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All the ideas for 'Writing the Book of the World', 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' and 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'

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69 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider]
     Full Idea: Ontological 'cheaters' are those ne'er-do-well metaphysicians (such as presentists, phenomenalists, or solipsists) who refuse to countenance a sufficiently robust conception of the fundamental to underwrite the truths they accept.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.4)
     A reaction: Presentists are placed in rather insalubrious company here, The notion of 'cheaters' is nice, and I associate it with Australian philosophy, and the reason that was admired by David Lewis.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics, at bottom, is about the fundamental structure of reality. Not about what's necessarily true. Not about what properties are essential. Not about conceptual analysis. Not about what there is. Structure.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01)
     A reaction: The opening words of his book. I take them to be absolutely correct, and to articulate the new orthodoxy about metaphysics which has emerged since about 1995. He expands this as being about patterns, categories and joints.
Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider]
     Full Idea: The most extreme critics of metaphysics base their critique on sweeping views about language (logical positivism), or knowledge (empiricism), ...but this notoriously threatens the science of unobservables as much as it threatens metaphysics.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 05.1)
     A reaction: These criticisms also threaten speculative physics (even about what is possibly observable).
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider]
     Full Idea: It has always seemed odd that insight into the fundamental workings of the universe should be gained by reflection on how we think and speak.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.8)
     A reaction: A nice expression of what should by now be obvious to all philosophers - that analysis of language is not going to reveal very much. It is merely clearing the undergrowth so that we can go somewhere.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider]
     Full Idea: Conceptual analysts generally regard intuitive judgements about particular cases as being far more diagnostic than intuitive judgements about general principles.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.4 n7)
     A reaction: Since I take the aim to be the building up an accurate picture about general truths, it would be daft to just leap to our intuitions about those general truths. Equally you can't cut intuition out of the picture (pace Ladyman).
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
     Full Idea: Rules of deduction are rules of deductive argument; they are not rules of inference or reasoning.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 1)
     A reaction: And I have often noticed that good philosophing reasoners and good logicians are frequently not the same people.
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
     Full Idea: We sometimes discover our views are inconsistent and do not know how to revise them in order to avoid inconsistency without great cost. The best response may be to keep the inconsistency and try to avoid inferences that exploit it.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2)
     A reaction: Any decent philosopher should face this dilemma regularly. I assume non-philosophers don't compare the different compartments of their beliefs very much. Students of non-monotonic logics are trying to formalise such thinking.
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
     Full Idea: Although logic does not seem specially relevant to reasoning, immediate implication and immediate inconsistency do seem important for reasoning.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2)
     A reaction: Ordinary thinkers can't possibly track complex logical implications, so we have obviously developed strategies for coping. I assume formal logic is contructed from the basic ingredients of the immediate and obvious implications, such as modus ponens.
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
     Full Idea: I am assuming the following principle: Clutter Avoidance - in reasoning, one should not clutter one's mind with trivialities.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2)
     A reaction: I like Harman's interest in the psychology of reasoning. In the world of Frege, it is taboo to talk about psychology.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
     Full Idea: Implication is cumulative, in a way that inference may not be. In argument one accumulates conclusions; things are always added, never subtracted. Reasoned revision, however, can subtract from one's view as well as add.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 1)
     A reaction: This has caught Harman's attention, I think (?), because he is looking for non-monotonic reasoning (i.e. revisable reasoning) within a classical framework. If revision is responding to evidence, the logic can remain conventional.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider]
     Full Idea: Arguably, 'there is absolutely no space between two objects in contact' is false, but definitional of 'contact'. ...We need a word for true definitional sentences. I propose: 'analytic'.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.8)
Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider]
     Full Idea: Philosophical concepts of interest are rarely reductively defined; still more rarely does our understanding of such concepts rest on definitions. ...(We generally understand concepts to the extent that we know what role they play in thinking).
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.1)
     A reaction: I'm not sure that I agree with this. I suspect that Sider has the notion of definition in mind that is influenced by lexicography. Aristotle's concept of definition I take to be lengthy and expansive, and that is very relevant to philosophy.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider]
     Full Idea: What we care about is truth in joint-carving terms, not just truth.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 04.5)
     A reaction: The thought is that it matters what conceptual scheme is used to express the truth (the 'ideology'). Truths can be true but uninformative or unexplanatory.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider]
     Full Idea: According to the entrenched truthmaker theorist, the fundamental facts consist just of facts citing the existence of entities. It's hard to see how all the complexity we experience could possibly be explained from that sparse basis.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.5)
     A reaction: This may be the 'entrenched' truthmaker view, but it is not clear why there could not be more complicated fundamental truthmakers, with structure as well as entities. And powers.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider]
     Full Idea: If we accept the Barcan and converse Barcan schemas, this leads to surprising ontological consequences. Wittgenstein might have fathered something, so, by the Barcan schema, there is something that Wittgenstein might have fathered.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.9)
     A reaction: [He cites Tim Williamson for this line of thought] I was liking the Barcan picture, by now I am backing away fast. They cannot be serious!
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider]
     Full Idea: An object is 'gunky' if each of its parts has further proper parts; thus gunk involves infinite descent in the part-whole relation.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.11.2)
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider]
     Full Idea: Should our fundamental theory of part and whole take 'part' or 'overlap' as primitive?
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.3)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider]
     Full Idea: Certain debates over the 'correct' logic are genuine, and not linguistic or conceptual.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01.3)
     A reaction: It is rather hard to give arguments in favour of this view, but I am pleased to have the authority of Sider with me.
'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider]
     Full Idea: I cannot legislate-true 'It is raining' and I cannot legislate true 'It is not raining', so if I cannot legislate either true then I cannot legislate-true the disjunction 'it is raining or it is not raining'.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a very simple and very persuasive argument against the idea that logic is a mere convention. I take disjunction to be an abstract summary of how the world works. Sider seems sympathetic.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider]
     Full Idea: Despite its brilliant success in mathematics and fundamental science, classical logic applies uneasily to natural language.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 10.6)
     A reaction: He gives examples of the conditional, and debates over the meaning of 'and', 'or' and 'not', and also names and quantifiers. Many modern philosophical problems result from this conflict.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider]
     Full Idea: The simplest modal account is that logical consequence is just necessary consequence; another modal account says that logical consequences are modal consequences that involve only logical words essentially.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.3)
     A reaction: [He cites Quine's 'Carnap and Logical Truth' for the second idea] Sider is asserting that Humeans like him dislike modality, and hence need a nonmodal account of logical consequence.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider]
     Full Idea: Some say that logical constants are those expressions that are defined by their proof-theoretic roles, others that they are the expressions whose semantic values are permutation-invariant, and still others that they are the topic-neutral expressions.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 10.3)
     A reaction: [He cites MacFarlane 2005 as giving a survey of this]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider]
     Full Idea: 'Tonk' is stipulated by Prior to stand for a meaning that obeys the elimination and introduction rules; but there simply is no such meaning; 'tonk' cannot be interpreted so as to obey the rules.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5)
     A reaction: 'Tonk' thus seems to present a problem for so-called 'natural' deduction, if the natural deduction consists of nothing more than obey elimination and introduction rules.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider]
     Full Idea: Supervenience is just a kind of modal connection.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.10)
     A reaction: It says what would happen, as well as what does. This is big for Sider because he rejects modality as a feature of actuality. I think the world is crammed full of modal facts, so supervenience should be a handy tool for me.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin]
     Full Idea: Shadows are distinct from the physical objects casting the shadows and irreducible to them; any attempt at reduction would be incoherent, as it would entail identifying a shadow with the object of which it is a shadow.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 6.3)
     A reaction: Another failure to find a decent analogy for what is claimed in property dualism. A 'shadow' is a reification of the abstract concept of an absence of light. Objects lose their shadows at dusk, but the object itself doesn't change.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / b. Types of fundamental
Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider]
     Full Idea: The locus of fundamentality for a Finean is the whole proposition, whereas for me it is the proposition-part. Fundamentality is holistic for the Finean, atomistic for me.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.3)
     A reaction: This is because Kit Fine has pushed fundamentality into a relation (grounding), rather than into the particular entities involved (if I understand Sider's reading of him aright). My first intuition is to side with Sider. I'm on Sider's side...
Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider]
     Full Idea: The existence of tables and chairs is just as fundamental as the existence of electrons (in contrast, perhaps, with smirks and shadows, which do not exist fundamentally). However, tables and chairs have nonfundamental natures.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.7)
     A reaction: This seems to be a good clarification, and to me the 'nature' of something points towards its essence. However, I suppose he refers here to the place of something in a dependence hierarchy. But then, why does it have that place? What power?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
     Full Idea: Stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism, whereas things do not.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.6.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Markosian 2004]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin]
     Full Idea: The word 'ontology' is derived from the Greek word 'ontia', which means 'things which exist'.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.1)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider]
     Full Idea: The truthmaker theorist's 'concrete' states of affairs must be distinguished from necessarily existing 'abstract' states of affairs.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.4)
     A reaction: [He cites Plantinga's 'Nature of Necessity' for the second one; I presume the first one is Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider]
     Full Idea: We can add to the Quinean advice to believe the ontology of your best theory that you should also regard the ideology of your best theory as carving at the joints.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.3)
     A reaction: I've never liked the original Quinean formulation, but this is much better. I just take my ontological commitments to reside in me, not in whatever theory I am currently employing. I may be dubious about my own theory.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider]
     Full Idea: Chisholm and Kim proposed a modal notion of an 'intrinsic' property - that a property is intrinsic if and only if it is possibly instantiated by an object that is alone in the world.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Chisholm 1976:127 and Kim 1982:59-60] Sider then gives a counterexample from David Lewis (Idea 14979).
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider]
     Full Idea: For Armstrong a predicate is sparse when there exists a corresponding universal; for Lewis, a predicate is sparse when there exists a corresponding natural property or relation.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06)
     A reaction: I like 'sparse' properties, but have no sympathy with Armstrong, and am cautious about Lewis. I like Shoemaker's account, which makes properties even sparser. 'Abundant' so-called properties are my pet hate. They are 'predicates'!
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider]
     Full Idea: We should not regard nonmodal essence as being metaphysically basic: fundamental theories need essence no more than they need modality.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1)
     A reaction: He is discussing Kit Fine, and notes that Fine offers a nonmodal view of essence, but still doesn't make it fundamental. I am a fan of essences, but making them fundamental in metaphysics seems unlikely.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
     Full Idea: The Gambler's Fallacy says if black has come up ten times in a row, red must be highly probable next time. It overlooks how the impact of an initial run of one color can become more and more insignificant as the sequence gets longer.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 1)
     A reaction: At what point do you decide that the roulette wheel is fixed, rather than that you have fallen for the Gambler's Fallacy? Interestingly, standard induction points to the opposite conclusion. But then you have prior knowledge of the wheel.
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
     Full Idea: Propositions that are individually highly probable can have an immediate implication that is not. The fact that one can assign a high probability to P and also to 'if P then Q' is not sufficient reason to assign high probability to Q.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 3)
     A reaction: He cites Kyburg's Lottery Paradox. It is probable that there is a winning ticket, and that this ticket is not it. Thus it is NOT probable that I will win.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider]
     Full Idea: The spirit of Humeanism is that necessity is not a realm to be discovered. We draw the lines around what is necessary.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.3)
     A reaction: I disagree, but it is hard to argue the point. My intuitions are that the obvious necessities of logic and mathematics reflect the way nature has to be. The deepest necessities are patterns (about which God has no choice).
Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider]
     Full Idea: English modals are context-dependent through and through; there is no stable 'outer modality'.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.7)
     A reaction: Sider has been doing so well up to here. To me this is swallowing the bait of linguistic approaches to philosophy which he has fought so hard to avoid.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider]
     Full Idea: If □φ says that φ is true by convention, then □φ would apparently turn out to be contingent, since statements about what conventions we adopt are not themselves true by convention. The main axioms of S4 and S5 would be false.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1)
Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider]
     Full Idea: Conventionalism is apparently inapplicable to Kripke's and Putnam's examples of the necessary a posteriori (and, relatedly, to de re modality).
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1)
     A reaction: [Sidelle 1989 discusses this]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider]
     Full Idea: Why are logical (or mathematical, or analytic...) truths necessary? The Humean's answer is that this is just how our concept of necessity works.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.11)
     A reaction: This is why I (unlike Sider) am not a Humean. If we agreed that 'necessary' meant 'whatever is decreed by the Pope', that would so obviously not be necessary that we would have to start searching nature for true necessities.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider]
     Full Idea: At bottom, the world is an amodal place. Necessity and possibility do not carve at the joints; ultimate reality is not 'full of threats and promises' (Goodman). The book of the world says how things are, not how they must or might be.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12)
     A reaction: Nice to see this expressed so clearly. I find it much easier to disagree with as a result. At first blush I would say that if you haven't noticed that the world is full of threats and promises, you should wake up and smell the coffee. Actuality is active.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
     Full Idea: Moore's Paradox: one is strongly disposed not to believe both P and that one does not believe that P, while realising that these propositions are perfectly consistent with one another.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2)
     A reaction: [Where in Moore?] A very nice example of a powerful principle of reasoning which can never be captured in logic.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
     Full Idea: The key issue in belief revision is whether one needs to keep track of one's original justifications for beliefs. What I am calling the 'foundations' theory says yes; what I am calling the 'coherence' theory says no.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 4)
     A reaction: I favour coherence in all things epistemological, and this idea seems to match real life, where I am very confident of many beliefs of which I have forgotten the justification. Harman says coherentists need the justification only when they doubt a belief.
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
     Full Idea: Coherence in a view consists in connections of intelligibility among the elements of the view. Among other things these included explanatory connections, which hold when part of one's view makes it intelligible why some other part should be true.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 7)
     A reaction: Music to my ears. I call myself an 'explanatory empiricist', and embrace a coherence theory of justification. This is the framework within which philosophy should be practised. Harman is our founder, and Paul Thagard our guru.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider]
     Full Idea: 'Theories' based on bizarre, non-joint-carving classifications are unexplanatory even when true.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.1)
     A reaction: This nicely pinpoints why I take explanation to be central to whole metaphysical enterprise.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider]
     Full Idea: If the entire theory of this book were replaced by its Ramsey sentence, omitting all mention of fundamentality, something would seem to be lost.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.2 n2)
     A reaction: It is a moot point whether Ramsey sentences actually eliminate anything from the ontology, but trying to wriggle out of ontological commitment looks a rather sad route to follow.
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider]
     Full Idea: 'Is nonblack', 'is a nonraven', and 'grue' fail to carve at the joints.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.3)
     A reaction: A lot more than this needs to said, but this remark encapsulates why I find most of these paradoxes of induction uninteresting. They are all the creations of logicians, rather than of scientists.
Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider]
     Full Idea: The applicability of 'grue' to each of a pair of particulars does not guarantee the similarity of those particulars.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.2)
     A reaction: Grue is not a colour but a behaviour. If two things are 'mercurial' or 'erratic', will that ensure a similarity at any given moment?
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider]
     Full Idea: In the Bayesian approach, bizarre prior probability distributions will result in bizarre responses to evidence.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.3)
     A reaction: This is exactly what you find when people with weird beliefs encounter ridiculous evidence for things. It doesn't invalidate the formula, but just says rubbish in rubbish out.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
     Full Idea: Explanations must cite generalisations.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.13)
     A reaction: I'm uneasy about this. Presumably some events have a unique explanation - a unique mechanism, perhaps. Language is inescapably general in its nature - which I take to be Aristotle's reason for agreeing the Sider. [Sider adds mechanisms on p.159]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider]
     Full Idea: Ultimate explanations always terminate in the citation of entities; but since a mere list of entities is so unstructured, these 'explanations' cannot be systematized with detailed general laws, patterns, or mechanisms.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.5)
     A reaction: We just need to distinguish between ultimate ontology and ultimate explanations. I think explanations peter out at the point where we descend below the mechanisms. Patterns or laws don't explain on their own. Causal mechanisms are the thing.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin]
     Full Idea: The argument from analogy makes it impossible to check my inductive inferences because of the privacy of other minds; it also seems irresponsible to generalise from a single case; and it seems like a case of human chauvinism.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 8.2)
     A reaction: Privacy of other minds need not imply scepticism about them. I'm a believer, so I have no trouble checking my theories. Solipsists can't 'check' anything. It isn't 'irresponsible' to generalise from one case if that is all you have.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider]
     Full Idea: One day the physicists will complete the catalogue of ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the like of spin, charm and charge will perhaps appear on the list. But aboutness sure won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 4 Intro)
     A reaction: Fodor's project is to give a reductive, and perhaps eliminative, account of intentionality of mind, while leaving open what one might do with the phenomenological aspects. Personally I don't think they will appear on the list either.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin]
     Full Idea: If I am my brain this leads to the odd result that you have never met me because you have never seen my brain.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 10.7)
     A reaction: 'Star Trek' is full of aliens who appear beautiful, and turn out to be ugly grey lumps. 'I am my face' would be just as odd, particularly if I were in a coma, or dead.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin]
     Full Idea: I may be the final authority on whether my shoe pinches, but I am manifestly not the final authority on whether I understand some mathematical theorem.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.7)
     A reaction: However, it doesn't follow that his teachers are the final authority either, because he may get correct answers by an algorithm, and bluff his way when demonstrating his understanding. Who knows whether anyone really understands anything?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin]
     Full Idea: If mental events are causally efficacious only by virtue of their physical features and not their mental ones, …then anomalous monism leads straight to ephiphenomenalism.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.6)
     A reaction: As epiphenomenalism strikes me as being incoherent (see Idea 7379), what this amounts to is that either mental effects are causally efficacious, or they are not worth mentioning. I take them to be causally efficacious because they are brain events.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin]
     Full Idea: In token-identity mental and physical features seem as unrelated as colour and shape, which is very weak physicalism because it does not allow physical states an explanatory role in accounting for mental states.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 3.8.6)
     A reaction: Colour and shape are not totally unrelated, as they can both be totally explained by a full knowledge of the physical substance involved. ...But maybe if we fully understood Spinoza's single substance...? See Idea 4834.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider]
     Full Idea: It is absurd to say that 'before we introduced our conventions, not all green things were green'.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5)
     A reaction: Well… Different cultures label the colours of the rainbow differently, and many of them omit orange. I suspect the blue/green borderline has shifted.
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider]
     Full Idea: To suggest that analytic truths make statements about linguistic conventions is a nonstarter; statements about linguistic conventions are contingent, whereas the statements made by typical analytic sentences are necessary.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5)
     A reaction: That 'anything yellow is extended' is not just a convention should be fairly obvious, and it is obviously necessary. But we can say that bachelors are necessarily unmarried men - given the current convention.
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]
     Full Idea: Nothing can fully play the role traditionally associated with analyticity, for much of that traditional role presupposed the doctrine of truth by convention.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.8)
     A reaction: Sider rejects Quine's attack on analyticity, but accepts his critique of truth by convention.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin]
     Full Idea: The principle of nomological causality says that if two events are intrinsically causally related, there must be a strict physical law under which they can be subsumed.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5)
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin]
     Full Idea: 'Deductive-nomological' explanation consists of two premises - a strict law with no exceptions and supporting deterministic counterfactuals, and a statement of an event which falls under the law - which together logically require the effect.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.4)
Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin]
     Full Idea: 'Strict' laws of nature contain no ceteris paribus clauses ('all things being equal'), and are part of a closed system (so that whatever affects the system must be included within the system).
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5)
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider]
     Full Idea: That spacetime is 4D Lorentzian manifold, that the universe began with a singularity, and in a state of low entropy, are all central to physics, but it is a stretch to call them 'laws'. ...It has been argued that there are no laws of biology.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.1)
The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider]
     Full Idea: Adding the notion of law to physical theory doesn't seem to enhance its explanatory power.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.4)
     A reaction: I agree with his scepticism about laws, although Sider offers it as part of his scepticism about modal facts being included in explanations of actuality. Personally I like dispositions, but not laws. See the ideas of Stephen Mumford.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider]
     Full Idea: In metaphysics, space is intrinsically structured; the genuine betweenness and congruence relations are privileged in a way that Euclidean-betweenness and Euclidean-congruence are not.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.4)
     A reaction: I note that Einstein requires space to be 'curved', which implies that it is a substance with properties.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider]
     Full Idea: The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space?
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.1)
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider]
     Full Idea: The spotlight theorist accepts the block universe, but also something in addition: a joint-carving monadic property of presentness, which is possessed by just one moment of time, and which 'moves', to be possessed by later and later times.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.9)
     A reaction: This seems better than the merely detached eternalist view, which seems to ignore the key phenomenon. I just can't comprehend any theory which makes the future as real as the past.