75 ideas
13786 | Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato] |
Full Idea: Wisdom [phronesis] is correctly given the name 'kalon' [beautiful], since it performs the works that we say are beautiful and welcome as such. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 416d) | |
A reaction: 'Phronesis' in Aristotle is more like prudence, or common sense, rather than wisdom ['sophia']. 'Kalon' also means fine or noble. This translation seems fair enough, though. |
13780 | Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates: Are good people any different from wise ones? No, they aren't. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 398b) | |
A reaction: This is Socrates's 'intellectualism', his view that being good is entirely a matter of reason and knowledge, and not a matter of habit or emotion. Do we still accept the traditional assumption that wise people are thereby morally good? |
15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
Full Idea: Ontological 'cheaters' are those ne'er-do-well metaphysicians (such as presentists, phenomenalists, or solipsists) who refuse to countenance a sufficiently robust conception of the fundamental to underwrite the truths they accept. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.4) | |
A reaction: Presentists are placed in rather insalubrious company here, The notion of 'cheaters' is nice, and I associate it with Australian philosophy, and the reason that was admired by David Lewis. |
14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics, at bottom, is about the fundamental structure of reality. Not about what's necessarily true. Not about what properties are essential. Not about conceptual analysis. Not about what there is. Structure. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: The opening words of his book. I take them to be absolutely correct, and to articulate the new orthodoxy about metaphysics which has emerged since about 1995. He expands this as being about patterns, categories and joints. |
14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
Full Idea: The most extreme critics of metaphysics base their critique on sweeping views about language (logical positivism), or knowledge (empiricism), ...but this notoriously threatens the science of unobservables as much as it threatens metaphysics. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 05.1) | |
A reaction: These criticisms also threaten speculative physics (even about what is possibly observable). |
15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
Full Idea: It has always seemed odd that insight into the fundamental workings of the universe should be gained by reflection on how we think and speak. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.8) | |
A reaction: A nice expression of what should by now be obvious to all philosophers - that analysis of language is not going to reveal very much. It is merely clearing the undergrowth so that we can go somewhere. |
14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
Full Idea: Conceptual analysts generally regard intuitive judgements about particular cases as being far more diagnostic than intuitive judgements about general principles. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.4 n7) | |
A reaction: Since I take the aim to be the building up an accurate picture about general truths, it would be daft to just leap to our intuitions about those general truths. Equally you can't cut intuition out of the picture (pace Ladyman). |
13778 | A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato] |
Full Idea: What would you call someone who knows how to ask and answer questions? Wouldn't you call him a dialectician? | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 390c) | |
A reaction: Asking good questions and giving good answers sound like two very different skills. I presume dialectic is the process of arriving at answers by means of asking the right questions. |
15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
Full Idea: Arguably, 'there is absolutely no space between two objects in contact' is false, but definitional of 'contact'. ...We need a word for true definitional sentences. I propose: 'analytic'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.8) |
14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
Full Idea: Philosophical concepts of interest are rarely reductively defined; still more rarely does our understanding of such concepts rest on definitions. ...(We generally understand concepts to the extent that we know what role they play in thinking). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.1) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I agree with this. I suspect that Sider has the notion of definition in mind that is influenced by lexicography. Aristotle's concept of definition I take to be lengthy and expansive, and that is very relevant to philosophy. |
14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
Full Idea: What we care about is truth in joint-carving terms, not just truth. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 04.5) | |
A reaction: The thought is that it matters what conceptual scheme is used to express the truth (the 'ideology'). Truths can be true but uninformative or unexplanatory. |
15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
Full Idea: According to the entrenched truthmaker theorist, the fundamental facts consist just of facts citing the existence of entities. It's hard to see how all the complexity we experience could possibly be explained from that sparse basis. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.5) | |
A reaction: This may be the 'entrenched' truthmaker view, but it is not clear why there could not be more complicated fundamental truthmakers, with structure as well as entities. And powers. |
13776 | Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato] |
Full Idea: Those statements that say of the things that are that they are, are true, while those that say of the things that are that they are not, are false. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 385b) | |
A reaction: It was quite a shock to discover this, because the famous Aristotle definition (Idea 586) is always quoted, and no modern writers seem to have any awareness of the Plato remark. Classical scholarship is very poor in analytic philosophy. |
15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
Full Idea: If we accept the Barcan and converse Barcan schemas, this leads to surprising ontological consequences. Wittgenstein might have fathered something, so, by the Barcan schema, there is something that Wittgenstein might have fathered. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.9) | |
A reaction: [He cites Tim Williamson for this line of thought] I was liking the Barcan picture, by now I am backing away fast. They cannot be serious! |
15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
Full Idea: An object is 'gunky' if each of its parts has further proper parts; thus gunk involves infinite descent in the part-whole relation. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.11.2) |
14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
Full Idea: Should our fundamental theory of part and whole take 'part' or 'overlap' as primitive? | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.3) |
14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
Full Idea: Certain debates over the 'correct' logic are genuine, and not linguistic or conceptual. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01.3) | |
A reaction: It is rather hard to give arguments in favour of this view, but I am pleased to have the authority of Sider with me. |
15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
Full Idea: I cannot legislate-true 'It is raining' and I cannot legislate true 'It is not raining', so if I cannot legislate either true then I cannot legislate-true the disjunction 'it is raining or it is not raining'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very simple and very persuasive argument against the idea that logic is a mere convention. I take disjunction to be an abstract summary of how the world works. Sider seems sympathetic. |
15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
Full Idea: Despite its brilliant success in mathematics and fundamental science, classical logic applies uneasily to natural language. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 10.6) | |
A reaction: He gives examples of the conditional, and debates over the meaning of 'and', 'or' and 'not', and also names and quantifiers. Many modern philosophical problems result from this conflict. |
15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
Full Idea: The simplest modal account is that logical consequence is just necessary consequence; another modal account says that logical consequences are modal consequences that involve only logical words essentially. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Quine's 'Carnap and Logical Truth' for the second idea] Sider is asserting that Humeans like him dislike modality, and hence need a nonmodal account of logical consequence. |
15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
Full Idea: Some say that logical constants are those expressions that are defined by their proof-theoretic roles, others that they are the expressions whose semantic values are permutation-invariant, and still others that they are the topic-neutral expressions. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 10.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites MacFarlane 2005 as giving a survey of this] |
13777 | A name is a sort of tool [Plato] |
Full Idea: A name is a sort of tool. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 388a) | |
A reaction: Idea 13775 gives a background for this metaphor, from earlier in the text. Wittgenstein has a famous toolkit metaphor for language. The whole of this text, 'Cratylus', is about names. |
13790 | A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The name-giver might have made a mistake at the beginning and then forced the other names to be consistent with it. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 436c) | |
A reaction: Lovely. This is Gareth Evans's 'Madagascar' example. See Idea 9041. |
13791 | Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: If things cannot be learned except from their names, how can we possibly claim that the name-givers or rule-setters have knowledge before any names had been given for them to know? | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 438b) | |
A reaction: Running through this is a hostility to philosophy of language, so I find it very congenial. We are animals who relate to the world before language takes a grip. We have full-blown knowledge of things, with no intervention of words. |
13789 | Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato] |
Full Idea: The simple truth is that anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 435d) | |
A reaction: A nice slogan, but it seems to be blatantly false. The best example is Gareth Evans's of joining in a conversation about a person ('Louis'?), and only gradually tuning in to the person to which the name refers. |
15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Tonk' is stipulated by Prior to stand for a meaning that obeys the elimination and introduction rules; but there simply is no such meaning; 'tonk' cannot be interpreted so as to obey the rules. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: 'Tonk' thus seems to present a problem for so-called 'natural' deduction, if the natural deduction consists of nothing more than obey elimination and introduction rules. |
2063 | How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato] |
Full Idea: If beauty never stays the same, how can it be something? | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 439e) |
15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
Full Idea: Supervenience is just a kind of modal connection. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.10) | |
A reaction: It says what would happen, as well as what does. This is big for Sider because he rejects modality as a feature of actuality. I think the world is crammed full of modal facts, so supervenience should be a handy tool for me. |
15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
Full Idea: The locus of fundamentality for a Finean is the whole proposition, whereas for me it is the proposition-part. Fundamentality is holistic for the Finean, atomistic for me. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.3) | |
A reaction: This is because Kit Fine has pushed fundamentality into a relation (grounding), rather than into the particular entities involved (if I understand Sider's reading of him aright). My first intuition is to side with Sider. I'm on Sider's side... |
15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
Full Idea: The existence of tables and chairs is just as fundamental as the existence of electrons (in contrast, perhaps, with smirks and shadows, which do not exist fundamentally). However, tables and chairs have nonfundamental natures. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.7) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a good clarification, and to me the 'nature' of something points towards its essence. However, I suppose he refers here to the place of something in a dependence hierarchy. But then, why does it have that place? What power? |
15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
Full Idea: Stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism, whereas things do not. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.6.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Markosian 2004] |
15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker theorist's 'concrete' states of affairs must be distinguished from necessarily existing 'abstract' states of affairs. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Plantinga's 'Nature of Necessity' for the second one; I presume the first one is Armstrong] |
14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
Full Idea: We can add to the Quinean advice to believe the ontology of your best theory that you should also regard the ideology of your best theory as carving at the joints. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.3) | |
A reaction: I've never liked the original Quinean formulation, but this is much better. I just take my ontological commitments to reside in me, not in whatever theory I am currently employing. I may be dubious about my own theory. |
13775 | We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato] |
Full Idea: If we undertake to cut something and make the cut in whatever way we choose and with whatever tool we choose, we will not succeed. If we cut according to the nature of cutting and being cut, and with the natural tool, we'll succeed and cut correctly. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 387a) | |
A reaction: I take this passage to be the creed for realists about the physical world - a commitment not merely to the existence of an external world, but to the existence of facts about it, which we may or may not be able to discover. |
14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
Full Idea: Chisholm and Kim proposed a modal notion of an 'intrinsic' property - that a property is intrinsic if and only if it is possibly instantiated by an object that is alone in the world. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Chisholm 1976:127 and Kim 1982:59-60] Sider then gives a counterexample from David Lewis (Idea 14979). |
14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
Full Idea: For Armstrong a predicate is sparse when there exists a corresponding universal; for Lewis, a predicate is sparse when there exists a corresponding natural property or relation. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06) | |
A reaction: I like 'sparse' properties, but have no sympathy with Armstrong, and am cautious about Lewis. I like Shoemaker's account, which makes properties even sparser. 'Abundant' so-called properties are my pet hate. They are 'predicates'! |
13787 | Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Don't you think that just as each thing has a colour or some of those other qualities we mentioned, it also has a being or essence? | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 423e) | |
A reaction: The Greek here seems to be 'ousia', which I increasingly think should be translated as 'distinct identity', rather than as 'existence' or as 'essence'. Maybe the philosophical term 'haecceity' captures it best. |
13774 | Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato] |
Full Idea: If Euthydemus is wrong that everything always has every attribute simultaneously, or that being or essence is private for each person, then it is clear that things have some fixed being or essence of their own. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 386d) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what 'being or essence' translates. If it translates 'ousia' then I wouldn't make too much of this remark from an essentialist point of view. |
13772 | Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is the being or essence of each of the things that are something private to each person, as Protagoras tells us? | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 385e) | |
A reaction: This kind of drastic personal relativism about essences doesn't sound very plausible, but the idea that essences are private to each culture, or to each language, must certainly be taken seriously. |
15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
Full Idea: We should not regard nonmodal essence as being metaphysically basic: fundamental theories need essence no more than they need modality. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1) | |
A reaction: He is discussing Kit Fine, and notes that Fine offers a nonmodal view of essence, but still doesn't make it fundamental. I am a fan of essences, but making them fundamental in metaphysics seems unlikely. |
13788 | If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato] |
Full Idea: Soc: Suppose we made a duplicate of everything you have and put it beside you; would there then be two Cratyluses, or Cratylus and an image of Cratylus? Crat: It seems to me, Socrates, that there would be two Cratyluses. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 432c) | |
A reaction: Don't think that science fiction examples are a modern development in philosophy. Plato has just invented the Startrek transporter. The two Cratyluses are the two spheres in Max Black's famous example. |
15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
Full Idea: The spirit of Humeanism is that necessity is not a realm to be discovered. We draw the lines around what is necessary. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.3) | |
A reaction: I disagree, but it is hard to argue the point. My intuitions are that the obvious necessities of logic and mathematics reflect the way nature has to be. The deepest necessities are patterns (about which God has no choice). |
15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
Full Idea: English modals are context-dependent through and through; there is no stable 'outer modality'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.7) | |
A reaction: Sider has been doing so well up to here. To me this is swallowing the bait of linguistic approaches to philosophy which he has fought so hard to avoid. |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
Full Idea: If □φ says that φ is true by convention, then □φ would apparently turn out to be contingent, since statements about what conventions we adopt are not themselves true by convention. The main axioms of S4 and S5 would be false. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1) |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
Full Idea: Conventionalism is apparently inapplicable to Kripke's and Putnam's examples of the necessary a posteriori (and, relatedly, to de re modality). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1) | |
A reaction: [Sidelle 1989 discusses this] |
15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
Full Idea: Why are logical (or mathematical, or analytic...) truths necessary? The Humean's answer is that this is just how our concept of necessity works. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.11) | |
A reaction: This is why I (unlike Sider) am not a Humean. If we agreed that 'necessary' meant 'whatever is decreed by the Pope', that would so obviously not be necessary that we would have to start searching nature for true necessities. |
15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
Full Idea: At bottom, the world is an amodal place. Necessity and possibility do not carve at the joints; ultimate reality is not 'full of threats and promises' (Goodman). The book of the world says how things are, not how they must or might be. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12) | |
A reaction: Nice to see this expressed so clearly. I find it much easier to disagree with as a result. At first blush I would say that if you haven't noticed that the world is full of threats and promises, you should wake up and smell the coffee. Actuality is active. |
13792 | There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato] |
Full Idea: It isn't even reasonable to say that there is such a thing as knowledge, Cratylus, if all things are passing on and none remain. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 440a) | |
A reaction: This encapsulates Plato's horror at Heraclitus scepticism about the stable identity of things. It leads to the essentialism of Aristotle and Leibniz, who fear that there is no knowledge if we can't pin down individual identities. Know processes? |
14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Theories' based on bizarre, non-joint-carving classifications are unexplanatory even when true. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.1) | |
A reaction: This nicely pinpoints why I take explanation to be central to whole metaphysical enterprise. |
14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
Full Idea: If the entire theory of this book were replaced by its Ramsey sentence, omitting all mention of fundamentality, something would seem to be lost. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.2 n2) | |
A reaction: It is a moot point whether Ramsey sentences actually eliminate anything from the ontology, but trying to wriggle out of ontological commitment looks a rather sad route to follow. |
14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Is nonblack', 'is a nonraven', and 'grue' fail to carve at the joints. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.3) | |
A reaction: A lot more than this needs to said, but this remark encapsulates why I find most of these paradoxes of induction uninteresting. They are all the creations of logicians, rather than of scientists. |
14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
Full Idea: The applicability of 'grue' to each of a pair of particulars does not guarantee the similarity of those particulars. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.2) | |
A reaction: Grue is not a colour but a behaviour. If two things are 'mercurial' or 'erratic', will that ensure a similarity at any given moment? |
14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
Full Idea: In the Bayesian approach, bizarre prior probability distributions will result in bizarre responses to evidence. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.3) | |
A reaction: This is exactly what you find when people with weird beliefs encounter ridiculous evidence for things. It doesn't invalidate the formula, but just says rubbish in rubbish out. |
15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
Full Idea: Explanations must cite generalisations. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.13) | |
A reaction: I'm uneasy about this. Presumably some events have a unique explanation - a unique mechanism, perhaps. Language is inescapably general in its nature - which I take to be Aristotle's reason for agreeing the Sider. [Sider adds mechanisms on p.159] |
15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
Full Idea: Ultimate explanations always terminate in the citation of entities; but since a mere list of entities is so unstructured, these 'explanations' cannot be systematized with detailed general laws, patterns, or mechanisms. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.5) | |
A reaction: We just need to distinguish between ultimate ontology and ultimate explanations. I think explanations peter out at the point where we descend below the mechanisms. Patterns or laws don't explain on their own. Causal mechanisms are the thing. |
13781 | Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato] |
Full Idea: Those who named the soul thought that when the soul is present in the body, it causes it to live and gives it the power to breathe the air and be revitalized [anapsuchon]. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 399d) | |
A reaction: I quote this to emphasis that Greek psuché is very different from the consciousness which is largely discussed in modern philosophy of mind. I find it helpful to make a real effort to grasp the Greek concept. The feeling of life within you. |
21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The emerging consensus is that we probably overrate the power of conscious experience in our lives. Freud, of course, said the same thing for different reasons. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: [He cites Pockett, Banks and Gallagher 2006]. Freud was concerned with big deep secrets, but the modern view concerns ordinary decisions and perceptions. An important idea, which should incline us all to become Nietzscheans. |
15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
Full Idea: One day the physicists will complete the catalogue of ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the like of spin, charm and charge will perhaps appear on the list. But aboutness sure won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 4 Intro) | |
A reaction: Fodor's project is to give a reductive, and perhaps eliminative, account of intentionality of mind, while leaving open what one might do with the phenomenological aspects. Personally I don't think they will appear on the list either. |
21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: There is still some hope for something like identity theory for sensations. But almost no one believes that strict identity theory will work for more complex mental states. Strict identity is stronger than type neurophysicalism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: It is so hard to express the problem. What needs to be explained? How can one bunch of neurons represent many different things? It's not like computing. That just transfers the data to brains, where the puzzling stuff happens. |
14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
Full Idea: It is absurd to say that 'before we introduced our conventions, not all green things were green'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: Well… Different cultures label the colours of the rainbow differently, and many of them omit orange. I suspect the blue/green borderline has shifted. |
14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
Full Idea: To suggest that analytic truths make statements about linguistic conventions is a nonstarter; statements about linguistic conventions are contingent, whereas the statements made by typical analytic sentences are necessary. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: That 'anything yellow is extended' is not just a convention should be fairly obvious, and it is obviously necessary. But we can say that bachelors are necessarily unmarried men - given the current convention. |
15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
Full Idea: Nothing can fully play the role traditionally associated with analyticity, for much of that traditional role presupposed the doctrine of truth by convention. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.8) | |
A reaction: Sider rejects Quine's attack on analyticity, but accepts his critique of truth by convention. |
21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Morality is 'normative' in the sense that it consists of the extraction of ''good' or 'excellent' practices from common practices. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Naturalism') |
21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Two explanations came forward in the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Altruism is either 1) person-based reciprocal altruism, or 2) gene-based kin altruism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Darwin') | |
A reaction: Flanagan obviously thinks there is also 'genuine psychological atruism'. Presumably we don't explain mathematics or music or the desire to travel as either contracts or genetics, so we have other explanations available. |
21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It would be nice if I could advance the case for Eudaimonics - empirical enquiry into the nature, causes, and constituents of flourishing, …and the case for some ways of living and being as better than others. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Normative') | |
A reaction: Things seem to be moving in that direction. Lots of statistics about happiness have been appearing. |
13785 | 'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: 'Areté' signifies lack of perplexity [euporia, ease of movement], and that the flow of a good soul is unimpeded. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 415d) | |
A reaction: Some highly dubious etymology going on here, and throughout 'Cratylus', but it gives a nice feeling for the way Socrates and Plato saw virtue. |
21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: What Marx called 'alienation' is the widespread condition of not being able to discover what one wants, or not being remotely positioned to achieve. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Expanding') | |
A reaction: I took alienation to concern people's relationship to the means of production in their trade. On Flanagan's definition I would expect almost everyone aged under 20 to count as alienated. |
14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
Full Idea: That spacetime is 4D Lorentzian manifold, that the universe began with a singularity, and in a state of low entropy, are all central to physics, but it is a stretch to call them 'laws'. ...It has been argued that there are no laws of biology. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.1) |
14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
Full Idea: Adding the notion of law to physical theory doesn't seem to enhance its explanatory power. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.4) | |
A reaction: I agree with his scepticism about laws, although Sider offers it as part of his scepticism about modal facts being included in explanations of actuality. Personally I like dispositions, but not laws. See the ideas of Stephen Mumford. |
14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
Full Idea: In metaphysics, space is intrinsically structured; the genuine betweenness and congruence relations are privileged in a way that Euclidean-betweenness and Euclidean-congruence are not. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.4) | |
A reaction: I note that Einstein requires space to be 'curved', which implies that it is a substance with properties. |
15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
Full Idea: The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.1) |
15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
Full Idea: The spotlight theorist accepts the block universe, but also something in addition: a joint-carving monadic property of presentness, which is possessed by just one moment of time, and which 'moves', to be possessed by later and later times. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.9) | |
A reaction: This seems better than the merely detached eternalist view, which seems to ignore the key phenomenon. I just can't comprehend any theory which makes the future as real as the past. |
13779 | The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that it is right to call a lion's offspring a 'lion' and a horse's offspring a 'horse' (I'm talking about natural offspring, not some monster). ...but by the same argument any offspring of a king should be called a 'king'. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 393b) | |
A reaction: The standard modern difficulty is whether all descendants of dinosaurs are still called 'dinosaur', which they are not. |
13783 | Even the gods love play [Plato] |
Full Idea: Even the gods love play. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 406c) |
21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Buddhism rejected the idea of a creator God, and the unchanging self [atman]. They accept the appearance-reality distinction, reward for virtue [karma], suffering defining our predicament, and that liberation [nirvana] is possible through wisdom. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Buddhism') | |
A reaction: [Compressed] Flanagan is an analytic philosopher and a practising Buddhist. Looking at a happiness map today which shows Europeans largely happy, and Africans largely miserable, I can see why they thought suffering was basic. |