11 ideas
8074 | There is a five shilling fine for each point of divergence from the thinking of Aristotle [Oxford Univ 1350] |
Full Idea: Bachelors and Masters of Arts who do not follow Aristotle's philosophy are subject to a fine of five shillings for each point of divergence, as well as for infractions of the rules of the Organon. | |
From: Oxford Univ 1350 (Oxford University Statutes [1350]), quoted by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Lovely quotation! We may defend the medieval period as a genuinely philosophical age, but this sort of statement suggests otherwise, and shows what intellectual heroes the few independent thinkers like William of Ockham really were. |
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: A standard objection to minimalist truth is the 'incompleteness objection'. Since there are propositions inexpressible in present English the concept of truth isn't captured by all the instances of the Tarski biconditional. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Sounds like a good objection. |
14626 | In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson] |
Full Idea: In system S5 matters of possibility and necessity are always non-contingent. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: This will be because if something is possible in one world (because it can be seen to be true in some possible world) it will be possible for all worlds (since they can all see that world in S5). |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The view that all quantification is substitutional is not very plausible in general. Some uses of quantifiers clearly seem to have the function to make a claim about a domain of objects out there, no matter how they relate to the terms in our language. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Robust realists like myself are hardly going to say that quantification is just an internal language game. |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Since properties themselves can have properties there is a well-known division in the theory of properties between those who take a typed and those who take a type-free approach. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: A typed approach would imply restrictions on what it can be a property of. 'Green' is a property of surfaces, 'dark' is a property of colours. My first reaction is to opt for type-free. |
14625 | Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Modal thinking is logically equivalent to a type of counterfactual thinking. ...The necessary is that which is counterfactually implied by its own negation; the possible is that which does not counterfactually imply its own negation. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: I really like this, because it builds modality on ordinary imaginative thinking. He says you just need to grasp counterfactuals, and also negation and absurdity, and you can then understand necessity and possibility. We can all do that. |
14623 | Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The strict conditional implies the counterfactual conditional: □(A⊃B) ⊃ (A□→B) - suppose that A would not have held without B holding too; then if A had held, B would also have held. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: [He then adds a reading of his formula in terms of possible worlds] This sounds rather close to modus ponens. If A implies B, and A is actually the case, what have you got? B! |
14624 | Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The counterfactual conditional transmits possibility: (A□→B) ⊃ (◊A⊃◊B). Suppose that if A had held, B would also have held; the if it is possible for A to hold, it is also possible for B to hold. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic [2010], 1) |
14531 | Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
Full Idea: Instead of regarding counterfactuals as conditionals restricted to a range of possible worlds, we can define the necessity operator by means of counterfactuals. Metaphysical necessity is a special case of ordinary counterfactual thinking. | |
From: report of Timothy Williamson (Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic [2010]) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 2 | |
A reaction: [compressed] I very much like Williamson's approach, of basing these things on the ordinary way that ordinary people think. To me it is a welcome inclusion of psychology into metaphysics, which has been out in the cold since Frege. |
14628 | Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Imagination can be made to look cognitively worthless. Once we recall its fallible but vital role in evaluating counterfactual conditionals, we should be more open to the idea that it plays such a role in evaluating claims of possibility and necessity. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic [2010], 6) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a really important idea, because it establishes the importance of imagination within the formal framework of modern analytic philosopher (rather than in the whimsy of poets and dreamers). |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Holism says that nothing that can be said in one language can be said in another one. The expressibility hypothesis says that everything that can be said in one language can be said in every other one. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 6.4) | |
A reaction: Obviously expressibility would only refer to reasonably comprehensive languages (with basic logical connectives, for example). Personally I vote for the expressibility hypothesis, which Hofweber seems to favour. |