23 ideas
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' can be taken as true without have any truthmaker. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: There might be an equivocation over 'true' here. 'What, really really true that he IS a fictional mouse?' |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: No truth predicate is ever indispensable, because Tarski biconditionals, the equivalences between sentences and explicit truth ascriptions to those sentences, allow us to replace explicit truth ascriptions with the sentences themselves. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Holding a sentence to be true isn't the same as saying that it is true, and it isn't the same as saying the sentence, because one might say it in an ironic tone of voice. |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: My take on truth is a fairly deflationary one: The role of the truth predicate is to enable us to assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Intro) | |
A reaction: Clearly this is a role for truth, as in 'I forget what he said, but I know it was true', but it isn't remotely what most people understand by true. We use 'true' about totally explicit sentences all the time. |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: Names function the same way (semantically and grammatically) regardless of whether or not there's an object that they refer to. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3 n55) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a fairly clear rebuttal of the 'Fido'-Fido view of names (that the meaning of the name IS the dog), which never seems to quite go away. A name is a peg on which description may be hung, seems a good slogan to me. |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: If the argument isn't that, metaphysically speaking, anything that exists must have causal powers - how on earth would we show that? - rather, the claim is an epistemic one. Any thing we're in a position to know about we must causally interact with. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: A very good point. I am attracted to causal power as a criterion for existence, but Azzouni's distinction is vital. Maybe there is just no point in even talking about things which exist but have no causal powers. |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: It's robustly part of common sense that fictional objects don't exist in any sense at all, and this means they aren't abstracta either. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Nice. It is so easy to have some philosopher dilute and equivocate over the word 'object' until you find yourself committed to all sorts of daft things as somehow having objectual existence. We can discuss things which don't exist in any way at all. |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: It is widespread in contemporary metaphysics to extract commitments to various types of object on the basis of the logical form of certain sentences. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: I'm with Azzouni in thinking that this procedure is a very bad idea. I'm increasingly inclined towards the wild view that people are only ontologically committed to things if they explicitly say that they are so committed. |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: The argument that objectual quantifiers are ontologically committing has the crucial and unnoticed presupposition that the language in which the semantics for the objectual quantifiers is couched (the 'metalanguage') also has quantifiers with commitment. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: That is, presumably we find ourselves ontologically committed to the existence of quantifiers, and are also looking at an infinite regress. See Idea 12439. |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: There are no linguistic devices, no idioms (not 'there is', not 'exists') that unequivocally indicate ontological commitment in the vernacular. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems right, since people talk in such ways about soap opera, while understanding the ontological situation perfectly well. Presumably Quine is seeking higher standards than the vernacular, if we are doing science. |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: A slogan: One can't read ontological commitments from semantic conditions unless one has already smuggled into those semantic conditions the ontology one would like to read off. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: The arguments supporting this are subtle, but it's good enough for me, as I never thought anyone was ontologically committed just because they used the vagueries of language to try to say what's going on around here. |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: Things that don't exist don't have any properties. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Sounds reasonable! I totally agree, but that is because my notion of properties is sparse and naturalistic. If you identify properties with predicates (which some weird people seem to), then non-existents can have properties like 'absence' or 'nullity'. |
14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: Some deep essentialists resist the need to explain the structure under de re modal properties, taking them as primitive. One version (which we can call 'substance theory') takes them to fall under a sortal concept, with no further explanation. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1) | |
A reaction: A very helpful identification of what Wiggins stands for, and why I disagree with him. The whole point of essences is to provide a notion that fits in with sciences, which means they must have an explanatory role, which needs structures. |
14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: If the substance essentialist holds that the sort an object belongs to determines its de re modal properties (rather than the other way round), then he needs to give an (ontological, not conceptual) explanation of what determines an object's sort. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1) | |
A reaction: See Idea 14193 for 'substance essentialism'. I find it quite incredible that anyone could think that a thing's sort could determine its properties, rather than the other way round. Even if sortals are conventional, they are not arbitrary. |
14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: The explanation of material constitution given by substance essentialism is that there are multiple objects. A person is essentially human-shaped (falling under the human sort), while their hunk of tissue is accidentally human-shaped (as tissue). | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1) | |
A reaction: At this point sortal essentialism begins to look crazy. Persons are dubious examples (with sneaky dualism involved). A bronze statue is essentially harder to dent than a clay one, because of its bronze. If you remake it of clay, it isn't the same statue. |
14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would imply that objects with incompatible properties and objects such as winged pigs or golden mountains were actual. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §5) | |
A reaction: Note that this is 'qualitative' composition, and not composition of parts. The objection seems to rule out unrestricted qualitative composition, since you could hardly combine squareness with roundness. |
14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: Essentialism says that objects have their properties essentially. 'Deep' essentialists take the (nontrivial) essential properties of an object to determine its nature. 'Shallow' essentialists substitute context-dependent truths for the independent ones. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: If the deep essence determines a things nature, we should not need to say 'nontrivial'. This is my bete noire, the confusion of essential properties with necessary ones, where necessary properties (or predicates, at least) can indeed be trivial. |
14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: The deep essentialist holds that most objects have essential properties such that there are many ways they could not be, or many changes through which they could not persist. Objects' modal profiles characterize their natures. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the view I like, especially the last bit. If your modal profile doesn't determine your nature, then what does? Think of how you sum up a person at a funeral. Your modal profile is determined by dispositions and powers. |
14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: Two objections to deep essentialism are that it falters when faced with a skeptical objection concerning arbitrariness, and the need for a reductive account of de re modality. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: An immediate response to the second objection might be to say that modal facts about things are not reducible. The charge of arbitrariness (i.e. total arbitrariness, not just a bit of uncertainty) is the main thing a theory of essences must deal with. |
14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: I reject the view that an object's de re modal properties determine its relations to possibilia. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §3) | |
A reaction: You'll have to read Paul to see why, but I flat disagree with her on this. The whole point of accepting such properties is to determine the modal profile of the thing, and hence see how it can fit into and behave in the world. |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: A 'modal realist' believes that there are many concrete worlds, while the 'actualist' believes in only one concrete world, the actual world. The 'ersatzist' is an actualist who takes nonactual possible worlds and their contents to be abstracta. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: My view is something like that modal realism is wrong, and actualism is right, and possible worlds (if they really are that useful) are convenient abstract fictions, constructed (if we have any sense) out of the real possibilities in the actual world. |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: The periodic table not only governs what elements there can be, with their properties, but also explicitly excludes others sorts of elements, because the elements are individuated by the number of discrete protons in their nuclei. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: It has to be central to the thesis of scientific essentialism that the possibilities in nature are far more restricted than is normally thought, and this observation illustrates the view nicely. He makes a similar point about subatomic particles. |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |