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7746
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We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
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Full Idea:
If Tully=Cicero is synthetic, the names must have different senses, which seems implausible, for we don't normally think of proper names as having senses in the way that predicates do (we do not, e.g., give definitions of proper names).
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From:
John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.89)
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A reaction:
It is probably necessary to prize apart the question of whether Tully 'has' (intrinsically) a sense, from whether we think of Tully in that way. Stacks of books have appeared about this one, since Kripke.
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7747
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How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
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Full Idea:
It seems that a proper name could not have a reference unless it did have a sense, for how, unless the name has a sense, is it to be correlated with the object?
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From:
John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.91)
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A reaction:
This might (just) be the most important question ever asked in modern philosophy, since it provoked Kripke into answering it, by giving a social, causal, externalist account of how names (and hence lots of language) actually work. But Searle has a point.
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23684
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Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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Full Idea:
In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
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From:
report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
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A reaction:
Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.
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23690
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We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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Full Idea:
Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
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From:
report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
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A reaction:
The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.
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22379
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The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
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Full Idea:
There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
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A reaction:
I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.
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