6200
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Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it [Kant]
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Full Idea:
Wisdom, theoretically regarded, means the knowledge of the highest good and, practically, the conformability of the will to the highest good.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.V)
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A reaction:
This seems a narrow account of wisdom, focusing entirely on goodness rather than truth. A mind that valued nothing but understood everything would have a considerable degree of wisdom, in the normal use of that word.
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13331
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Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The whole identity of a part is relevant to whether it is a part, but the identity of the whole makes a part a part. The whole part belongs to the whole as a part. The standard account in terms of time-slices fails to respect this part/whole asymmetry.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §2)
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A reaction:
Hard to follow, but I think the asymmetry is that the wholeness of the part contributes to the wholeness of the whole, while the wholeness of the whole contributes to the parthood of the part. Wholeness does different jobs in different directions. OK?
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13332
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Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
It is the hierarchical conception of sets and their members, rather than the linear conception of set and subset or of aggregate and component, that provides us with the better model for the structure of part-whole in its application to material things.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
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A reaction:
His idea is to give some sort of internal structure. He says of {a,b,c,d} that we can create subsets {a,b} and {c,d} from that. But {{a,b},{c,d}} has given member sets, and he is looking for 'natural' divisions between the members.
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13333
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The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The wood is, as it were, a relatively unstructured version of the tree, just as the set {a,b,c,d} is an unstructured counterpart of the set {{a,b},{c,d}}.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
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A reaction:
He is trying to give a modern logicians' account of the Aristotelian concept of 'form' (as applied to matter). It is part of the modern project that objects must be connected to the formalism of mereology or set theory. If it works, are we thereby wiser?
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13326
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A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
First, a thing can be a part in a way that is relative to a time, for example, that a newly installed carburettor is now part of my car, whereas earlier it was not. (This will be called a 'temporary' part).
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
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A reaction:
[Cf Idea 13327 for the 'second' concept of part] I'm immediately uneasy. Being a part seems to be a univocal concept. He seems to be distinguishing parts which are necessary for identity from those which aren't. Fine likes to define by example.
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13327
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A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Second, an object can be a part of another in a way that is not relative to time ('timeless'). It is not appropriate to ask when it is a part. Thus pants and jacket are parts of the suit, atoms of a water molecule, and two pints part of a quart of milk.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
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A reaction:
[cf Idea 13326 for the other concept of 'part'] Again I am uneasy that 'part' could have two meanings. A Life Member is a member in the same way that a normal paid up member is a member.
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13329
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An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
In the 'aggregative' understanding of a sum, it is spread out in time, so that exists whenever any of its components exists (just as it is located at any time wherever any of its components are located).
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
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A reaction:
This works particularly well for something like an ancient forest, which steadily changes its trees. On that view, though, the ship which has had all of its planks replaced will be the identical single sum of planks all the way through. Fine agrees.
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13330
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An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
In the 'compound' notion of sum, the mereological sum is spread out only in space, not also in time. For it to exist at a time, all of its components must exist at the time.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
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A reaction:
It is hard to think of anything to which this applies, apart from for a classical mereologist. Named parts perhaps, like Tom, Dick and Harry. Most things preserve sum identity despite replacement of parts by identical components.
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13328
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Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
I develop a version of hylomorphism, in which the theory of 'rigid embodiment' provides an account of the timeless relation of part, and the theory of 'variable embodiment' is an account of the temporary relation. We must accept two new kinds of whole.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
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A reaction:
[see Idea 13326 and Idea 13327 for the two concepts of 'part'] This is easier to take than the two meanings for 'part'. Since Aristotle, everyone has worried about true wholes (atoms, persons?) and looser wholes (houses).
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6196
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People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant]
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Full Idea:
In the subject there is no antecedent feeling tending to morality; that is impossible, because all feeling is sensuous, and the drives of the moral disposition must be free from every sensuous condition.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.III)
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A reaction:
I'm not quite clear (even after reading Kant) why moral drives 'must' be free of sensuousness. Aristotle gives a much better account, when he tells us that the sensuous drives must be trained in the right way, and must be in harmony with the reason.
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22007
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An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard]
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Full Idea:
For Kant, there is something about beings that can act autonomously that is itself of 'absolute worth', which Kant calls the 'dignity' [Würde] of each such agent.
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From:
report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02
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A reaction:
This answers my puzzle about where Kant's fundamental values come from. Surely wicked actions can be autonomous? Autonomous actions aren't thereby good actions. A 'good' will, course, whatever that is. Rational? My problem with existentialist ethics.
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6192
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Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant]
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Full Idea:
If something is held to be absolutely good or evil in all respects and without qualification, it could not be a thing but only the manner of acting, i.e., it could only be the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself is good or evil.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.II)
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A reaction:
It goes on to deny that pain is intrinsically evil, but his reason for the claim is not clear. Nevetheless, I think he is right. This remark is an important bridge between Enlightenment concerns with law and Greek concerns with character.
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6193
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Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant]
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Full Idea:
Our happiness is the only thing of importance, provided this is judged, as reason requires, not according to transitory sensation but according to the influence which this contingency has on our whole existence and our satisfaction with it.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.II)
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A reaction:
This is closer to the Greek eudaimonia than to the modern conception of happiness, which is largely just a feeling. Kant's view seems more like a private judgement on your whole life, where the Greek idea seems more public and objective.
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6185
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No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant]
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Full Idea:
If my maxim is 'augment my property by all safe means', I can't make that a law allowing me to keep a dead man's loan, because no one would make a loan if that were the moral law.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.1.§4)
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A reaction:
This is a simple illustration of Kant's strategy and it shows clearly how, for all his talk of 'pure reason', his moral law is strongly guided by consequences, and that these can only judged by prior values - for example, that loans are a good thing.
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6187
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Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant]
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Full Idea:
The form of universality is itself the determining ground of the will, …and from this limitation alone, and not from the addition of any exernal drive, the concept of obligation arises to extend the maxim of self-love also to the happiness of others.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.1.§8)
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A reaction:
This is the heroic and optimistic part of Kant's philosophy, the attempt to derive altruism from pure reason. The claim seems to be that maxims don't motivate until they have been universalised. I fear that only altruism could add such motivation.
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6201
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Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means [Kant]
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Full Idea:
In the order of ends, man (and every rational being) is an end in himself, i.e., he is never to be used merely as a means for someone (even for God) without at the same time being himself an end.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.V)
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A reaction:
The worry here is that Kant has set up an exam that you have to pass before you can be treated as a moral end. Animals and the ecosystem will fail the exam, and even some human beings will be borderline cases. We should respect everything.
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1455
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Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [Kant, by PG]
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Full Idea:
To believe in justice in an unjust world, you have to believe in a place of perfect justice (heaven), a time for perfect justice (eternity), and a cause of perfect justice (God).
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From:
report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.V) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
Compare Boethius in Idea 5765. I can see that we might need to grasp the ideals of eternal justice in order to understand morality, but belief in their genuine possibility, or even actuality, doesn't seem to follow.
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6205
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To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds [Kant]
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Full Idea:
We can't infer the existence of God from knowledge of this world, because we should have to know all possible worlds in order to compare them - in short, we should have to be omniscient - in order to say that it is possible only through a God.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.VI)
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A reaction:
A nice remark, but not wholly convincing. This argument would block all attempts to work out necessities a priori, such as those of maths and logic. Must we know all possible worlds intimately to know that 2+2 is always 4?
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6204
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Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you [Kant]
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Full Idea:
To have recourse to God in explaining the arrangements of nature is not a physical explanation but a confession that one has come to the end of philosophy, since one assumes something of which one has no concept to conceive what is before one's eyes.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.VI)
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A reaction:
Hume had many objections to the design argument, some of them positively sarcastic, but none as ruthless as this, since Kant (here) seems to find God to be a totally empty concept, and hence a complete non-starter as explanation for anything.
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6206
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From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones [Kant]
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Full Idea:
Since we know only a small part of the world, and cannot compare it with all possible worlds, we can infer from the order, design and magnitude to a wise, beneficent and powerful Author, but not that He is all-knowing, all-good, and all-powerful.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.VI)
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A reaction:
This is very much in the spirit of David Hume, who inferred from the flaws in the world that God did not seem to be entirely competent. Hume is also more imaginative, in seeing that God might be a committee, or a hired workman.
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6202
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In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left [Kant]
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Full Idea:
One can confidently challenge all pretended natural theologians to cite one single definitive attribute of their object, of which one could not irrefutably show that, when everything anthropomorphic is removed, only the word remains.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.VI)
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A reaction:
This idea derives from Hume's very empiricist view of our understanding of God (Idea 2185), but Kant is (remarkably) more hostile than Hume, because he actually implies that most people's concept of God is totally vacuous.
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