Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Does Consciousness Exist?' and 'Wittgenstein'

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5 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy

7091	The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling]
	Full Idea: The argument from analogy is a weak one, because it does not logically guarantee the inference I draw to the other's inner states, for he might be dissimulating or acting, or may even be a cleverly contrived robot which feels nothing.
	From: A.C. Grayling (Wittgenstein [1988], Ch.3)
	A reaction: This gives the impression that for an argument to be strong it must logically guarantee its inference. It strikes me that analogy is a good reason for believing in other minds, but that is because I am looking for the best explanation, not logical proof.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness

9286	Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
	Full Idea: Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences.
	From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3)
	A reaction: This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness?

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism

9285	'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James]
	Full Idea: 'Consciousness' is the name of a nonentity. ..Those who cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. ..I deny that it stands for an entity, but it does stand for a function.
	From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], Intro)
	A reaction: This kind of view is often treated as being preposterous, but I think it is correct. No one is denying the phenomenology, but it is the ontology which is at stake. Either you are a substance dualist, or mind must be eliminated as an 'entity'.

29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy

16713	Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
	Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
	From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism

6610	I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
	Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
	From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
	A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.