Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Of Liberty and Necessity', 'In Defence of Convention T' and 'On Minerals'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


3 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Substantial forms must exist, to explain the stability of metals like silver and tin [Albertus Magnus]
     Full Idea: There is no reason why the matter in any natural thing should be stable in its nature, if it is not completed by a substantial form. But we see that silver is stable, and tin and other metals. Therefore they will seem to be perfected by substantial forms.
     From: Albertus Magnus (On Minerals [1260], III.1.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.2
     A reaction: Illuminating. This may be the best reason for proposing substantial forms. Once materialism arrives, the so-called 'laws' of nature have to be imposed on the material to do the job - but what the hell is a law supposed to be?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: For contingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but that which hath not for cause any thing that we perceive, as when a traveller meets a shower, they both had sufficient causes, but they didn't cause one another, so we say it was contingent.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Of Liberty and Necessity [1654], §95)
     A reaction: Contingent nowadays means 'might not have happened', or 'does not happen in all possible worlds'. Personally I share Hobbes' doubts about the concept of contingency, and this is quite a good account of the misunderstanding.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
     Full Idea: For a theory of meaning for a fragment of natural language, what Davidson requires, in effect, is that the sentences be translatable into the language of Frege's symbolic logic.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (In Defence of Convention T [1973]) by David Macey - Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory
     A reaction: This assumes the adequacy of Fregean logic, which seems unlikely. Is this the culmination of Leibniz's dream of a fully logical language - so that anything that won't fit into our logical form is ruled (logical positivist style) as meaningless?