as the same [Barnes,J] |
Full Idea: The procedure of abstraction will not allow us to distinguish the ambiguity between 'mole' as an animal and as an artefact. The stages of abstraction will only end up with 'physical object', and this will then count as the definition. | |
From: Jonathan Barnes (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics [1993], n to 97b7) | |
A reaction: This is a problem if you adhere to a rather precise account of the steps of abstraction, with every stage explicit (and probably expressed in terms of sets), but I suspect that the real tangle of semi-conscious abstraction avoids this problem. |
9074 | Abstraction cannot produce the concept of a 'game', as there is no one common feature [Barnes,J] |
Full Idea: Abstractions cannot account for those general terms whose instances do not have any set of features in common. The word 'game' is not ambiguous, but not all games have one thing in common; they are united by looser 'family resemblance'. | |
From: Jonathan Barnes (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics [1993], n to 97b7) | |
A reaction: (This point comes from Wittgenstein, Idea 4141) English-speakers can't agree on borderline cases (avoiding cracks in pavements). Life is just a game. The objection would be refuted by discussion of higher-level abstractions to make connections. |
9072 | Defining concepts by abstractions will collect together far too many attributes from entities [Barnes,J] |
Full Idea: If we create abstractions by collection of attributes common to groups of entities, we will collect far too many attributes, and wrongly put them into the definition (such as 'having hairless palms' when identifying 'men'). | |
From: Jonathan Barnes (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics [1993], n to 97b7) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Defining 'man' is a hugely complex business (see Idea 1763!), unlike defining 'hair' or 'red'. Some attributes will strike perceivers immediately, but absence of an attribute is not actually 'perceived' at all. |
21796 | Man is God if he raises himself, by denying his nature and finitude [Hegel] |
Full Idea: Man is only God in so far as he negates the natural existence and finitude of his spirit and raises himself to God. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (The Philosophy of History [1840], p.324), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 10 'God' | |
A reaction: I suspect that it was ideas like this which motivated Nietzsche - denial of what we are, in the name of some idle daydream. I personally have no idea how to negate my natural existence or my finitude. |
21784 | Slavery is unjust, because humanity is essentially free [Hegel] |
Full Idea: Slavery is in and for itself an injustice, for the essence of humanity is freedom. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (The Philosophy of History [1840], p.99), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Rights' | |
A reaction: This is a corrective to Idea 12783, which offers a defence of the reality of historical slavery. That seemed to depend on some notion that each phase of history is necessary, which is implausible. |
21783 | State slavery is a phase of education, moving towards a full culture [Hegel] |
Full Idea: Because slavery exists in states, it is a phase of advance from the merely isolated sensual existence - a phase of education - a mode of becoming participant in a higher morality and the culture connected with it. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (The Philosophy of History [1840], p.98), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Rights' | |
A reaction: [He adds that slavery should be removed slowly, not suddenly] A nicely provocative thought. Is it better to participate in something grand (like pyramid building) as a slave, or drift in dull isolation? How long should this 'phase' last? |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |