14024
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Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
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Full Idea:
Truthmaker is controversial: what of truths like 'all ravens are black', or 'there are no unicorns'. And 'John is tall' is not made true by John or the property of being tall, but by the fusion of the two, but what could this non-mereological fusion be?
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From:
Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], 3.4)
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A reaction:
A first move is to include modal facts (or possible worlds) among the truthmakers. The unicorns are tricky, and seem to need all of actuality as their truthmaker. I don't see the tallness difficulty. Predication is odd, but so what?
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18801
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Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett]
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Full Idea:
Explanations of classical negation assume that knowing what it is for the truth-condition of some statement to obtain, independently of recognising it to obtain, we thereby know what it is for it NOT to obtain; but this presupposes classical negation.
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From:
Michael Dummett (The Logical Basis of Metaphysics [1991], p.299), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 1.1
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A reaction:
[compressed wording] This is Dummett explaining why he prefers intuitionistic logic, with its doubts about double negation.
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7634
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Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
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Full Idea:
For Peirce there are three different kinds of sign, which are different kinds of representation, built on different relationships: an 'icon' represents what it resembles, an 'index' is a natural sign, and a 'symbol' is a conventional sign.
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From:
report of Charles Sanders Peirce (Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs [1897]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.4
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A reaction:
Maund makes use of natural signs (like footprints) to explain representative perception. Peirce's distinctions seem useful in philosophy of mind generally, if the brain somehow represents what it experiences. How subjective are signs?
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14020
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'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM]
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Full Idea:
I use the term Eternalism for the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities. (It is sometimes used for the view that all propositions have their truth-value eternally - it is always true or never true).
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From:
Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], Intro n.1)
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A reaction:
'Eternalism' strikes me as an excellent word for the former meaning, so I shall promote that, and quietly forget the second one. The idea that the future exists has always stuck in my craw, and the belief that Napoleon still exists strikes me as a weird.
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14022
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The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM]
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Full Idea:
Three theories exhaust the options on time: presentism, dynamic eternalism (eternalism with the tensed dynamic A-series view of time, and the totality of events changing over time), and static eternalism (eternalism with the B-series).
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From:
Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], 2.4)
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A reaction:
I think the idea that reality is Static Eternalism is just a misunderstanding, arising from our imaginative ability to take a lofty objective overview of a very fluid reality. The other two are the serious candidates. Present, or Growing-block.
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