42 ideas
| 1597 | Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales] |
| Full Idea: Thales was the first thinker in the west to believe that the arché (the basis of things) was intelligible. | |
| From: comment on Thales (fragments/reports [c.585 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.138 |
| 11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Many definitions have three elements: the term that is defined, an expression containing the defined term (the 'definiendum'), and another expression (the 'definiens') that is equated by the definition with this expression. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2) | |
| A reaction: He notes that the definiendum and the definiens are assumed to be in the 'same logical category', which is a right can of worms. |
| 11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Notable examples of definitions in philosophy have been Plato's (e.g. of piety, in 'Euthyphro'), Anselm's definition of God, the Frege-Russell definition of number, and Tarski's definition of truth. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], Intro) | |
| A reaction: All of these are notable for the extensive metaphysical conclusions which then flow from what seems like a fairly neutral definition. We would expect that if we were defining essences, but not if we were just defining word usage. |
| 11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: In a modal logic in which names are non-vacuous and rigid, not only must existence and uniqueness in a definition be shown to hold necessarily, it must be shown that the definiens is satisfied by the same object across possible worlds. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
| 11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: The 'revision theory' of definitions says definitions impart a hypothetical character, giving a rule of revision rather than a rule of application. ...The output interpretation is better than the input one. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.7) | |
| A reaction: Gupta mentions the question of whether such definitions can extend into the trans-finite. |
| 11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Traditional definitions are generalized identities (so definiendum and definiens can replace each other), in which the sentential is primary (for use in argument), and they involve reduction (and hence eliminability in a ground language). | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.2) |
| 11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: A traditional definition requires that the definiendum contains the defined term, that definiendum and definiens are of the same logical category, and the definition is conservative (adding nothing new), and makes elimination possible. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
| 11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: A definition is 'extensionally adequate' iff there are no actual counterexamples to it. It is 'intensionally adequate' iff there are no possible counterexamples to it. It is 'sense adequate' (or 'analytic') iff it endows the term with the right sense. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.4) |
| 11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: The chemist aims at real definition, whereas the lexicographer aims at nominal definition. ...Perhaps real definitions investigate the thing denoted, and nominal definitions investigate meaning and use. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Very helpful. I really think we should talk much more about the neglected chemists when we discuss science. Theirs is the single most successful branch of science, the paradigm case of what the whole enterprise aims at. |
| 11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Some definitions aim at precision, others at fairness, or at accuracy, or at clarity, or at fecundity. But if definitions 'give the essence of things' (the Aristotelian formula), then it may not be a unitary kind of activity. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1) | |
| A reaction: We don't have to accept this conclusion so quickly. Human interests may shift the emphasis, but there may be a single ideal definition of which these various examples are mere parts. |
| 11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Stipulative definition imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice question is how far one can go in stretching received usage. If I define 'democracy' as 'everyone is involved in decisions', that is sort of right, but pushing the boundaries (children, criminals etc). |
| 11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Ostensive definitions look simple (say 'this stick is one meter long', while showing a stick), but they are effective only because a complex linguistic and conceptual capacity is operative in the background, of which it is hard to give an account. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: The full horror of the situation is brought out in Quine's 'gavagai' example (Idea 6312) |
| 11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}. This does captures its essential uses. Pairs <x,y> <u,v> are identical iff x=u and y=v, and the definition satisfies this. Function matters here, not meaning. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: This is offered as an example of Carnap's 'explications', rather than pure definitions. Quine extols it as a philosophical paradigm (1960:§53). |
| 22355 | In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The substance of the absolute conception [of external reality] lies in the idea that it could nonvacuously explain how it itself, and the various perspectival views of the world, are possible. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], p.139), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 2.1 | |
| A reaction: I like this. Explanation and understanding strike me as more important than justified truths, and I am struck by the complete inability of subjectivists, relativists and anti-realists to give any kinds of good explanation. |
| 3013 | Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Necessity is the strongest of things, for it rules everything. | |
| From: report of Thales (fragments/reports [c.585 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 01.2.9 |
| 4244 | It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Some people believe a properly relativist view requires you to be equally well disposed to everybody's ethical beliefs, but this is seriously confused, as relativism has led to a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Good point. This need not stop a relativist from passionately defending tolerance - it is only that the lack of rational support for the passion must be recognised. |
| 4243 | Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The fact that people can and must react when confronted with another culture, and do so by applying existing notions, seems to show that ethical thought of a given culture can always stretch beyond its boundaries. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Hardly conclusive, but it does seem to show that there is an element of universalising in values, no matter how local you may consider them to be. |
| 4114 | Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If there is a truth about the subject matter of ethics, why should it be simple? ..I shall argue that philosophy should not try to produce ethical theories. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: Bizarrely defeatist - in parallel with Mysterians about the mind like McGinn. Is there any point in thinking at all? I suggest the aim of life as the best starting point. |
| 4128 | Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Intuitionism in ethics has been demolished by a succession of critics, and the ruins of it that remain above ground are not impressive enough to invite much history of what happened to it. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: Why does intuitionism have such appeal to beginners in moral philosophy? There is a truth buried in it somewhere. See 'Sources of the Self' by Charles Taylor. |
| 4132 | The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The category of person is a poor foundation for ethical thought, because it looks like a sortal or classificatory notion while in fact it signals characteristics that almost all come in degrees (responsibility, self-reflection etc). | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: On the contrary, it must be the basis of moral theory, and its shifting character is strong support for Aristotle's approach to moral growth and responsibility. |
| 4134 | The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: That "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" is intelligible brings out the basic weakness of prescriptive accounts of the evaluative. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 7) | |
| A reaction: This might be an elision of two different prescriptions, mine and most people's. In what sense do I think the hotel good, as opposed to other people? |
| 4135 | Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Some 'thicker' ethical notions, such as 'treachery', 'promise', 'brutality' and 'courage', seem to express a union of facts and values. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 8) | |
| A reaction: The onus does seem to be on the followers of Hume to disentangle what the rest of us have united. They may, of course, manage it. |
| 4120 | It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: We do not merely want the world to contain certain states of affairs (it is a deep error of consequentialism to believe that this is all we want). Among the things we basically want is to act in certain ways. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4) | |
| A reaction: A key objection. Does it matter whether Hiroshima is destroyed by earthquake or bombing? |
| 4252 | Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The institution of promise keeping operates to provide portable reliability, by offering a formula that will confer high deliberative priority on what might not otherwise receive it. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: This is a bit pessimistic. We do not perceive promise keeping as a mere suggestion that we should bear something in mind when making a decision. 'May I rot in hell if I fail you'. |
| 4116 | A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: A particular weakness of the contractual theory is that it is unstable with respect to a superior agent, one more intelligent and resourceful and persuasive than the rest. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: The very weak are equally a problem. Democratic societies produce fewer inequalities. Hierarchical societies are miserable (I expect..). |
| 4112 | A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Recently there has been much emphasis on the importance of our capacity to have second-order desires - the desire to have certain desires - and its significance for ethical reflection and the practical consciousness. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: This is a crucial point if we are to defend a reasonably rational view of morality against (say) emotivism. I agree that it is crucial to morality. |
| 4113 | 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: There is no ancient Greek word for duty; the word 'deon' (the basis of 'deontology') means what one must do. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably it covered compulsions which were not duties, such as the need to eat or drink. Greeks thought morally, but lacked a good moral vocabulary? |
| 4250 | The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: The only person who can offer a rebuttal of this is Aristotle. With the magnet of the Platonic Form of the Good, I can perceive the natural excellences of which I am capable, and feel a duty to pursue them. |
| 4110 | Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Obligation and duty look backwards; the acts they require lie in the future, but the reasons for those acts lie in the fact that I have already promised, the job I have undertaken, the position I am already in. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: Maybe the central issue in morality is forwards versus backwards. It reflects two types of human temperament. Tomorrow is another day. Spilt milk. |
| 4248 | Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Not every conclusion of moral deliberation expresses an obligation; for example, some moral conclusions merely announce that you 'may' do something. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: An important point for any deontological ethics. It may be possible to translate what 'may' be done into some form of duty, but it will probably involve contortions. |
| 4249 | "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: Williams says it is true in particular instances, but is not generally true of 'ought'. Maybe you 'ought' before you know whether you 'can'. |
| 4121 | Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Why should I think of myself as a legislator and at the same time a citizen of a republic governed by some notional laws? | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4) | |
| A reaction: Kant's answer is supposed to be 'because you are rational, and hence must want consistency'. If we were all rational, Kant would be right. |
| 4122 | If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: How can an 'I' that has taken on the perspective of impartiality be left with enough identity to live a life that respects its own interests? | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4) | |
| A reaction: Not a big problem. Thought constantly flips between objective and subjective, as Nagel has shown us. Compare Nagel in Idea 6446. |
| 4124 | Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and it is immune to the inverse square law. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 5) | |
| A reaction: Nicely put. The point is that the theory is inhuman, but Mill says it tells us what we should do, not what we actually tend to do. |
| 4245 | Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The view that the only alternative to the intellect is the will, and the source of ethical conviction is decisions about principles and ways of life, cannot be right; ethical conviction, like any conviction, must to some extent come to you passively. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Seems right. We cannot choose our factual beliefs (look at the sun and believe it is cloudy!). Could I 'decide' that it was right to betray my family just for fun? |
| 4246 | Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If ethics is a matter of decision, and we must face the responsibility and burden of those decisions, this ignores the obvious point that if we are uncertain, then we are uncertain what to decide. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Good point. The defence would be that the decision itself contains the seeds of certainty. Do something rather than nothing, and the sense of it will emerge. Modify as you go along. |
| 4247 | It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Maybe beliefs imply education. A commitment to truth is an aspiration that others will agree, especially those over whom we have the greatest influence. |
| 4131 | Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Few women see a spontaneous abortion or early miscarriage as the same thing as having a child who is stillborn or who dies very soon after birth. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This implies a theory about the nature of what is lost. Everyone sees the difference between potential and actual. |
| 4133 | Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Speciesism is falsely modelled on racism and sexism, which really are prejudices; ..our arguments have to be founded on the human point of view; they cannot be derived from a point of view that is no one's point of view at all. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This must be wrong. How else are we going to judge cruelty to animals as wrong? The 'point of view of the Universe' (Sidgwick) is not an empty concept. |
| 1494 | Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Thales says water is the first principle (which is why he declared the earth is on water); perhaps he concluded this from seeing that all food is moist. | |
| From: report of Thales (fragments/reports [c.585 BCE], A12) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 983b12 |
| 1713 | Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Thales seems, from what is recorded of him, to have supposed that the soul is something productive of movement, if he really said that the magnet has soul because it produces movement in iron. | |
| From: report of Thales (fragments/reports [c.585 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 405a20 |
| 1742 | Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: When asked whether a man who did wrong could escape the notice of the gods, Thales is said to have replied: 'No, not even if he thinks wrong.' | |
| From: report of Thales (fragments/reports [c.585 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 01.Th.9 |