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19463
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Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
In all inductive reasoning we make the assumption that there is a measure of uniformity in nature; or, roughly speaking, that the future will, in the appropriate respects, resemble the past.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
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A reaction:
I would say that nature is 'stable'. Nature changes, so a global assumption of total uniformity is daft. Do we need some global uniformity assumptions, if the induction involved is local? I would say yes. Are all inductions conditional on this?
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19459
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To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
To say 'I am not thinking' is self-stultifying since if it is said intelligently it must be false: but it is not self-contradictory. The proof that it is not self-contradictory is that it might have been false.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii)
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A reaction:
If it doesn't imply a contradiction, then it is not a necessary truth, which is what it is normally taken to be. Is 'This is a sentence' necessarily true? It might not have been one, if the rules of English syntax changed recently.
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19460
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'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
If there is no experience at all of finding out that one is not conscious, or that one does not exist, ..it is tempting to say that sentences like 'I exist', 'I am conscious', 'I know that I exist' do not express genuine propositions.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii)
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A reaction:
This is, of course, an application of the somewhat discredited verification principle, but the fact that strictly speaking the principle has been sort of refuted does not mean that we should not take it seriously, and be influenced by it.
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19462
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Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
Inductive reasoning covers all cases in which we pass from a particular statement of fact, or set of them, to a factual conclusion which they do not formally entail. The inference may be to a general law, or by analogy to another particular instance.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
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A reaction:
My preferred definition is 'learning from experience' - which I take to be the most rational behaviour you could possibly imagine. I don't think a definition should be couched in terms of 'objects' or 'particulars'.
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24071
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Markets are transparent, with known prices and activity, and minimal profits [Davies,W]
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Full Idea:
Markets are characterised by transparency. Prices are public, and all relevant activity is visible to everyone. And because of competition, profits are minimal, little more than a 'wage' for the seller.
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From:
William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
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A reaction:
This account, from Braudel, is to distinguish markets from capitalism.
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24073
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Capitalists use their exceptional power to impose their own rules, and make the state their ally [Davies,W]
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Full Idea:
Capitalists exploit their unrivalled control over time and space in order to impose their rules on everyone else. …It triumphed late, only becoming dominant in the 19th century, when it had conscripted the state as its ally.
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From:
William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
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A reaction:
This so very much makes sense of the modern world. Nowadays capitalists are so wealthy that the state has largely become their pawn, rather than their ally. Populist leaders are their puppets (and are well rewarded).
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24070
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Economies have material, economic and capitalist layers [Davies,W]
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Full Idea:
Braudel's economic history has three layers. At the bottom is material life of consumption, production, reproduction. Next is economic life of markets, of equals in exchange and competition. Top is capitalism, of opacity, monopoly, power, high profits.
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From:
William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
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A reaction:
The point Davies emphasises here is the sharp distinction between the market economy and capitalism.
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24074
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Capitalism must mainly rely either on the labour market, or on the financial markets [Davies,W]
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Full Idea:
According to Marxists, the one market capitalism cannot do without is the labour market, which creates saleable things. Others, influenced by Keynes, emphasise financial markets, where pieces of paper change hands on expectation of their value.
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From:
William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
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A reaction:
Modern Britain fits the Keynesian account much better, given its low production, and very active (until recently) London financial market.
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24072
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Capitalism is the anti-market, with opacity, monopolies, powers, exceptional profits and wealth [Davies,W]
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Full Idea:
Braudel sees capitalism as the 'anti-market': a world of opacity, monopoly, concentration of power and wealth, and the exceptional profits that can be achieved only by escaping the norms of 'economic life'.
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From:
William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
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A reaction:
Given all the talk about the wonders of the 'free market' from right-wingers, this passage came as a revelation to me. Capitalists all dream of a monopoly, which is precisely the destruction of a market.
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