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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Sophistical Refutations' and 'Lysis'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales]
     Full Idea: Thales was the first thinker in the west to believe that the arché (the basis of things) was intelligible.
     From: comment on Thales (fragments/reports [c.585 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.138
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Didactic arguments are those which reason from the principles appropriate to each branch of learning and not from the opinions of the answerer (for he who is learning must take things on trust).
     From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165b01)
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Reasoning is based on certain statements made in such a way as necessarily to cause the assertion of things other than those statements and as a result of those statements.
     From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165a01)
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Dialectical arguments are those which, starting from generally accepted opinions, reason to establish a contradiction.
     From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165b03)
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Those who compete and contend in argument aim at five objects: refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism, and the reduction of one's opponent to a state of babbling, that is, making him say the same thing over and over again.
     From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165b15)
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If you ask 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home or not at home?', whether they are both at home or not there, the number of propositions is more than one. For if the answer is true, it does not follow that the question is a single one.
     From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 176a08)
     A reaction: [compressed] Aristotle is saying that some questions should not receive a 'yes' or 'no' answer, because they are equivocal. Arthur Prior cites this passage, on 'and'. Ordinary use of 'and' need not be the logical use of 'and'.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: 'Man', and every generic term, denotes not an individual substance but a quality or relation or mode or something of the kind.
     From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 179a01)
     A reaction: This is Aristotle's denial that species constitutes the essence of anything. I take 'man' to be a categorisation of individuals, and is ontologically nothing at all in its own right.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is only to things which are indistinguishable and one in essence [ousia] that all the same attributes are generally held to belong.
     From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 179a37)
     A reaction: This simply IS Leibniz's Law (to which I shall from now on quietly refer to as 'Aristotle's Law'). It seems that it just as plausible to translate 'ousia' as 'being' rather than 'essence'. 'Indistinguishable' and 'one in ousia' are not the same.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Necessity is the strongest of things, for it rules everything.
     From: report of Thales (fragments/reports [c.585 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 01.2.9
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is beautiful [Plato]
     Full Idea: The good is beautiful.
     From: Plato (Lysis [c.400 BCE], 216d)
     A reaction: also Timaeus 87c
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
People say that friendship exists only between good men [Plato]
     Full Idea: People say that friendship exists only between good men.
     From: Plato (Lysis [c.400 BCE], 214d)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Thales says water is the first principle (which is why he declared the earth is on water); perhaps he concluded this from seeing that all food is moist.
     From: report of Thales (fragments/reports [c.585 BCE], A12) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 983b12
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Thales seems, from what is recorded of him, to have supposed that the soul is something productive of movement, if he really said that the magnet has soul because it produces movement in iron.
     From: report of Thales (fragments/reports [c.585 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 405a20
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: When asked whether a man who did wrong could escape the notice of the gods, Thales is said to have replied: 'No, not even if he thinks wrong.'
     From: report of Thales (fragments/reports [c.585 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 01.Th.9