11 ideas
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: A statement expressing a real definition must also accomplish more than simply to offer two different ways of singling out the same entity, since the definiens must also be explanatory of the essential nature of the definiendum. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4) | |
A reaction: This is why Aristotelian definitions are not just short lexicographical definitions, but may be quite length. Effectively, a definition IS an explanation. |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Being the successor of the successor of 0 is more explanatory than being predecessor of 3 of the nature of 2, since it mirrors more closely the method by which 2 is constructed from a basic entity, 0, and a relation (successor) taken as primitive. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4) | |
A reaction: This assumes numbers are 'constructed', which they are in the axiomatised system of Peano Arithmetic, but presumably the numbers were given in ordinary experience before 'construction' occurred to anyone. Nevertheless, I really like this. |
16789 | Only supernatural means could annihilate anything once it had being [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: A being cannot naturally go out of existence. For even if a ship or a plank ceases to be a ship or a plank, it never naturally ceases to be a being. For a being, unless it is annihilated, does not cease to be a being. To annihilate is a supernatural task. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Mundo (On the World) [1642], 12.5) | |
A reaction: This idea was becoming an orthodoxy in Hobbes's time, and leads to the various conservation laws in physics. |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The relata of the grounding relation are typically taken to be facts or propositions, while the relata of ontological dependence ...are objects and their characteristics, activities, constituents and so on. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.5 n25) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Good riddance to propositions here, but this seems a bit unfair to facts, since I take facts to be in the world. Audi's concept of 'worldly facts' is what we need here. |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: According to the approach of Plantinga, Forbes and Mackie, the primary job of essences is to individuate the entities whose essences they are across worlds and times at which these entities exist. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4 n13) | |
A reaction: A helpful simplification of what is going on. I wish those authors would just say this one their first pages. They all get in a right tangle, because individuation is either too easy, or hopeless. 'Tracking' is a good word for this game. |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Fine assumes that essences can be identified with collections of propositions that are true in virtue of the identity of a particular object, or objects. ...There is not, on this approach, much of a distinction between essences and real definitions. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4) | |
A reaction: This won't do, because the essence of a physical object is not a set of propositions, it is some aspects of the object itself, which are described in a definition. Koslicki notes that psuché is an essence, and the soul is hardly a set of propositions! |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: To make room for a less propositional conception of essence than that assumed by Fine, I urge that we distinguish more firmly between essences and real definitions (which state these essences in the form of propositions). | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.6) | |
A reaction: Yes. The idea that essence is just a verbal or conceptual entity would be utterly abhorrent to Aristotle (a hero for Fine), and it is anathema to me too. We intend essences to be in the world (even if we are deceived about that). They explain! |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: It is plausible to think that an explanation, when successful, captures or represents (by argument, or a why? question) an underlying real-world relation of dependence which obtains among the phenomena cited. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.6) | |
A reaction: She cites causal dependence as an example. I'm incline to think that 'grounding' is a better word for the target of good explanations than is 'dependence' (which can, surely, be mutual, where ground has the directionality needed for explanation). |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: In 'feature dependence', the ontologically dependent entity may be thought of as the result of a process of abstraction which takes the 'bearer' as its starting point and arrives at the abstracted entity by blocking out all the irrelevant features. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.6) | |
A reaction: She seems unaware that this is traditional abstraction, found in Aristotle, and a commonplace of thought until Frege got his evil hands on abstraction and stole it for other purposes. I'm a fan. |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |