8 ideas
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points. | |
From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13 | |
A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry. |
11993 | Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung] |
Full Idea: If Jones ceases to be a father, or ceases to be over eight years old, he will cease to exist, yet these properties surely do not belong essentially to him. | |
From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II) | |
A reaction: This seems to correct, though I would doubt whether either of these count as true properties, in the causal sense I prefer. If being 'over 8' is a property, how many 'over n' or 'under m' properties does he have? One for each quantum moment? |
11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
Full Idea: It is possible that a property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another. | |
From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], III) | |
A reaction: Thus a love of blues music may be part of your essence, but only a minor part of me. Sounds right. Spin or charge are part of the essence of an electron, but only contingently part of a child's top. |
11992 | Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung] |
Full Idea: Three essentialist claims are labelled 'Aristotelian': the thing would cease to exist without the property; an essential property is explanatory; and it is such that it must belong to everything to which it belongs. | |
From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], Intro) | |
A reaction: She says the second one is indispensable, and that it rules out the third one. My working assumption, like hers, is that the second one is the key part of the game, because Aristotle wanted to explain things. |
11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
Full Idea: There will be demonstrated properties at the edge of the system, so to speak. They will be explained in terms of the essential properties of the basic entities and principles of the science, but will themselves not be explanatory of further properties. | |
From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II) | |
A reaction: This is an important line of thought which needs clarification. We can't glibly say that essences are what explain the other properties. Some properties do more than others to explain subsequent dependent properties. |
11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |
Full Idea: It seems highly likely that some non-essential properties may explain more about the individual or about things of his kind than the peripheral properties. | |
From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II) | |
A reaction: Another important issue, if one is defending the explanatory role of essences. It is not only essences which explain. A key question is whether we endorse individual essences as well as generic ones. I think we should. They explain the details. |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |