18089
|
Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place]
|
|
Full Idea:
Dispositions are the substantive laws, not, as for Armstrong, of nature in general, but of the nature of individual entities whose dispositional properties they are.
|
|
From:
Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 6)
|
|
A reaction:
[He notes that Nancy Cartwright 1989 agrees with him] I like this a lot. I tend to denegrate 'laws', because of their dubious ontological status, but this restores laws to the picture, in the place where they belong, in the stuff of the world.
|
17993
|
Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain [Vetter]
|
|
Full Idea:
The laws of a domain are the fundamental, general explanatory relationships between kinds, quantities, and qualities of that domain, that supervene upon the essential natures of those things.
|
|
From:
Barbara Vetter (Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature [2012], 9.3)
|
|
A reaction:
Hm. How small can the domain be? Can it embrace the multiverse? Supervenience is a rather weak relationship. How about 'are necessitated/entailed by'? Are the relationships supposed to do the explaining? I would have thought the natures did that.
|