Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Psychophysical Nexus', 'Actualism and Possible Worlds' and 'There is No A Priori (and reply)'

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10 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being

14664	Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
	Full Idea: A 'necessary being' is one that exists in every possible world; and only some objects - numbers, properties, pure sets, propositions, states of affairs, God - have this distinction.
	From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 2)
	A reaction: This a very odd list, though it is fairly orthodox among philosophers trained in modern modal logic. At the very least it looks rather parochial to me.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience

4242	Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel]
	Full Idea: Pure, unexplained supervenience is never a solution to a problem but a sign that there is something fundamental we don't know.
	From: Thomas Nagel (The Psychophysical Nexus [2000], §III)
	A reaction: This seems right. It is not a theory or an explanation, merely the observation of a correlation which will require explanation. Why are they correlated?

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects

14666	Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
	Full Idea: Socrates is a contingent being; his essence, however, is not. Properties, like propositions and possible worlds, are necessary beings. If Socrates had not existed, his essence would have been unexemplified, but not non-existent.
	From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 4)
	A reaction: This is a distinctive Plantinga view, of which I can make little sense. I take it that Socrates used to have an essence. Being dead, the essence no longer exists, but when we talk about Socrates it is largely this essence to which we refer. OK?

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

14662	Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
	Full Idea: The idea of possible worlds has delivered insights on logical possibility (de dicto and de re), propositions, properties and sets, counterfactuals, time and temporal relations, causal determinism, the ontological argument, and the problem of evil.
	From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], Intro)
	A reaction: This date (1976) seems to be the high-water mark for enthusiasm about possible worlds. I suppose if we just stick to 'insights' rather than 'answers' then the big claim might still be acceptable. Which problems are created by possible worlds?

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism

16472	Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
	Full Idea: Plantinga's critics worry that the metaphysics is actualist in name only, since it is achieved only by populating the actual world with entities whose nature is explained in terms of merely possible things that would exemplify them if anything did.
	From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
	A reaction: Plantinga seems a long way from the usual motivation for actualism, which is probably sceptical empiricism, and building a system on what is smack in front of you. Possibilities have to be true, though. That's why you need dispositions in actuality.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

19565	How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
	Full Idea: What non-experiential link to reality could support insights into its necessary character?
	From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 4)
	A reaction: The key to it, I think, is your theory of mind. If you are a substance dualist, then connecting to such deep things looks fine, but if you are a reductive physicalist then it looks absurdly hopeful.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori

19564	Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
	Full Idea: It is overwhelmingly plausible that some knowledge is empirical. The attractive thesis of naturalism is that all knowledge is; there is only one way of knowing.
	From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 1)
	A reaction: How many ways for us to know seems to depend on what faculties we have. We lump our senses together under a single heading. The arrival of data is not the same as the arrival of knowledge. I'm unconvinced that naturalists like me must accept this.

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics

16469	Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: The domains in Plantinga's interpretation of Kripke's semantics are sets of essences, and the values of variables are essences. The values of predicates have to be functions from possible worlds to essences.
	From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
	A reaction: I begin to think this is quite nice, as long as one doesn't take the commitment to the essences too seriously. For 'essence' read 'minimal identity'? But I take essences to be more than minimal, so use identities (which Kripke does?).

16470	Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
	Full Idea: For Plantinga, essences are entities in their own right and will have properties different from what instantiates them. Hence he will need individual essences of individual essences, distinct from the essences. I see no way to avoid a hierarchy of them.
	From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
	A reaction: This sounds devastating for Plantinga, but it is a challenge for traditional Aristotelians. Only a logician suffers from a hierarchy, but a scientist might have to live with an essence, which contains a super-essence.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

14663	Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
	Full Idea: Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs.
	From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1)
	A reaction: Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me.