Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'The Myth of the Given' and 'Some Remarks on Essentialism'

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7 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

13952	Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
	Full Idea: Essentialism, as I shall understand it, is the doctrine that among the attributes of a thing some are essential, others merely accidental. Its essential attributes are those it has necessarily, those it could not have lacked.
	From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.149)
	A reaction: The problem with this, which Cartwright does not address, is that trivial and gerrymandered properties (such as having self-identity, or being 'such that 2+2=4') seem to be necessarily, but don't seem to constitute the essence of a thing.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences

13954	The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
	Full Idea: I see no reason for thinking essentialism unintelligible, but a chief perplexity is the obscurity of the grounds on which ratings of attributes as essential or accidental are to be made.
	From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.158)
	A reaction: In that case some of us younger philosophers will have to roll up our sleeves and tease out the grounds for essentialism, starting with Aristotle and Leibniz, and ending with the successes of modern science.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

13955	Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
	Full Idea: Apparently those who think essentialism unintelligible see support for their position in the doctrine that necessary truths are all analytic. Only relative to some mode of designation does it make sense to speak of an object as necessarily this or that.
	From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.158)
	A reaction: He has in mind Quine and his mathematician-cyclist (Idea 8482). Personally I have no problems with the example. No one is essentially a cyclist - that isn't what essence is. Two-legged people can be cyclists.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

13953	An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
	Full Idea: For an ostension to be successful it is surely not necessary that I gather what sort of object it is you have indicated, such as being a horse or a zebra. I may even gather which thing you have indicated without knowing that it is a mammal or even alive.
	From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.157)
	A reaction: This nicely articulates the objection I have always felt to Geach's relative identity. 'Oh my God, what the hell is THAT???' is probably going to be a successful act of verbal reference, even while explicitly denying all knowledge of sortals.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

8790	The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
	Full Idea: In my opinion, the 'doctrine of the given' is correct in saying that there are some beliefs or statements which are 'self-justifying' and that among such beliefs are statements some of which concern appearances or 'ways of being appeared to'.
	From: Roderick Chisholm (The Myth of the Given [1964], §12)
	A reaction: To boldly assert that they are 'self-justifying' invites a landslide of criticisms, pointing at a regress. It might be better to say they are self-evident, or intuitively known, or primitive, or true by the natural light of reason.

29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy

16713	Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
	Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
	From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism

6610	I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
	Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
	From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
	A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.