Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity' and 'Ordinatio'

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9 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Grounding is something like metaphysical causation. Just as causation links the world across time, grounding links the world across levels. Grounding connects the more fundamental to the less fundamental, and thereby backs a certain form of explanation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Obviously you need 'levels' for this, which we should take to be structural levels.
If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: By treating grounding as transitive (and irreflexive), one generates a strict partial ordering that induces metaphysical structure.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Schaffer's paper goes on to attach the claim that grounding is transitive, but I didn't find his examples very convincing.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: I maintain that a universal is not something real that exists in a subject [of inherence], either inside or outside the mind, but that it has being only as a thought-object in the mind.
     From: William of Ockham (Ordinatio [1320], DII Qviii prima redactio)
     A reaction: [A footnote says that William later abandoned this view] I don't see a clear distinction here between having real existence in the mind, and being a thought-object in the mind. Maybe we should say 'merely' a thought-object?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Explaining why ADAM ate the apple is a different matter from explaining why he ATE the apple, and from why he ate THE APPLE. ...In my view the best explanations incorporate ....contrastive information.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
     A reaction: But why are the contrasts Eve, or throwing it, or a pear? It occurs to me that this is wrong! The contrast is with anything else which could have gone in subject, verb or object position. It is a matter of categories, not of contrasts.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
A universal is the result of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: A universal is not the result of generation, but of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing.
     From: William of Ockham (Ordinatio [1320], DII Qviii prima redactio)
     A reaction: The phrase 'mental picturing' works very plausibly for the universal 'giraffe', but not so well for 'multiplication' or 'contradiction'. Though we might broaden 'picturing' to being a much less visual concept. Mapping seems basic.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: I myself would prefer to speak of what is fundamental in terms of the whole spatiotemporal manifold and the fields that permeate it, with parts counting as derivative of the whole.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.1.1)
     A reaction: Not quite the Parmenidean One, since it has parts, but a nice try at updating the great man. Note the reference to 'fields', suggesting that this view is grounded in the physics rather than metaphysics. How many fields has it got?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The leading treatments of causation work within 'structural equation models', with events represented via variables each of which is allotted a range of permitted values, which constitute a 'contrast space'.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
     A reaction: Like Woodward's idea that causation is a graph, this seems to be a matter of plotting or formalising correlations between activities, which is a very Humean approach to causation.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.