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All the ideas for 'works', 'Scientific Objectivity' and 'Non-Monotonic Logic'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity

22353	One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: One conception of objectivity is that the facts are 'out there', and it is the task of scientists to discover, analyze and sytematize them. 'Objective' is a success word: if a claim is objective, it successfully captures some feature of the world.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2)
	A reaction: This seems to describe truth, rather than objectivity. You can establish accurate facts by subjective means. You can be fairly objective but miss the facts. Objectivity is a mode of thought, not a link to reality.

22356	An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: Sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which scientific theories are to track the absolute conception [of reality], they must describe a world different from sense experience.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
	A reaction: This is a beautifully simple and interesting point. Even when you are looking at a tree, to grasp its full reality you probably need to close your eyes (which is bad news for artists).

22359	Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: There may be values involved in the choice of a research problem, the gathering of evidence, the acceptance of a theory, and the application of results. ...The first and fourth do involve values, but what of the second and third?
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
	A reaction: [compressed] My own view is that the danger of hidden distorting values has to be recognised, but it is then possible, by honest self-criticism, to reduce them to near zero. Sociological enquiry is different, of course.

22360	The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: According to the Value-Free Ideal, scientific objectivity is characterised by absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
	A reaction: This seems appealing, because it concedes that we cannot be value-free, without suggesting that we are unavoidably swamped by values. The obvious question is whether the two types of value can be sharply distinguished.

22362	Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: Three components of value-free science are Impartiality (appraising theories only by epistemic scientific standards), Neutrality (the theories make no value statements), and Autonomy (the theory is motivated only by science).
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.3)
	A reaction: [They are summarising Hugh Lacey, 1999, 2002] I'm not sure why the third criterion matters, if the first two are met. If a tobacco company commissions research on cigarettes, that doesn't necessarily make the findings false or prejudiced.

22364	Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: Thermometers assume the length of the fluid or gas is a function of temperature, and different substances yield different results. It was decided that different thermometers using the same substance should match, and air was the best, but not perfect.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.1)
	A reaction: [summarising Hasok Chang's research] This is a salutary warning that instruments do not necessarily solve the problem of objectivity, though thermometers do seem to be impersonal, and offer relative accuracy (i.e. ranking temperatures). Cf breathalysers.

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument

19115	You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli]
	Full Idea: A 'rebut' of an argument establishes that its conclusion is not the case. An 'undercut' of the argument shows that the premises do not support that conclusion.
	From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 3.2)

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics

19119	We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli]
	Full Idea: The exceptional status of an object with respect to some default is more likely to spread to other objects if they share properties with that object that may play a role in explaining the exceptional status.
	From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 4)
	A reaction: This is an example of the sort of rational behaviour we exhibit, and which a 'real life' logic would somehow need to capture. I would suggest the essentialist logic designed by Kit Fine as a first port of call.

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 12. Non-Monotonic Logic

19111	Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli]
	Full Idea: Most defeasible reasoning is externally dynamic, affected by the addition of further premises. But there is also an internal (or 'diachronic') dynamic, when further analysis reveals more about the given premises.
	From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 1)

19114	Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli]
	Full Idea: There is much discussion of whether Floating Conclusions should be derived, given that they were derived from two arguments which conflict with one another.
	From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 2.3)

19113	Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli]
	Full Idea: In the Weakest Link Principle, an argument is preferred to another conflicting argument if its weakest defeasible link is stronger than the weakest defeasible link in the conflicting argument.
	From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 2.1)
	A reaction: [He cites John Pollock 1991] This sounds like the elementary principle applied when choosing a rope by which to hang a large weight above your head. It gets non-monotonic logic off the ground - if you know how to evaluate 'weakest'.

19116	Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli]
	Full Idea: Conservative core of non-monotonic logic:Reflexivity (p proves p), Cut (if p proves q, it proves their joint implications), Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence (equivalences have same consequences), Right Weakening (non-m preserves classical).
	From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 3.5.1)
	A reaction: [Highly compressed, and without symbols]

19117	We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli]
	Full Idea: We can think of an 'ordinal ranking function' κ([φ)] as the level of surprise we would face were φ to hold, up to maximal surprise.
	From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 3.5.2)
	A reaction: This suggests that Bayes's Theorem might be relevant to non-monotonic logic. This suggests that registering surprise would need to be an important feature of robot behaviour.

19118	People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli]
	Full Idea: Test subjects seem to perform very poorly in various reasoning tests (Wason Selection, Suppression Task), suggesting logic has a subordinate role, but this may be using classical logic, where non-monotonic logics would be more appropriate.
	From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 4)
	A reaction: Fred Sommers presents his Term Logic (based on Aristotle) as closer to how people actually reason. It is certainly crazy to infer that most people's everyday reasoning is irrational. Induction is highly rational; it's just not deductive.

5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity

19110	In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli]
	Full Idea: In classical logic, Monotony follows immediately from the nature of the relation |=, for Γ |= φ holds precisely when φ is true on every interpretation on which all sentences in Γ are true.
	From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 1)
	A reaction: That is, semantic consequence (|=) is defined in terms of a sentence (φ) always being true if some other bunch of sentences (Γ) are true. Hence the addition of further sentences to Γ will make no difference - which is Monotony.

19112	Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli]
	Full Idea: Basic Monotony: something stays proved if further premises are added. Cautious Monotony: the addition of something which has been proved makes no difference. Rational Monotony: it stays proved as long as the addition's negation hasn't been proved.
	From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 1)
	A reaction: [A compressed and non-symbolic summary]

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment

22357	The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: The 'experimenter's regress' says that to know whether a result is correct, one needs to know whether the apparatus is reliable. But one doesn't know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one knows that it produces correct results ...and so on.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
	A reaction: [H. Collins (1985), a sociologist] I take this to be a case of the triumphant discovery of a vicious circle which destroys all knowledge turning out to be a benign circle. We build up a coherent relationship between reliable results and good apparatus.

14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem

22365	The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: The Bayesian approach is outspokenly subjective: probability is used for quantifying a scientist's subjective degree of belief in a particular hypothesis. ...It just provides sound rules for learning from experience.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.2)

29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy

16713	Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
	Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
	From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism

6610	I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
	Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
	From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
	A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.