6 ideas
| 9182 | Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: In the case of 'Obadiah', associated only with one act of writing a prophecy, ..it is the tradition which connects our use of the name with the man; where the actual name itself first came from has little to do with it. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference [1975], p.256) | |
| A reaction: Excellent. This seems to me a much more accurate account of reference than the notion of a baptism. In the case of 'Homer', whether someone was ever baptised thus is of no importance to us. The tradition is everything. Also Shakespeare. |
| 9181 | The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The causal theory of reference, in a full-blown form, makes it impossible to distinguish between knowing the use of a proper name and simply having heard the name and recognising it as a name. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference [1975], p.254) | |
| A reaction: None of these things are all-or-nothing. I have an inkling of how to use it once I realise it is a name. Of course you could be causally connected to a name and not even realise that it was a name, so something more is needed. |
| 22381 | Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Being a good father, or daughter, or friend seems to depend on one's intentions, rather than on such things as cleverness and strength. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Goodness and Choice [1961], p.138) | |
| A reaction: Not sure about that. In wartime a good father might need to be actually brave, and in times of hardship be actually economically successful. 'He meant well, but he was a hopeless father'? |
| 22380 | Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot] |
| Full Idea: The word 'knife' names an object in respect of its function. That is not to say (simply) that it names an object which has a function, but also that the function is involved in the meaning of the word. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Goodness and Choice [1961], p.134) | |
| A reaction: It seems faintly possible that someone (a child, perhaps) could know the word and recognise the object, but not know what the object is for. Ditto with other things which have functional names. |
| 16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
| 6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |