11 ideas
| 19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The wiser one is, the more one is determined to do that which is most perfect. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.151) | |
| A reaction: Debatable. 'Perfectionism' is a well-known vice in many areas of life. Life is short, and the demands on us are many. Skilled shortcuts and compromises are one hallmark of genius, and presumably also of wisdom. |
| 9465 | Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette] |
| Full Idea: The substitutional interpretation says the universal quantifier is true just in case it remains true for all substitutions of terms of the same type as that of the universally bound variable. | |
| From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem to tell us how it gets started with being true. |
| 9466 | Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette] |
| Full Idea: Some substitutional quantificationists in logic hope to avoid philosophical entanglements about the metaphysics of objects, ..and nominalists can find aid and comfort there. | |
| From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143) | |
| A reaction: This has an appeal for me, particularly if it avoids abstract objects, but I don't see much problem with material objects, so we might as well have a view that admits those. |
| 7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
| Full Idea: The historical honour of having first raised the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" belongs to Leibniz. | |
| From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: I presume that people before Leibniz may well have had the thought, but not bothered to even articulate it, because there seemed nothing to say by way of answer, other than some reference to the inscrutable will of God. |
| 19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Since something rather than nothing exists, there is a certain urge for existence, or (so to speak) a straining toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence itself; in a word, essence in and of itself strives for existence. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150) | |
| A reaction: Thus 'essence precedes existence'. Not sure I understand this, but at least it places an active power at the root of everything (though Leibniz probably sees that as divine). The Big Bang triggered by a 'quantum fluctuation'? |
| 19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: From the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, we recognise that there is in possible things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain exigent need of existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347) | |
| A reaction: I love the fact that Leibniz tried to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Bede Rundle and Dale Jacquette are similar heroes. As Leibniz tells us, contradictions have no claim to existence, but non-contradictions do. |
| 5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Although the world is not metaphysically necessary, such that its contrary would imply a contradiction or logical absurdity, it is necessary physically, that is, determined in such a way that its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.139) | |
| A reaction: How does Leibniz know things like this? The distinction between 'metaphysical' necessity and 'natural' (what he calls 'physical') necessity is a key idea. But natural necessity is controversial. See 'Essentialism'. |
| 19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: In practical affairs one always follows the decision rule in accordance with which one ought to seek the maximum or the minimum: namely, one prefers the maximum effect at the minimum cost, so to speak. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150) | |
| A reaction: Animals probably do that too, and even water sort of obeys the rule when it runs downhill. |
| 19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: There is always in things a principle of determination which is based on consideration of maximum and minimum, such that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to speak, expenditure. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347) | |
| A reaction: This is obvious in human endeavours. Leibniz applied it to physics, producing a principle that shortest paths are always employed. It has a different formal name in modern physics, I think. He says if you make an unrestricted triangle, it is equilateral. |
| 16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
| 6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |