8 ideas
| 15575 | Knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations [Polt] |
| Full Idea: Thanks to Heidegger, hermeneutics has gained wider acceptance - that knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations. | |
| From: Richard Polt (Heidegger: an introduction [1999], 3.§7) | |
| A reaction: I am not sure if I understand the notion of a search that has a refusal to actually find anything as one of its basic principles. |
| 13163 | Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: An infinite circle is impossible, since any circle is bounded by its circumference. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.114) | |
| A reaction: This is interesting if one is asking what the essence of a circle must be. If is tempting to say merely that the radii must be equal, but can they have the length of some vast transfinite number? The circumference must be 2π bigger. |
| 15568 | When we consider possibilities, there must be something we are considering [Polt] |
| Full Idea: We would hardly want to say that a possibility is nothing, since surely we are considering something when we consider possibilities. | |
| From: Richard Polt (Heidegger: an introduction [1999], 1) | |
| A reaction: A nice contribution to the issue of whether modality is a feature of actuality. I would prefer to say that we can self-evidently utter truths and falsehoods about what is or is not possible, in nature, in logic, and maybe in metaphysics. |
| 13162 | Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The ancient Sloth's Syllogism says that if something is foreseen and infallible, it will happen without my effort, and if it is not foreseen, it will not happen, even though I am able to do it. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.113) | |
| A reaction: Presumable the foreseeing is to be done by the oracle, and not by the slothful person. |
| 16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
| 6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |
| 19339 | Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The cause of good is positive, but evil is a defect, that is, a privation or negation, and consequently, it arises from nothingness or nonbeing. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.114) | |
| A reaction: He goes on to illustrate his idea from mathematics. He is modifying Augustine's view that evil is an absence of good, by adding nonbeing as the driving force behind it. Doesn't sound very persuasive to me. |
| 13164 | God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: We must believe that God would not have allowed sin nor would he have created things he knows will sin, if he could not derive from them a good incomparably greater than the resulting evil. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.115) | |
| A reaction: Why 'must' we believe this? Do we have to imagine all the genocides shrinking to insignificance once we grasp the wonderful goods that can be derived from them? The end justifies the means. Genocide is actually a good thing. Hm. |