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All the ideas for 'works', 'Virtues of the Mind' and 'Summa Theologicae'

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97 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: A distinctive mark of wisdom is that it cannot be misused, whereas knowledge surely can be misused.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 1.2)
     A reaction: She will argue, with Aristotle, that this is because wisdom (and maybe 'true' knowledge) must include 'phronesis' (practical wisdom), which is the key to all the virtues, intellectual and moral. This idea is striking, and obviously correct.
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb]
     Full Idea: Zagzebski takes wisdom as literally properties of persons, not persons' cognitive states.
     From: report of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], p.59-60) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom 'Twofold'
     A reaction: Not sure about this. Zagzebski uses this idea to endorse epistemic virtue. But knowledge and ignorance are properties of persons too. There can be, though, a precise mental state involved in knowledge, but not in wisdom.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: It is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob2)
     A reaction: Notice that this is 'superfluous' rather than 'wrong'. But ten people can lift a piano which could have been lifted by eight. Note that this is 150 years before Ockham.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Precision is but one virtue of a definition, one that must be balanced against simplicity, elegance, conciseness, theoretical illumination, and practical usefulness.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 2.1)
     A reaction: Illumination looks like the dream virtue for a good definition. Otherwise it is just ticked as accurate and stowed away. 'True justified belief' is a very illuminating definition of knowledge - if it is right. But it's not very precise.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Objection by counterexample is the weakest sort of attack a theory can undergo. Even when the objection succeeds, it shows only that a theory fails to achieve complete accuracy. It does not distinguish among the various rival theories.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 2.1)
     A reaction: Typically counterexamples are used to refute universal generalisations (i.e. by 'falsification'), but canny theorists avoid those, or slip in a qualifying clause. Counterexamples are good for exploring a theory's coverage.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q94 4)
     A reaction: Amazing how many modern thinkers fail to grasp this simple distinction. However, the truth is not quite the same for all if diverse persons are expressing a single truth with different concepts and languages. The word 'facts' is helpful here.
Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf]
     Full Idea: Lying can involve (1) speaking false words, (2) the intention to speak false words, (3) the intention of bringing about deception, and (4) the ultimate goal of one's deception.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q110) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 10 'Lying'
     A reaction: It's a start, but much more is needed to clarify lying. Irony is an obvious problem with (1).
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and if truth does not exist, then the proposition 'Truth does not exist' is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3)
     A reaction: A classic example of turning the tables, also applicable to anyone who firmly denies knowledge, or that words are meaningful, or says that meaning needs verification. However, one measily truth is not much consolation.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: In syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity, others must follow too.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q19 6)
     A reaction: This asserts the necessity of logical consequence, which he derives from Aristotle.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: What first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly the notion of multitude.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I Q11 ar2 ad4), quoted by Roderick Chisholm - Person and Object 1.5
     A reaction: This is one of the best things I have read on 'being'. It is the Aristotelian recognition that we can only study being by studying identity, and that this leads on to wider metaphysics. Other approaches to being are dead ends.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: All natural things can be reduced to one principle, which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle, which is human reason, or will. Therefore God does not exist.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob2)
     A reaction: Not, of course, the opinion of Aquinas. So the possibility of naturalism (assuming the human will can be further reduced to nature) was a clear option in the thirteenth century. In reply Aquinas cites his Fifth Way.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: A human being has no substantial form other than the intellective soul alone, and it contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, and all lower forms, and it alone brings about whatever it is that less perfect forms bring about in other things.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia Q76 4c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.1
     A reaction: He says brutes and plants also have a single soul. Pasnau says this is Aquinas's most distinctive doctrine, because other thinkers postulate a whole hierarchy of substantial forms.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: There are complaints that contemporary epistemology is too atomistic, and that the value of understanding has been neglected.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 2)
     A reaction: This is because of the excessive influence of logic in contemporary analytic philosophy, which has to reduce knowledge to K(Fa), rather than placing it in a human context.
Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: The present obsession with justification and the neglect of understanding has resulted in a feature of epistemology already criticised by several epistemologists: its atomism.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 2.2)
     A reaction: All analytic philosophy has become excessively atomic, because it relies too heavily on logic for its grounding and rigour. There are other sorts of rigour, such as AI, peer review, programming. Or rigour is an idle dream.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Of course we value the truth, but the value we place on knowledge is more than the value of the truth we thereby acquire. …It also involves a valuabe relation between the knower and the truth.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 1)
     A reaction: Hard to assess this. I take truth to be a successful relationship between a mind and a fact. Knowledge needs something extra, to avoid lucky true beliefs. Does a truth acquire greater and greater value as more people come to know it? Doubtful.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: My position is that beliefs, like acts, arrange themselves on a continuum of degrees of voluntariness, ranging from quite a bit to none at all.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 4.2)
     A reaction: I'm sure we have no idea how we came to hold many of our beliefs, and if we see a cat, nothing seems to intervene between the seeing and the believing. But if you adopt a religion, believing its full creed is a big subsequent effort.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Getting knowledge can be a matter either of reaching more truths or of gaining understanding of truths already believed. So it may be a way of increasing either the quality of true belief (cognitive contact with reality) or the quantity.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 2.1)
     A reaction: I'm not sure how one would increase understanding of currently believed truths if it didn't involve adding some new truths to the collection. There is only the discovery of connections or structures, but those are new facts.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Since the speculative reason is concerned chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q94 4)
     A reaction: This seems over-confident, and to confuse the facts with our knowledge of the facts. Simple arithmetic may seem certain, but long and intricate proofs are always a little uncertain.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Knowing beings are differentiated from non-knowing beings by this: non-knowing beings have only their own reality, but knowing beings are capable of possessing also the reality of something else, ...a presence of the thing known produced by this thing.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,q.Q14,art 1)
     A reaction: [Quoted by Ryan Meade in a talk at Pigotts] A famous and much discussed remark. Aquinas was a direct realist about perception, so this presence seems to be the thing itself, rather than a 'representation'.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other hand, self-evident in itself, and to us.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3)
     A reaction: A clear distinction, which is hard to deny, though there are lots of borderline cases. Self-evident to genius, and self-evident to future genius. Self-evident to almost everyone. Goldbach's Conjecture may be self-evident but unknowable.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject. E.g. Man is an animal, because animal is included in the essence of man.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3)
     A reaction: Aquinas focuses on the essence of the subject, where Kant embraces the whole concept of the subject. Is it self-evident that we are genetically related to apes? Yes, to a geneticiist. Is that part of human essence? No. So Kant wins.
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension, for these prepare the way to intellectual knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues by which we know truth; these are in the intellect or reason.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q56 a5 obj3), quoted by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind III 2.2
     A reaction: A gem of a quotation for Zagzebski's thesis, that knowledge is defined in terms of the intellectual virtues. The only virtues of perception are in focusing and paying attention to features. Good eyesight is a biological 'virtue', I suppose.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: In internalist theories the grounds for justification are accessible to the believer, and Gettier problems arise when there is nothing wrong with the internally accessible aspects of the situation, but there is a mishap inaccessible to the believer.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.1)
     A reaction: I'm sure we could construct an internal mishap which the believer was unaware of, such as two confusions of the meanings of words cancelling one another out.
Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: As long as the concept of knowledge closely connects the justification component and the truth component but permits some degree of independence between them, justified true belief will never be sufficient for knowledge.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.1)
     A reaction: Out of context this sounds like an advertisement for externalism. Or maybe it just says we have to live with Gettier threats. Zagzebski has other strategies.
We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: The way to avoid the Gettier problem is to define knowledge in such a way that truth is entailed by the other component(s) of the definition.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.1)
     A reaction: Thus she defines virtuous justification as being successful, as virtues tend to be. This smacks of cheating. Surely we can be defeated in a virtuous way? If the truth is entailed then of course Gettier can be sent packing.
Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: The procedure for generating Gettier cases involves 'double luck': an instance of good luck cancels out an instance of bad luck.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.2)
     A reaction: You can end up with the right answer in arithmetic if you make two mistakes rather than one. I'm picturing a life of one blundering error after another, which to an outsider seems to be going serenely well.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: I argue that intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II Intro)
     A reaction: This contrasts with Sosa, who seems to think intellectual virtues are just the most efficient ways of reaching the truth. I like Zabzebski's approach a lot, though we are in a very small minority. I love her book. We have epistemic and moral duties.
A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: It is not enough that a process is reliable; a person will not reliably use such a process without certain virtues.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 4.1.2)
     A reaction: This is a point against Sosa's reliabilist account of virtues. Of course, all theories of epistemic justification (or of morality) will fail if people can't be bothered to implement them.
Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Maybe the intellectual and the moral forms of prejudice are the same vice, and this may also be true of other traits with shared names, such as humility, autonomy, integrity, perseverance, courage and trustworthiness.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.1)
     A reaction: I find this claim very persuasive. The virtue of 'integrity' rather obviously embraces groups of both intellectually and morally desirable traits.
We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Some examples of intellectual vices: pride, negligence, idleness, cowardice, conformity, carelessness, rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, closed-mindedness, insensitivity to detail, obtuseness (in seeing relevance), and lack of thoroughness.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.1)
     A reaction: There are thousands of vices for which we don't have names, like thinking about football when you should be doing metaphysics. The other way round is also a vice too, because football needs concentration. Discontent with your chair is bad too.
A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: A justified belief is what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue, and who has the understanding of his cognitive situation a virtuous person would have, might believe in like circumstances.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 6.1)
     A reaction: This is a whole-hearted definition of justification in terms of a theory of intellectual virtues. Presumably this would allow robots to have justified beliefs, if they managed to behave the way intellectually virtuous persons would behave.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Just as a utility-calculating machine would be the ideal moral agent according to utilitarianism, a truth-producing machine would be the ideal epistemic agent according to reliabilism,
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 1.2)
     A reaction: Love this one! For consequentialists a successful robot is morally superior to an average human being. The reliabilist dream is just something that churns out truths. But what is the role of these truths in subsequent life?
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
     Full Idea: Sensory species received in external senses are transmitted to 'internal senses', organs located in the brain. The most important of these for cognition are 'phantasia' and 'imagination' (part of phantasia), which produce and preserve 'phantasms'.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11
     A reaction: This seems to make Aquinas a representative realist. I add this to my portfolio of philosophical faculties - those required by philosophy, rather than by psychology or neuroscience.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Mental activity combines two activities which in the senses are distinct: exterior perception in which we are simply affected by what we sense, and interior imagination in which we create images of things that are not, and never have been present.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2)
     A reaction: Geach cites this thought to show that he is anti-abstractionist, since mind creates images, and these can arise from things which have not been experienced. Any defence of abstractionism must allow an active power to imagination.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Abstacting A from B can mean denying A's connection with B, or simply thinking A without thinking B. Abstracting what in reality is connected generates falsehood if done the first way, but not if done the second.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
     A reaction: Despite Geach's denials, this seems to make Aquinas a classic abstractionist. He goes on to distinguish two sorts of abstraction, but he certainly thinks of abstraction from sense experience as a revelation about the nature of reality.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: If we think what defines a stone, man or horse, without thinking of any individual peculiarities it may have, this is precisely what we do when we abstract the general nature of what we understand from any particular way in which we imagine it.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
     A reaction: This may not be simple abstraction from sense experience, since there would obviously be a threatened circularity in the process. Do you need to know the essential definition first, in order to discard the individual peculiarities?
The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Our mind both abstracts the species from images when it attends to the general nature of things, and understand the species in the images when it has recourse to the images in order to understand the things whose species it has abstracted.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
     A reaction: Geach claims that the second half of this idea means that Aquinas is not an abstractionist, but he seems to be explictly abstractionist about the way in which we create higher level concepts from lower ones.
Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: There are even things we can abstract from thought matter in general, things like being and oneness and potentiality and realization.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
     A reaction: The Aristotelian 'potentiality' means possibility, which means that modality is understood by abstraction. Aquinas seems to have four levels: particular perceived, general perceived, particular thought, and general thought. This is the highest level.
Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The generality attaching to a nature - its relatedness to many particular instances - results from abstraction, so in this sense a generalized nature presupposes its instances, and does not, as Plato thought, precede them.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2)
     A reaction: This seems to be a quite explicit endorsement of abstractionism by Aquinas, despite all Geach's assertions to the contrary.
Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms insofar as through the power of the agent intellect we can take into our consideration the natures of the species without the individual conditions.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad4)
     A reaction: There might be a threatened circularity here, in trying to decide which features to ignore and which to retain. If we saw a hundred horses with a white nose blaze, we still wouldn't be sure that this was essential to a horse. Innate notions of species??
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that the concept of the self is constituted as much by what we know as by what we do.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 1)
     A reaction: People take pride in what they know, which indicates that it is of central importance to a person's nature. Hard to evaluate ideas such as this.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
     Full Idea: Aquinas conceives of freedom as free decision or judgement, which cannot be attributed to the will alone.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 12
     A reaction: This idea might improve the free will debate considerably, because it is not clear what sort of thing a 'will' is, and it is not clear how an entity can be 'free' in isolation, by its intrinsic nature. Isn't all freedom contextual?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: It is necessary to say that that which is the principle of intellective activity, what we call the soul of a human being, is an incorporeal, subsistent principle.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia.Q75 2c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 10
     A reaction: Note 'subsistent' rather than 'existent' (capable of independence?). This identifies the immortal soul with the conscious mind. 'Principle' is an odd word, presumably with roots in Aristotle. It seems to be an Aristotelian 'form' [morphe].
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Most feelings are experienced as pleasant or painful, but it is not evident that they all are; curiosity may be one that is not. [note: 'curiosity' may not be the name of a feeling, but a feeling typically accompanies it]
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.1)
     A reaction: If a machine generates a sliding scale from pain to pleasure, is there a neutral feeling at the midpoint, or does all feeling briefly vanish there? Not sure.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The intellect first apprehends the quiddity of a thing. ...Then it acquires the properties, accidents and dispositions associated with the thing's essence. It must proceed from one compounding or dividing of aspects to another, which is reasoning.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia.Q85 5c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11
     A reaction: [compressed] Tracking the process of acquiring knowledge of a thing (rather than necessary and sufficient conditions for full knowledge) is closer to Quine's naturalised epistemology than to the standard analytic approach to the concept of knowledge.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: To cognize that which is in individual matter, not as it is in such matter, is to abstract the form from the individual matter that the phantasms represents. Thus we come to a degree of cognition of immaterial things.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Reply)
     A reaction: This offers abstraction as a kind of inference to best explanation which takes us beyond immediate empirical experience to what is behind it. Aquinas thinks the concepts and explanation are spiritual, but they may be generalities and essences.
Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Of the thing understood all that is within the actually understanding intellect is the abstracted intelligible species.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Art2)
     A reaction: Abstraction is never supposed to be a luxury bolt-on, but is always seen (in this tradition, and presumably in the modern one), as essential to the intellect, and its way of coming to understand the world. Aristotelian definition is behind this idea.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Intellect can abstract mathematical species from sensible matter, both individual and common. Yet it cannot abstract such species from common intelligible matter, but only from individual intelligible matter.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad2)
     A reaction: The idea is that common intelligible matter lacks underlying substance, which is where quantity is to be found.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Objects of mathematics abstract from perceived matter both in particular and in general, though from thought matter (substance as underlying quality) only in particular and not in general.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
     A reaction: This appears to be a thoroughly abstractionist view of the way in which humans create mathematics. Aquinas explicitly denies the Platonic view that the numbers already have abstract existence, awaiting our discovery.
We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The apple is not part of the nature of the colour, and so nothing prevents one from understanding the colour while understanding nothing of the apple.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Ad 1)
     A reaction: This helps to clarify why the procedure of 'ignoring' features is possible. It suggests that some features might be too entangled with the substance (too essential?) to be thus ignored. I can't think of an example, though. Why not?!
Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Abstracting takes place in two ways: by composition and division, understanding something to be not in another or to be separated from it; and by a simple and unconditioned consideration, understanding one thing while not considering the other at all.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Ad 1)
     A reaction: The second way is by 'ignoring', which he says cannot contain error. The first seems to be considering some mode of a thing to be actually separate from the thing, which could clearly be erroneous. Ignoring makes to commitment to a unity.
Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Quantities such as numbers and dimensions, and also shapes (which are the limits of quantities) can be considered without their sensible qualities, which is for them to be abstracted from sensible matter.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad2)
     A reaction: His account relies on underlying substance, which is where quantity is to be found (presumably because a substance is the epitome of a unit).
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The agent mind must itself turn to images, and produce by its own power in the receptive mind a representation as to species of whatever the images represent as individual.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
     A reaction: Unlike much of this section, this sentence supports Geach's claim that Aquinas agrees with him - that the mind creates its concepts, rather than 'abstracting' them from experience.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The will is the rational appetite.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 4)
     A reaction: Defining the will in terms of reason sounds more like an Enlightenment optimist than a medieval theologian. I suspect that for him it is tautological the reason is involved, if only the reason can make decisions. Hobbes prefers to ruling appetite.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: A motive does have an aspect of desire, but it includes something about why a state of affairs is desired, and that includes something about the way my emotions are tied to my aim.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.6)
     A reaction: It is standard usage that a 'motive' involves some movement towards achieving the desire, and not merely having the desire. I'd quite like to stand on top of Everest, but have absolutely no motivation to try to achieve it.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Modern ethics generally considers morality much less a system for fulfilling human nature than a set of principles for dealing with individuals in conflict.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 7)
     A reaction: Historically I associate this move with Hugo Grotius around 1620. He was a great legalist, and eudaimonist virtue ethics gradually turned into jurisprudence. The Enlightenment sought rules for resolving dilemmas. Liberalism makes fulfilment private.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: A human being's good is existing in accordance with reason, while what is bad for a human being is whatever is contrary to reason.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q18.5c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13
     A reaction: For anyone who thought Kant invented the idea that morality derives from reason. This idea of Aquinas is a fairly precise echo of the stoic view (which influenced Kant). Is there a circularity? Is it irrational because bad, or bad because irrational?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end but also knowing it under the aspect of the end and the relation of the means to that end.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-I.Q132), quoted by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness 4
     A reaction: We don't talk much now about 'perfect' knowledge of something, but I suppose this is the necessary and sufficient conditions. If you complete the checklist, your knowledge should be perfect (if the list is right).
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Because of moral luck, the realm of the morally praiseworthy / blameworthy is not indisputably within one's voluntary control or accessible to one's consciousness.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 4.2)
     A reaction: [She particularly cites Thomas Nagel for this] It is a fact that we will be blamed (more strongly) when we have moral bad luck, but the question is whether we should be. It seems harsh, but you can't punish someone as if they had had bad luck.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Modern moral philosophers have been considerably more skeptical than were the ancient Greeks about the close association between the flourishing of the individual and that of the community.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.2)
     A reaction: I presume this is not just a change in fashion, but a reflection of how different the two societies are. In a close community with almost no privacy, flourishing individuals are good citizens. In the isolations of modern liberalism they may be irrelevant.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: An analysis of virtue is hopeless unless we can assume that most of a selected list of traits count as virtues, in a way not strictly culture. ...These would include wisdom, courage, benevolence, justice, honesty, loyalty, integrity, and generosity.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.1)
     A reaction: This requirement needs there to be a single core to human nature, right across the species. If we are infinitely flexible (as existentialists imply) then the virtues will have matching flexibility, and so will be parochial and excessively relative.
A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: It is important for the nature of virtue that it have a corresponding vice (or two, in the doctrine of the mean). Claustrophobia is not a vice not only because it is involuntary, but also because there is no corresponding virtue.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.3)
     A reaction: Presumably attaining a virtue is an achievement, so we would expect a label for failure in the same field of endeavour. The failure is not purely negative, because bad things ensue if the virtue is not present.
Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG]
     Full Idea: The difference between skills and virtues is that virtues must be enacted, are always desirable, can't be forgotten, and can be simulated, whereas skills are very specific, involve a technique, lack contraries, and lack intrinsic value.
     From: report of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.4) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: [my summary of her II 2.4 discussion of the differences] She observes that Aristotle made insufficient effort to distinguish the two. It may be obscure to say that virtues go 'deeper' than skills, but we all know what is meant. 'Skills serve virtues'.
Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: A virtue can be defined as 'a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end'.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.7)
     A reaction: She puts this in bold, and it is the culminating definition of a long discussion. It rather obviously fails to say anything about the nature of the end that is desired. Learning the telephone book off by heart seems to fit the definition.
Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Being reasonably intelligent within a certain area of life is part of having almost any moral virtue.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.1)
     A reaction: The fact that this bars persons of very limited intelligence from acquiring the Aristotelian virtues is one of the attractions of the Christian enjoinder to merely achieve 'love'. Anyone can have a warm heart. So is virtue elitist?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The good of any virtue …is referable to the common good, to which justice directs, so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice insofar as it directs man to the common good.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 5)
     A reaction: Michael Sandel has recently lamented to fading of the concept of 'the common good' from our moral and political life. In which case this thought of Aquinas takes on great importance. I certainly like it. It seems to apply to courage, for example.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: A pure virtue theory can have as many rules as you like as long as they are understood as grounded in the virtuous motivations and understanding of the nonmoral facts that virtuous agents possess.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 6.1)
     A reaction: It is important, I think, to see that a virtue theorist does not have to be a particularist.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre]
     Full Idea: The Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas (unlike St Augustine's Platonism) is not concerned with escaping from the snares of the world and of desire, but with transforming desire for moral ends.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9
     A reaction: This is very close to Aristotle himself, for whom education of the feelings (into good habits, and then true virtues) was central. Education of feelings should be central to all education (though young psychopaths may show resistance).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: There must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good, and this virtue is legal justice.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 6)
     A reaction: This concept of legal justice is underpinned, for Aquinas, by the concept of natural law, which has divine backing. Positive law could hardly fulfil such a major role, given that it could be corrupt.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: We need phronesis (practical wisdom) to coordinate the various virtues into a single line of action or line of thought leading up to an act or to a belief.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 5.2)
     A reaction: If I have a conflicting virtue and vice in a single situation, something must make sure that the virtue dominates. That sounds more like Kant's 'good will' than like phronesis.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: It is not sufficient for honesty that a person tells whatever she happens to believe is the truth. An honest person is careful with the truth.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.2)
     A reaction: Not sure about that. It matches what Aristotle says about courage, which also needs practical reason [phronesis]. But being sensitive and careful with truth seems to need other virtues. If total honesty is not a virtue, then is honesty a virtue at all?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The passions may incite us to something against reason, and so we need a curb, which we name 'temperance'.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia 2ae Q61 a.3), quoted by Philippa Foot - Virtues and Vices II
     A reaction: I am increasingly unclear what 'reason' means in contexts like these. It seems to mean no more than the awareness of greater goods than the indulgence of passion. Without that awareness, high intelligence couldn't produce temperance.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are 'adjusted' when they are made equal.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 1)
     A reaction: Even if you say justice is giving people what they deserve, rather than mere equality, they must still be equal in receiving like for like. Legal justice implies equality before the law (except for monarchs?).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: In the case of a courageous Nazi soldier, my position is that a virtue is worth having even in those cases in which it makes a person worse overall.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.2)
     A reaction: A brave claim, which seems right. If a nasty Nazi reforms, they will at least have one good quality which can be put to constructive use.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: There are many differences of degrees among men, for instance, some are soldiers, some are priests, some are princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be alloted to them.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 4)
     A reaction: An objection (3), but Aquinas endorses it in his reply. In 58.10 he says striking a prince is worse that striking a commoner. The shift to the idea that everyone is supposed to be equal before the law has been slow, and we are not quite there yet.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: It is evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q91 2)
     A reaction: It is not enough merely that God decrees eternal laws. It is also necessary for us to use reason in order to participate. I'm not sure what reasoning process is involved.
Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: A tyrannical law, since it is not in accord with reason, is not unconditionally a law, but is rather a perversion of law.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q92.1, ad 4), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13
     A reaction: Only a belief in natural law can give a basis for such a claim. Positivists will say a tyrannical law is unconditionally a law like any other, but a bad one.
Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: All things to be done or to be avoided pertain to the precepts of natural law, which practical reasoning apprehends naturally as being human goods.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q94.2c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13
     A reaction: No mention of God, but you feel the divine presence in the background. He also cites 'eternal law'. No coincidence that the atheist Hobbes rejected natural law. Personally I would offer an atheistic defence of natural law, based on human nature.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Aquinas argued that on three conditions war can be justified: first, that there is a just cause; second, that it is begun on proper authority; and third, that it is waged with right intention, for 'the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil'.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II) by A.C. Grayling - Among the Dead Cities Ch.6
     A reaction: But see also Idea 7292. Nowadays we are rightly suspicious of all three conditions. Evil people seem to think their cause is just; authority has often been seized by violence, or is being abused; and people seem confused about what is good or evil.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: In Aquinas's view the fertilized egg is not, either at the moment of conception or for quite a while afterwards, endowed with an immortal soul. In fact, technically speaking, it is not even human.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.20
     A reaction: It is pointed at that therefore Aquinas does not give good support for modern Catholic views on abortion. There is certainly no reason why a human zygote should be ensouled from the start, as God may do this whenever He wishes.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Bodies are those substances in which one finds three dimensions.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia Q18.2c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 16.2
     A reaction: Pasnau points out that this extensional view of physical bodies was a commonplace long before Descartes. Presumably there are also non-dimensional substances (such as angels?).
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The divine law commands certain things because they are good and forbids others because they are evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others evil because they are forbidden.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 2)
     A reaction: This is a fifty-fifty response to the Euthyphro dilemma, but it seems to leave the theological puzzle of the source of the goodness which is prescribed because it is in fact good.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition 'God exists' is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3)
     A reaction: Depends on his definition of self-evidence (Idea 21250), which needs knowledge of the essence of the subject. Anselm required 'understanding' of the concept. One might understand the existence criteria without knowing the whole essence. Anselm wins.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas]
     Full Idea: To those who assume the existence of a necessary being, and would only know which among all things had to be regarded as such a thing, one could not answer: This thing here is the necessary being
     From: comment on Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason A612/B640
     A reaction: See Aquinas in Idea 1431. Kant makes a nice point. You might turn out to be the necessary being? How could you tell? You only know that there must be one lurking somewhere. I could be a slug. Aquinas makes a huge leap to God.
Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: A thing can only be reduced from potentiality to actuality by something actual. A thing can never be in actuality and potentiality in the same respect. So what is moved must be moved by another. But this cannot go on to infinity, with no first mover.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
     A reaction: [compressed] This relies on the Aristotelian ideas of potentiality and actuality. We might talk about things moving, but lacking the 'power' to move. This is almost identical to Plato in 'The Laws' (which I guess Aquinas knew nothing of).
Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: If there is no first cause among efficient causes, there is no ultimate or intermediate cause. That in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity is plainly false. So it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, which everyone calls God.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
     A reaction: [compressed] It doesn't seem to follow at all that the First Cause is God. There could be a single thing like the Phoenix, with unique self-causing properties. Or a quantum fluctuation.
Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: That which can not-be at some time is not. So if everything can not-be, then once there was nothing in existence. If so, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist. So there must be some being having of itself its own necessity.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
     A reaction: [compressed] Why can't things take it in turns to not-be, so that something is always on duty? Maybe it is a feature of things that they bring other things into existence (e.g. virtual particles)?
Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: More and less are predicated of different things according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum. The maximum of a genus is the cause of all in that genus. So there must be something causing the perfections of all beings.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
     A reaction: [compressed] The argument makes a startling jump from each quality (like heat or nobility) having a maximum, to their being a single entity (a 'being' at that) which is the sole source of all human perfections.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, which is usually in the same way, to obtain the best result. Hence they achieve their end designedly. Hence some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
     A reaction: [compressed] This is Greek teleology with a vengeance. Plants probably illustrate best what he has in mind. There is obvious teleology in human affairs, and there is a sort of teleology in living things, but we take the end to be reinforced by success.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Aquinas describes the ultimate end of human life as the Beatific Vision, a state that is simultaneously the enjoyment of perfect happiness and a perfect revelation of truth.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II 4.2
     A reaction: I like that a lot, even though my idea of the revelation of truth is very distant from that of Aquinas. Ignorant happiness is not much of an aspiration.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
     Full Idea: Unlike some of his contemporaries, Aquinas does not think that there is a 'spiritual matter' that angels or disembodied souls have as one of their components, but rather that they are separated forms that configure no matter at all.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 10
     A reaction: 'Separated forms' sounds like the modern concept of abstract entities, meaning that souls and angels exist in the way that platonists believe numbers exist. How else might Aquinas have understood them?
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji]
     Full Idea: Aquinas infers from Aristotle that intellectual understanding is the only operation of the soul that is performed without a physical organ, so that only human souls, and not animal ones, can be immortal.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I, q75, a3, resp) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Reason'
     A reaction: This shows why so many thinkers are desperate to hang on to dualism, of some sort. Interesting that he only claims partial dualism.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: In order that the bliss of the saints may be more delightful for them, and they may render more copious thanks to God for it, it is given to them to see perfectly the punishment of the damned.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], III Supp Q94,1), quoted by Friedrich Nietzsche - On the Genealogy of Morals I.§15
     A reaction: This has probably been repudiated by the Church of England. Justice should be seen to be done. Presumably you mustn't gloat, or you join them.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: If one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the name God means that He is infinite goodness. If therefore God existed there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1)
     A reaction: This is not, of course, the opinion of Aquinas. I love the way he states the opposition's arguments so lucidly. The modern problem usually talks of God's omnipotence, rather than infinity. His formulation allows that there might be undiscoverable evil.
It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: As Augustine says, God would not allow any evil to exist in his works, unless he were to bring good even out of evil. It is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He allows evil to exist and out of it produces good.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1rep)
     A reaction: Are God's powers so limited that He could not have achieved an equal amount of good without having to indulge in some evil first?