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All the ideas for 'Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics', 'fragments/reports' and 'Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Crates lived in poverty, and treated his whole life as a joke [Crates of Thebes, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Crates, with his bag and threadbare cloak, spent his whole life laughing and joking as though he were on holiday.
     From: report of Crates (Theb) (fragments/reports [c.325 BCE]) by Plutarch - 30: Quiet of Mind 266e
     A reaction: Crates sounds a little less alarming than Diogenes, while living a similar life. Was Crates the first ancestor of post-modernism?
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Everyone should study philosophy until they see all people in the same light [Crates of Thebes, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: A man should study philosophy up to the point of looking on generals and donkey-drivers in the same light.
     From: report of Crates (Theb) (fragments/reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Cr.9
     A reaction: This seems to reject Aristote's idea that some people are clearly superior to others.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality [Hofweber]
     Full Idea: Esoteric metaphysics appeals to those, I conjecture, who deep down hold that philosophy is the queen of sciences after all, since it investigates what the world is REALLY like.
     From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 2)
     A reaction: He mentions Kit Fine and Jonathan Schaffer as esoteric metaphysicians. I see a pyramid of increasing generality and abstraction, with metaphysics at the top. This doesn't make it 'queen', though, because uncertainties multiply higher up.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics? [Hofweber]
     Full Idea: Material science has found that some features of metals make them more susceptible to corrosion but more resistant to fracture. Thus this immediately implies that there are features, i.e. properties. What is left for metaphysics to do?
     From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 1.1)
     A reaction: Presumably economists have discovered 'features' of economies that cause unemployment, and literary critics have discovered 'features' of novels that make them good.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc) [Hofweber]
     Full Idea: The inferential role of the existential quantifier in first order logic does not carry over to the existential quantifier in English (we have empty names, singular terms that are not even in the business of denoting, and so on).
     From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 2)
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
     Full Idea: That the first motion, or the first effect, whatever it be, cannot be produced necessarily, and, consequently, that the First Cause must be a free agent, has been demonstrated clearly and unanswerably.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 8)
     A reaction: He has said that the First Cause can only be conceived by us as an 'agent'. If there is an agential First Cause, then he must be right. It is this need for God to be free which makes scepticism about free will unacceptable to many.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
     Full Idea: There can be no will without such a degree of understanding, at least, as gives the conception of that which we will.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 1)
     A reaction: Presumably this 'conception' includes an understanding of the probable consequences, but they are of infinite complexity. I see this as an objection to 'ultimate' free will and responsibility, because there are only ever degrees of understanding.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
     Full Idea: I believe in moral liberty first because we have a natural conviction of belief that in many cases we act freely, second because we are accountable, and third because we can prosecute an end by a long series of means adapted.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5)
     A reaction: This is his final summary of why he believes in free will. Why didn't Plato and Aristotle have this natural belief? He could only believe we are 'accountable' because he believes in free will. Ants and bees pursue lengthy projects. Hm.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
     Full Idea: A motive is equally incapable of action and of passion; because it is not a thing that exists, but a thing that is conceived. …Motives may be compared to advice or exhortation.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 4)
     A reaction: We say people are motivated by greed or anger or love, which seems a bit stronger than mere advice.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
     Full Idea: Every man who understands the language knows that neither priority, nor constant conjunction, nor both taken together, imply efficiency.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 2)
     A reaction: This invites the question of how we do know causal events, if none of our experiences are enough to prove it. Reid says we have an innate knowledge that all events are caused, but that isn't much help. The presence of power?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]
     Full Idea: The law of nature respecting matter is grounded upon this principle: That matter is an inert, inactive substance, which does not act, but is acted upon.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5)
     A reaction: A clear statement (alongside Euler's) of the 18th century view, still with us, but strikes me as entirely wrong. Their view needs the active power of God to drive the laws. Matter has intrinsic primitive powers, and laws describe patterns of behaviour.