59 ideas
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The aim of analysis is to give us knowledge of all and only the platitudes surrounding our use of the concept that is up for analysis. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.10) | |
A reaction: His earlier specimen concept is 'redness'. For other concepts there might be considerable disagreement about which propositions are or are not the relevant platitudes. Smith emphasises that analysis need not be reductive. |
4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as science; there are only sciences: physics, chemistry, meteorology, geology, biology, psychology, sociology. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Intro) | |
A reaction: A simple but nice point. It suggests that maybe each science has an entirely different method, and style of reasoning, experiment and explanation. Some have strict laws, others have 'ceteris paribus' laws. |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The discussion of colour concepts shows that permutation problems arise when a set of concepts, acquired inter alia via the presentation of paradigms, is largely interdefined. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: Smith says that our normative moral concepts are largely interdefined in this way. The 'permutation' problem is that they can change places in the definition set, and so their intrinsic individual character is not pinned down. Sounds right. |
4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
Full Idea: 'Supervenience' means lower-level objects and properties suffice for the higher level ones, but the higher level is distinct from its ground, which is reflected in the higher level being governed by distinct laws of nature. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: A nice summary of Davidson's idea. It feels wrong to me. Can I create some 'new laws of nature' by combining things novelly in a laboratory so that a supervenient state emerges. Sounds silly to me. Must we invoke God to achieve this? |
4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
Full Idea: Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The problem is that anything which can't figure in a causal law will therefore be undetectable, so we could only speculate about the existence of such properties, never know them. |
4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
Full Idea: A predicate that does not designate a property could nevertheless hold true of an object in virtue of that object's properties. An object is a stone not in virtue of holding the property of being a stone, but because it possesses certain other properties. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: Sounds simple but important, especially in relation to the mind. We are left with the problem of how to individuate a property, and the possibility of 'basic' properties. |
4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
Full Idea: New combinations of properties are just that: new combinations, not new properties. (This is not to reject complex properties, but only to reaffirm that complex properties are nothing over and above their constituents suitably arranged). | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: I wish I could be so confidence, but no one seems quite sure what a property is. Are they defined causally, or as 'qualities'? If the latter, what is a quality? Are there basic properties? Can properties merge to form a new one? |
4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
Full Idea: Complex properties do not "emerge"; they are nothing "over and above" the properties of the simple constituents duly arranged. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: I am glad to see someone challenging the concept of 'emergence', which strikes me as incoherent. Small properties add up to macro-properties (like 'steep', or 'square'). |
4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
Full Idea: If P and Q are predicates denoting properties, we can construct a disjunctive predicate ('P or Q'). But it is not clear that this gives us any right whatever to suppose that 'P or Q' designates a property. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Pref) | |
A reaction: An important idea, needed to disentangle our ontology from our language, and realise that they are separate. Properties are natural; predicates are conventional. |
4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
Full Idea: I resist the term 'trope' as it has become common for the proponents of tropes to regard objects as "bundles" of tropes. This turns tropes into something too much resembling parts of objects for my taste. .I think an object is a possessor of properties. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply a belief in 'substance', which is an intrinsically dodgy concept, but something has to exist. Keep ontology and epistemology separate! We can only know bundles of properties. |
4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
Full Idea: If a boat can continue to exist after the planks that currently make it up have ceased to exist, and if the planks could continue to exist when the boat does not, then a boat cannot be identified with the planks that make it up at a given time. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This seems obvious, but it opposes Locke's claim that the particles of an object are its identity. Does this mean identities are entirely in our heads, and not a feature of nature? I want to resist that. |
4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
Full Idea: We should be suspicious of anyone who embraces the formal apparatus of possible worlds while rejecting the ontology. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Pref) | |
A reaction: What matters is that good philosophy should not duck the ontological implications of any apparatus. If only embracing the 'ontology of possible worlds' were a simple matter. What makes one world 'close' to another? |
4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
Full Idea: Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Nicely put. There is a certain intellectual integrity about idealism, but it is still mad. The overall picture seems to me incoherent if we don't assume that appearances are bringing us close to reality (without ever quite getting there). |
4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
Full Idea: One generation addresses the qualitative aspect of mentality, the next focuses on its scientific standing, its successor takes up the problem of mental content, then the cycle starts all over again… | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints the three interlinked questions. We seem to be currently obsessed with the quality of experience (the 'Hard Question'), but the biggest questions is how the three aspects fit together. If there are three necessities here, they must coexist. |
4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
Full Idea: If a mental property is realised by a material property, then it looks as though its material realiser pre-empts any causal contribution on the part of the realised mental property. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This has a beautiful simplicity about it. I can see how some very odd phenomena might suddenly appear out of a physical combination, but not how entirely new causal laws can be created. |
4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
Full Idea: Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: If only I knew what a 'quality' was. Do combinations have qualities in addition to the qualities of the components? A pair of trees, a pile of sand, a mass of neurons. |
4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers have thought that intentional states are exhausted by propositional attitudes, but what about mental imagery? You may have propositional attitudes to food, but I would wager that most of your thoughts about it are imagistic. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: Seems right. If I encounter an object by which I am bewildered, I may form no propositions at all about it, but I can still contemplate the object. |
4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
Full Idea: The prevailing 'externalist' line on intentionality regards intentional states of mind as owing their content (what they are of, or about) to causal relations agents bear to the world. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This goes back to Putnam's Twin Earth. 'Meanings aren't in the head'. I may defer to experts about what 'elm' means, but I may also be arrogantly wrong about what 'juniper' means. |
4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
Full Idea: Error, like truth, presupposes judgement. Judgements you make about your conscious states are distinct from those states. This leaves room for error. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This sounds very neat. The reply would have to be that a lot of introspection is not judgement, but direct perception of self-evident facts and truths. I agree with Heil. |
4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
Full Idea: If causal relations boil down to nothing more than regularities (as Hume suggests), then it is a mistake to regard the absence of a mechanism or causal link between mental events and material events as a special problem. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: So critics of Descartes who were baffled by interaction, were actually sniffing Hume's wholesale scepticism about necessary causation. Even so, physical conjunction is more tangible than spiritual conjunction. |
4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
Full Idea: If there are elementary particles, then they are certainly capable of endless interactions beyond those in which they actually engage. Everything points to dispositionality being a fundamental feature of our world. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced that my ontology has to include something called a 'disposition'. Dispositions are the consequence of how things are. Are there passive dispositions? |
4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
Full Idea: Any attempt to say what behaviour follows from a given state of mind can be shown to be false by producing an example in which the state of mind is present but, owing to the addition of new beliefs and desires, the behaviour does not follow. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: The objection seems misplaced against eliminative behaviourism, because there are held to be no mental states to correlate with the behavior. There is just behaviour, some times the same, sometimes different. |
4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
Full Idea: Although your heart is a material object, the property of being a heart is, if we accept the functionalist picture, not a material property. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Presumably functional properties are not physical because they are multiply realisable. The property of being a heart is more like a theoretical flow diagram than it is like a muscle. That word 'property' again… |
4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
Full Idea: If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: The problem is not that qualia must be denied, but that there is strong pressure to class them as epiphenomena. However, a raw colour can have a causal role (e.g. in an art gallery). Best to say (with Chalmers?) that functions cause qualia? |
4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
Full Idea: The categories definitive of a given science mark off boundaries that are largely invisible within science at lower levels. That is why there is, in general, no prospect of reducing a higher-level science to a science at some lower level. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This sounds slick, but I am unconvinced. Molecules only exist at the level of chemistry, but they are built up out of physics, and the 'boundaries' could be explained in physics, if you had the knowledge and patience. |
4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
Full Idea: The categories embedded in a higher-level science (psychology, for instance) designate genuine properties of objects, which are not reducible to properties found in sciences at lower levels. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This isn't an argument against reductionism. It is obviously true that someone with a physics degree won't make a good doctor. It's these wretched 'property' things again. Is 'found repulsive by me' a property terrorists? |
4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
Full Idea: 'Property dualism' is the view according to which the mental and the physical are not distinguishable kinds of substance, but distinct families of properties. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.2 n) | |
A reaction: I am struggling to make sense of properties being in distinct families. If it is like smells and colours, it doesn't say much, and if the difference is more profound then it begins to look like old-fashioned dualism in disguise. |
4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
Full Idea: The early identity theorists talked of identifying mental processes with brain processes, but I am now proposing it as a theory about properties. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Since a process is presumably composed of more basic ontological ingredients, this is presumably a good move, but there is still a vagueness about the whole concept of a 'property'. |
4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
Full Idea: Some have argued that eliminativism about propositional attitudes is self-refuting. If no one believes anything, then how could we believe the eliminativist thesis? | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Sounds slick, but it doesn't strike me as a big problem. Presumably you don't 'believe' eliminativism. You treat some of your brain processes as if they fell into the fictional category of 'belief'. |
4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
Full Idea: The identity theory is preferable to dualism since 1) if mental events are neurological, it is easy to explain causal relations between them, and 2) if we can account for mental phenomena by reference to brains and their properties, we don't need minds. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: One might add that it fits into the overall scientific world, and permits the possible closure of physics. The challenge is that identity theory must 'save the phenomena'. |
4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
Full Idea: The functionalists' point is that higher-level properties like being in pain or computing the sum of 7 and 5 are not to be identified with ("reduced to") or mistaken for their realisers. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I take it that functionalist minds can't be reduced because they are abstractions rather than physical entities. Nevertheless, the implied ontology seems to be entirely physical, and hence in some sense reductionist. |
4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
Full Idea: Proponents of multiple realisability regard it as vital to distinguish realised, higher-level properties from their lower-level realisers. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: So that the very idea of 'multiple realisability' begs the question. Minds are private, so it is never clear what has been realised, especially in non-linguistic brains. |
4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
Full Idea: Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties; it is the phenomenon of predicates applying to objects in virtue of distinct, though pertinently similar, properties possessed by those objects. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: The analogies for multiple realisability usually involve functions rather than properties or predicates (different types of corkscrew). Pain or belief in danger are not just 'predicates'. |
4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
Full Idea: Imagine a neuroscientist who is intimately familiar with the physiology of headaches, but who has never actually experienced a headache. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: A more realistic version of Frank Jackson's 'Mary'. Doctors need to know that headaches are unpleasant; what they actually feel like seems irrelevant (epiphenomenal). What's it like to only have two pairs of shoes? |
4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
Full Idea: A fierce debate has raged between proponents of 'pictorial' conceptions of imagery (Kosslyn) and those who take imagery to be propositional (Pylyshyn). | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This may not be a simple dilemma. Pure pictorial imagery seem possible (abstract patterns) and pure propositions are okay (maths), but in most thought they are inextricable. The image is the proposition (a nuclear cloud). |
4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology and neuroscience are not competitors, any more than cartography and geology are competitors. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This seems true enough, unless someone like Fodor claims that the correct way to do neuroscience is to try to explicate folk psychology categories in terms of brain function. Folk psychology is fine for folk. |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: It would be a superhuman task just to write down an explicit, non-summary style, statement of the platitudes that capture our idea of what it is to be fully rational. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: Well said. Philosophers are inclined to make simplistic binary judgements about whether persons or animals are rational. A visit to YouTube will show fish acting extremely rationally. |
4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
Full Idea: I intend the notion of truth-conditions to correspond to what I have called 'literal meaning'. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Yes. If I identify myself to you by saying "the spam is in the fridge", that always has a literal meaning (which we assemble from the words), as well as connotation in this particular context. |
4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
Full Idea: There is something puzzling about the notion that someone could understand the sentences "birds warble" and "tigers growl", yet have no idea what the sentence "tigers warble" meant. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: True enough, but this need not imply the full thesis of linguistic holism. Words are assembled like bricks. I know tigers might warble, but stones don't. Might fish warble? Or volcanoes? I must know that 'birds warble' is not a tautology. |
4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |
Full Idea: Anyone who takes propositions to be abstract entities owes the rest of us an account of how human beings could interact with such things. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: He makes this sound impossible, but that would mean that all abstraction is impossible, and there are no such things as ideas and concepts. In the end something has to be miraculous, so let it be our ability to think about abstractions. |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: There is a minor proviso to Hume's view, which is that desires are subject to rational criticism, but only insofar as they are based on beliefs that are subject to rational criticism. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
A reaction: He says this is not a refutation of the basic Humean claim. He has in mind a desire such as to consume cyanide because you believe it will be good for you. |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: We should concede that a desire may be had in the absence of its being felt. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
A reaction: A nice observation. An example he gives is a father's desire that his child does well. Smith is discussing Hume's account of motivation in terms of desires and beliefs. |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: According to the standard picture of human psychology that we get from Hume, not only are desires not assessable in terms of truth and falsehood, they are not subject to any sort of rational criticism at all. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
A reaction: This is where action theory meets metaethics. The separation of facts from values underlies this, because a desire is a fact, but the wickedness of a desire is not. Surely a desire could be a failure of practical reason? |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: It is an adequacy constraint on any conception of desire that the epistemology of desire it recommends allows that subjects may be fallible about the desires they have. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [I do wish authors would write my short versions instead of their rambling sentences!] Even after the event we may be unsure why we did something. If someone observes self-interest when I thought my action was altruistic, I don't know how to respond. |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Humeans claim that agents who believe they should act may nevertheless lack the desire to do so, where anti-Humeans must say the two go together, and someone with the belief thereby has the desire. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.7) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] A very helpful distinction about the classic debates over the motivations of action. Smith defends the Humean view, and makes it very plausible. No mere sense of rightness or duty can compel us to act. |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Even if we assume that reason prefers harmony between first- and second-order desires, there is no reason to assume that reason is on the side of achieving that harmony by changing first-order desires to suit second-order, rather than vice versa. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.7) | |
A reaction: [Smith is discussing David Lewis 1989 on second-order desires] Smith says that on the Humean view the rational winner should simply be the stronger of the two. Since this sounds like an endorsement for weakness of will, Smith relies on beliefs. |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: One way to decide what we have normative reasons to do …is by trying to find a set of desires that is systematically justifiable, which is our best assessment of the desires we would have under conditions of full rationality. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: This is Smith accepting the Humean view that desires are essential for motivation, but trying to find a marriage of desires with reason to produce the more objective aspects of morality. An interesting aspiration… |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Only an agent's desires may constitute her having certain goals, and it follows from this that only her desires may constitute her motivating reasons. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.8) | |
A reaction: We might distinguish between reasons which direct us towards certain ends, and reasons which motivate us to pursue those ends. Most mornings I have a reason to get out of bed, which precedes my motivation to actually do it. |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: There are motivating reasons for action, which are psychological states, and normative reasons, which are propositions of the general form 'a person's doing this is desirable or required'. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Motivating reasons are locatable entities in minds, whereas normative reasons are either abstract, or perhaps motivating reasons expressed by other people. Smith says the two types are unconnected. |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The distinctive Humean view of normative reasons for action is that the rational thing for an agent to do is simply to act so as to maximally satisfy her desires, whatever the content of those desires. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.1) | |
A reaction: Smith disagrees with this view (though he agrees with Hume about motivating reasons). An obvious problem for the Humean view would be a strong desire to do something excessively dangerous. |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: We cannot expect that, even under conditions of full rationality, agents would all converge on the same desires about what is to be done in the various circumstances they might face. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: A very good argument in favour of the Humean view that desires are an essential part of moral motivation. Possible convergence of view is a standard hallmark of communal rationality. |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The 'externalist' view of morality says either that judgements of rightness are motives but not reasons, or (more strongly) that they are neither, meaning that moral judgements do not have practical implications. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [Philippa Foot's untypical 1972 article is cited for the strong view. Hare and Blackburn are typical of the first view]. I would say that such judgements are both reasons and motives - but not necessarily for me! 'Someone should do something about this!'. |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Amoralists make moral judgements without being motivated accordingly, and without suffering any sort of practical irrationality either; the practicality requirement of moral judgement is thus false. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.3) | |
A reaction: It is hard to imagine an immoralist with this nihilistic attitude bothering to make any moral judgements at all. Why would someone indifferent to art make aesthetic judgements? What could a 'judgement of rightness' mean to an amoralist? |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Moral 'internalism' says if an agent judges an action as right in some circumstance, then they are either thereby motivated to do it, or they are irrational (e.g. their will is weak). | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [Somewhat reworded] So the motivation comes from an internal judgement, not from external factors. Is it not tautological that 'this is the right thing to do' means it should be done (ceteris paribus)? |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Moral 'rationalism' says if an action is right for agents in some circumstances, then there is a reason for the agents to do it. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: That is, there is not merely a motivation to act (the 'internalist' view), but there is a reason to act. Smith calls both views the 'practicality requirement' of normal moral judgements. Smith defends the rationalist view. |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The pro- and con- attitudes of the expressivists count as 'moral' only if they are had towards particular people, actions or states of affairs in virtue of their natural features, ….rather than in virtue of being the particulars that they are. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 2.4) | |
A reaction: So whereas emotivists don't have to have any reasons for their moral feelings, other expressivists seem to require reasons (i.e. indicating features of things) to endorse their attitudes. What of reasonless emotionless attitudes? |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: What is it to value something? That is, equivalently, what is it to accept that we have a normative reason to do something? In Hume's terms, is it a matter of believing? Or is it a matter of desiring? We seem to face a dilemma. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Smith is discussing moral motivation, and there is obviously more to valuing something than acting on it. Nice question, though. Personally I value St Paul's Cathedral, but I don't desire it. I value heart surgeons, but don't want to emulate them. |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |