Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Apology for Raymond Sebond' and 'Causation and the Flow of Energy'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: Why cannot a wise man dare to doubt anything and everything?
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0562)
     A reaction: This question seems to be the start of the Enlightenment Project, of attempting to prove everything. MacIntyre warns of the dangers of this in ethical theory. The story of modern philosophy is the discovery of its impossibility. E.g. Davidson on truth.
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: Take a beam wide enough to walk along: suspend it between two towers: there is no philosophical wisdom, however firm, which could make us walk along it just as we would if we were on the ground.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0672)
     A reaction: This proposes great scepticism about the practical application of philosophical wisdom, but if we talk in terms of the wise assessment of risk in any undertaking, our caution on the raised beam makes perfectly good sense.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: The distinctive mark of the Truth we hold ought to be virtue, which is the most exacting mark of Truth, the closest one to heaven and the most worthy thing that Truth produces.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0493)
     A reaction: A long way from Tarski and minimalist theories of truth! But not so far from pragmatism. Personally I think Montaigne is making an important claim, which virtue theorists should be attempting to incorporate into their theory. Aristotle would sympathise.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: We may all lack some sense or other; because of that defect, most of the features of objects may be concealed from us.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0666)
     A reaction: This strikes me as simple, straightforward common sense, and right. I cannot make sense of the claim that reality really is just the way it appears. We do not have a built-in neutrino detector, for example.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: Pyrrhonians say that truth and falsehood exist; within us we have means of looking for them, but not of making any lasting judgements: we have no touchstone.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0564)
     A reaction: This states the key difference between sceptics and relativists. The latter are more extreme as they say there is no such thing as truth. The former concede truth, and their scepticism is about the abilities of human beings. I am an anti-relativist.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: The seat of the powers of the soul is in the brain, as is clearly shown by the fact that wounds and accidents affecting the head immediately harm the faculties of the soul.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0614)
     A reaction: At last someone has finally got the facts clear. It seems surprising that the Greeks never clearly grasped this piece of irrefutable evidence - even those Greeks who speculated that the brain was the key. Here we have a fixed fact of philosophy of mind.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley]
     Full Idea: Basic causal relations can, as a consequence of our scientific knowledge, be identified with certain physicalistic [sic] relations between objects that can be characterized in terms of transference of either energy or momentum between objects.
     From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by E Sosa / M Tooley - Introduction to 'Causation' §1
     A reaction: Presumably a transfer of momentum is a transfer of energy. If only anyone had the foggiest idea what energy actually is, we'd be doing well. What is energy made of? 'No identity without substance', I say. I like Fair's idea.
Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Fair, who originated the energy flow view of causation, moved to a view that understands connection in terms of counterfactuals about energy flow.
     From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.1.2
     A reaction: David Fair was a pupil of David Lewis, the king of the counterfactual view. To me that sounds like a disappointing move, but it is hard to think that a mere flow of energy through space would amount to causation. Cause must work back from an effect.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.