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63 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature [Epicurus, by Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Epicurus in his popular exposition allows the existence of God, but in expounding the real nature of things he does not allow it.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.58
     A reaction: Plato and Aristotle also distinguished their esoteric from their exoteric writings, but this is an indication that thei popular works may always have presented safer doctrines.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: To win true freedom you must be a slave to philosophy.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 008
     A reaction: A lovely idea. It is one thing to free the body, or to free one's social situation, but the challenge to 'free your mind' is either romantic nonsense or totally baffling, apart from the suggestion offered here. Reason is freedom. Very Kantian.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is an activity which secures the happy life by arguments and discussions.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Ethicists (one book) VI.169
     A reaction: Presumably this aims at the happiness of the participant. Universal happiness would need to be much more political. If this is your aim then you can't just follow the winds of the argument, but must channel it towards happiness. No nasty truths?
Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: To T.H. Green an ideal was no creation of an idle imagination, metaphysics no mere play of the speculative reason. Ideals were the most solid, and metaphysics the most practical thing about a man.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I
     A reaction: This is despite the fact that Green was an idealist in the Hegelian tradition. I like this. I see it not just as ideals having practical guiding influence, but also that ideals themselves arising out of experience.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: I congratulate you, sir, because you have come to philosophy free of any taint of culture.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE])
     A reaction: [source: Athenaeus, 'Deipnosophists' 13 588b] No one nowadays thinks such an aspiration remotely possible, not least because the culture is embedded in your native language, but I find the idea very appealing.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / f. Philosophy as healing
The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Just as there is no benefit to medicine if it does not heal the sicknesses [nosos] of bodies, so too there is none to philosophy unless it expels that affections of the soul.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], fr 221), quoted by James Allen - Soul's Virtue and the Health of the Body p.78
     A reaction: This sounds rather Buddhist, if the only route to happiness is to suppress the emotions. Epicurus probably refers to the more extreme desires, which only lead to harm. Galen quotes Chrysippus as endorsing this idea (see footnote 5).
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: We should make no assertion about the whole when our contact is with the parts.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109e
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic [Epicurus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.30.97
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: When we speak of anything as true or false, we do so on the ground of its relation to a whole of organised knowledge existing actually in no human mind, but prefigured in every mind which is possessed of reason.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I n1
     A reaction: This seems to be the super-idealist view of the coherence account of truth. I have no idea what 'prefigured' means here.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic [Epicurus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Epicurus said that not every proposition is either true or false. ...Epicurus was afraid that if he admits that every proposition is true or false he will also have to admit that all events are caused by fate (if they are so from all eternity).
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.21
     A reaction: Epicurus proposed his 'swerve' in the movements of atoms to avoid this fatalism. Epicurus is agreeing with Aristotle, who did not accept excluded middle for a future contingent sea-fight.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Epicureans make the impudent assertion that disjunctions consisting of contrary propositions are true, but that the statements contained in the propositions are neither of them true.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 16.36
     A reaction: Is that 'it is definitely one or the other, but we haven't a clue which one'? Seems to fit speculations about Goldbach's Conjecture. It doesn't sound terribly impudent to me. Or is it the crazy 'It's definitely one of them, but it's neither of them'?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: All knowledge is seen on ultimate analysis to rest upon the idea of a fundamental unity between subject and object, between the knower and that which there is to be known.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III
     A reaction: I don't really understand this thought, but I think it embodies the essence of Hegelian idealism. If I know a tree in the wood, any 'unity' between us strikes as merely imaginary. If the tree isn't separate, what does 'knowing' it mean?
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: We could not seek for anything if we had not some notion of it.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.21
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: We could not give names to things, if we had not a preliminary notion of what the things were.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.21
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Epicurus says that colours are not intrinsic to bodies but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative to the eye, which implies that body is no more colourless than coloured.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], Fr 30) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1110
     A reaction: This seems to me such a self-evident truth that I am puzzled as to why anyone would claim that colours are real features of bodies. Epicurus points out that entering a dark room we see no colour, but then colour appears after a while.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Sensation is out of reach of control, because one sensation cannot judge another which resembles itself, as they have equal value, and different sensations have different objects.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20
     A reaction: Scepticism about the possibility of purely empirical knowledge; an interesting comment on the question of whether perceptions contain any intrinsic knowledge.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The criteria of truth are the senses, the preconceptions, and the passions.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Reason cannot judge the senses, because it is based on them.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: Systematic interdependence in the world of nature is the ultimate test of truth.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: Green (or Muirhead) drifts between coherence as the nature of truth and coherence as the nature of justification. He it is the 'test' for truth, which was Russell's view.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values [Nietzsche on Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Epicurus denied the possibility of knowledge in order to retain moral (or hedonistic) values as the highest values.
     From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - The Will to Power (notebooks) §578
     A reaction: The history of philosophy suggests that this dichotomy is unnecessary. Dogmatist place a high value on multitudes of things.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed [Epicurus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Epicurus says that if one sense has told a lie once in a man's life, no sense must ever be believed.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.25.79
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: If one person says the wine is dry and the other that it is sweet, and neither errs in his sensation, how is the wine any more dry than sweet?
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b
Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: In the very same bath some treat the water as too hot, others as too cold.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b
When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: On entering a dark room we see no colour, but do so after waiting a short time.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1110d
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Democritus and Epicurus say the soul has two parts, one which is rational and is situated in the chest area, and the other which is non-rational and is spread throughout the entire compound of the body
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE])
     A reaction: [source Aetius 4.4.6]
Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception [Epicurus, by Aetius]
     Full Idea: Epicurus says the soul is a blend of fiery stuff (for bodily warmth), airy stuff (rest), breath (motion), and a nameless stuff (sense-perception).
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Aetius - fragments/reports 4.3.11
     A reaction: Obviously Epicurus thought the four stuffs were different combinations of atoms, rather than being elements. Is there no stuff which gives reason? Reason must reduce to motion, presumably.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley]
     Full Idea: By posing the problem of determinism, Epicurus became arguably the first philosopher to recognise the philosophical centrality of what we call the Free Will Question. His strongly libertarian approach is strongly contrasted with Stoic determinism.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary
     A reaction: Epicurus introduced the rather dubious 'swerve' of the atoms to make room for free will. It seems to me more consistent to stick with the determinism of Democritus. Zeno became a determinist in reaction to Epicurus.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms [Epicurus, by Diogenes of Oen.]
     Full Idea: There is a free motion in the atoms, which Democritus did not discover, but which Epicurus brought to light, and which consists in a swerve, as he demonstrated on the basis of what is seen to be the case?
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes (Oen) - Wall inscription 54.II-III
     A reaction: I presume the last bit means that we see that we have freedom of choice, and infer the swerve in the atoms as the only possible explanation. The worry for libertarians is, of course, who is in charge of the swerve.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Necessity is a bad thing, but there is no necessity to live with necessity.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], 9)
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus]
     Full Idea: If Epicurus makes the end consist in pleasure and asserts that the soul, like all else, is composed of atoms, it is impossible to explain how in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure, or judgement of the good.
     From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism III.187
     A reaction: This is a nice statement of the mind-body problem. Ontologically, physics still seems to present reality as a 'heap of particles', which gives no basis for the emergence of anything as strange as consciousness. But then magnetism is pretty strange.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Epicurus was responsible for the innovatory recognition that the question of the will's freedom is central to ethics.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3
     A reaction: Compare Ideas 7672 and 6018. Obviously ethical action needs freedom, but the idea of a 'free will' is quite different. It is a fiction, created to give some sort of arrogant ultimate responsibility to our actions, like God.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: All that is distinctively human in the life of man springs not from the desire to possess this or that object, and so far to realise a better, but to be something more and better than he is.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: An example of Victorian optimism, I think. I'm guessing that people who are not motivated by this impulse are not behaving in a way that is 'distinctively human'. That said, this is an interesting aspect of human nature.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: I spit on the fine and those who emptily admire it, when it doesn't make any pleasure.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.16
     A reaction: in Athenaeus
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Pleasure is the chief good, because all animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended by pain by their natural instinct, without the employment of reason.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29
     A reaction: The highest pleasure of predators is likely to be the killing of weaker animals. What all animals do isn't much of a criterion for the natural chief good. They also breathe.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The pains of the soul are worst, for the flesh is only sensible of present affliction, but the soul feels the past, present and future.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29
     A reaction: I don't think feeling extended across time is very relevant. What matters is that pains of the soul usually endure far longer than physical suffering.
Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: If every pleasure lasted long, and affected the whole body, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.08
     A reaction: This seems to miss out on intensity, which is of great importance to most pleasure seekers. Also it is a pleasure to be alive, which is lifelong, but we barely notice it.
The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas]
     Full Idea: Epicurus identifies our final end with what he calls tranquillity or 'ataraxia', which is static pleasure.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.7
     A reaction: I don't recall any Greek ever spotting that boredom is a problem. But then they didn't have privacy, so other people always hold their attention. Maybe this is a dream of privacy.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: Hedonism failed because it offered as an end of human aspiration an object in which the human spirit, pledged by its own nature to self-betterment, …could never find satisfaction.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: It is always both sad and amusing to see that 150 years ago someone wrote of a doctrine that is still with us that it has 'failed'. Nowadays they try to say the same of physicalism. His objection rests on optimism about humanity.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.35
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: We choose the virtues for the sake of pleasure, and not on their own account.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.30
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
A wise man would be happy even under torture [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Even if the wise man were put to the torture, he would still be happy.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.26
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.28
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: Where laws and institutions are apparently the work of deliberate volition, they are in reality the result of a compromise, which while by a kind of social contract it has the acquiescence of all, expresses the will of none.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III
     A reaction: Politicians who claim to be enacting the 'will of the people' (e.g. when they won a referendum 52-48) are simply lying. Committees usually end up enacting one person's will, but often without realising what has happened.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: With all seriousness and reverence we may hope and pray for a condition of English society in which all honest citizens will recognise themselves and be recognised by each other as gentlemen.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV
     A reaction: Call me old fashioned but, as long as we expand this to include ladies, I like this thought. Chaucer's knight (in his Prologue) should be our national role model. The true gentleman is an Aristotelian ideal.
Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: Enfranchisement of the people is an end in itself. …Only citizenship makes the moral man; only citizenship gives that respect which is the true basis of the respect for others.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii:436), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV
     A reaction: Should people respect their betters? If so, that is a sort of deferential respect which is different from the mutual respect between equals. That said, I wholly approve of this idea.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: The modern idea of the good has developed in respect of the range of persons who have the capacity and therefore the right to participate in this good.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: Green is a notable Victorian liberal, starting from an idealist metaphysics. This is an intriguing view of liberal values. The concept of the good should be what suits persons with full capacity. Having the capacity bestows the right of access to it. Hm.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: In so far as society commits itself to the principle of individuality of its citizens does it realise the unity and stability that constitute it a true 'State'.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: This asserts the liberal vision of a state, rather than asserting a fact. A state consistently mostly of slaves still seems to be a state, and may achieve a lot.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: In so far as the individual commits himself to the principle of co-operation in a social whole does he realise his end as individual personality.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: This makes for a very communitarian type of liberalism. The question is whether we create insitutions which suck our free citizens into a communal way of life, or whether that is a matter of their own initiative.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Even though he lose his eyes, a wise man should still partake of life.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.26
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: To anyone who understands a process of development, the result being developed is the reality; and it is its ability to become this that the subject undergoing development has its true nature.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii: 224), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: Although this contains the dubious Hegelian idea that development tends towards some 'end', presented as fixed and final, it still seems important that anything accepted as a 'development' is the expression of some natural potential.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas]
     Full Idea: Epicurus alone among the ancient schools denies that in nature we find any teleological explanations. Nothing in nature is for anything, neither the world as a whole nor anything in it.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction
     A reaction: This may explain the controversial position that epicureanism held in the seventeenth century, as well as its incipient atheism.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight [Epicurus, by Ps-Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Democritus said that the properties of the atoms are in number two, magnitude and shape, but Epicurus added to these a third one, weight.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.3.18
     A reaction: The addition of Epicurus seems very sensible, and an odd omission by Democritus. He seems to think that atoms have a uniform density, so that volume indicates weight.
Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused [Cicero on Epicurus]
     Full Idea: The swerve of Epicurus takes place without a cause; it does not take place in consequence of being struck by another atom, since how can that take place if they are indivisible bodies travelling perpendicularly in straight lines by the force of gravity?
     From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.22
     A reaction: The swerve is the most ad hoc proposal in the history of theoretical physics. This is interesting for spelling out that the travel in vertical parallels. What's that all about, then?
What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? [Cicero on Epicurus]
     Full Idea: What fresh cause exists in nature to make the atom swerve (or do the atoms cast lots among them which is to swerve and which not?), or to serve as the reason for making a very small swerve and not a large one, or one swerve, and not two or three swerves?
     From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 20.46
     A reaction: This is an appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which seems to be the main ground for rejecting the swerve. The only reason to accept the swerve is reluctance to accept determinism or fatalism.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Stoics posited that time is an incorporeal which is conceived of all by itself, while Epicurus thinks that it is an accident of certain things, ...and he called in a property of properties.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE])
     A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.219-227]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: God is a subject which is eternally all that the self-conscious subject as developed in time has the possibility of becoming.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I
     A reaction: [Ethics p.197] Reminiscent of Peirce's account of truth, as the ideal end of enquiry. If God is a human ideal, we either limit God, or exaggerate our powers of idealisation.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal [Epicurus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: For Epicureans the gods are made of atoms, so in that case they are not eternal.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.68
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds [Epicurus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Epicurus alone saw that gods must exist because nature herself has imprinted an idea of them in the minds of all mankind.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.43
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: God is identical with the self of every man in the sense of being the realisation of its determinate possibilities.…In being conscious of himself man is conscious of God and thus knows that God is, but only in so far as he knows what he himself really is.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii:226-7), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: Does this, by the transitivity of identity, imply the identity of all individual men? Do we all contain identical possibilities, which converge on a unified concept of God? I always take the monotheistic God to far exceed mere human possibilities.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians [Epicurus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Some believe that Epicurus gave lip-service only to the gods, so as not to offend the Athenians, but in fact did not believe in them.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.84
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: If god acted in accordance with the prayers of men, all men would rather quickly be destroyed, since they constantly pray for many sufferings to befall each other.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE])
     A reaction: [source Maximus the Abbott 'Gnom.' 14]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.