5 ideas
| 8720 | A logic is 'relevant' if premise and conclusion are connected, and 'paraconsistent' allows contradictions [Priest,G, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Priest and Routley have developed paraconsistent relevant logic. 'Relevant' logics insist on there being some sort of connection between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. 'Paraconsistent' logics allow contradictions. | |
| From: report of Graham Priest (works [1998]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.8 | |
| A reaction: Relevance blocks the move of saying that a falsehood implies everything, which sounds good. The offer of paraconsistency is very wicked indeed, and they are very naughty boys for even suggesting it. |
| 10242 | I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine] |
| Full Idea: My own line is a yet more sweeping structuralism (than David Lewis's account of classes), applying to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Structure and Nature [1992], p.6), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9 | |
| A reaction: Shapiro calls this 'breathtaking', and retreats from it, but it is something like my own view, starting from Mill's pebbles and working up. |
| 10243 | My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine] |
| Full Idea: My tentative ontology continues to consist of quarks and their compounds, also classes of such things, classes of such classes, and so on. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Structure and Nature [1992], p.9), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9 | |
| A reaction: I would call this the Hierarchy of Abstraction (just coined it - what do you think?). Unlike Quine, I don't see why its ontology should include things called 'sets' in addition to the things that make them up. |
| 16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
| 6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
| Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
| From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |