Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Anthropological Studies of Classification' and 'Letters to Thomasius'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Monothetic categories have fixed defining features, and polythetic categories do not [Ellen]
     Full Idea: Many categories are 'monothetic' (the defining set of features is always unique), and others are 'polythetic' (single features being neither essential to group membership nor sufficient to allocate an item to a group).
     From: Roy Ellen (Anthropological Studies of Classification [1996], p.33)
     A reaction: This seems a rather important distinction which hasn't made its way into philosophy, where there is a horrible tendency to oversimplify, with the dream of a neat and unified picture. But see Goodman's 'Imperfect Community' problem (Idea 7957).
In symbolic classification, the categories are linked to rules [Ellen]
     Full Idea: Symbolic classification occurs when we use some things as a means of saying something about other things. ..They enhance the significance of some categories, so that categories imply rules and rules imply categories.
     From: Roy Ellen (Anthropological Studies of Classification [1996], p.35)
     A reaction: I'm afraid the anthropologists seem to have more of interest to say about categories than philosophers do. Though maybe we couldn't do anthropology if philosophers had made us more self-conscious about categories. Teamwork!
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Continuous experience sometimes needs imposition of boundaries to create categories [Ellen]
     Full Idea: Because parts of our experience of the world are complexly continuous, it is occasionally necessary to impose boundaries to produce categories at all.
     From: Roy Ellen (Anthropological Studies of Classification [1996], p.33)
     A reaction: I like it. Ellen says that people tend to universally cut nature somewhere around the joints, but we can't cope with large things, so the sea tends to be labelled in sections, even though most of the world's seas are continuous.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The essence of a circle consists in the equality of all lines drawn from its centre to its circumference.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomasius [1669], 1669)
     A reaction: Compare Locke in Idea 13431 and Spinoza in Idea 13073 on the essence of geometrical figures. A key question is whether the essence is in the simplest definition, or in a complex and wide-ranging account, e.g. including conic sections for circles.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Classification is no longer held to be rooted in social institutions [Ellen]
     Full Idea: The view that all classification finds its roots in social institutions is now generally considered untenable.
     From: Roy Ellen (Anthropological Studies of Classification [1996], p.36)
     A reaction: And about time too. Ellen (an anthropologist) inevitably emphasises the complexity of the situation, but endorses the idea that people everywhere largely cut nature at the joints.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I have demonstrated that whatever moves is continuously created and that bodies are nothing at any time between the instants in motion.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomasius [1669], 1669.04), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: Leibniz is a little over-confident about what he has 'demonstrated', but I think (from this remark) that he would not have been displeased with quantum theory, and the notion of a 'quantum leap' and a 'Planck time'. A 'conatus' is a 'smallest motion'.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.